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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of this work to compare the effects of the Cold War on the politics
and political economy of Angola and Ethiopia between 1975 and 1991. This discussion
will view the many phases of the Cold War from 1945 to 1990 as an inter-core rivalry
between the competing blocs of the two superpowers emergent after World War II.
African states fought their colonizers, obtained their independence, embarked upon new
state experiments, staffed new governments and struggled to develop all within the
international context of the Cold War. Clearly, throughout this time, as in centuries past,
African governments, economies and African peoples have been strongly influenced by
outside forces. The onset of the 1 990s and the end of the Cold War did not bring about
the “end of history,” but it did reveal the strains of the recent past.
In 1964, Ché Guevara asserted that “it must be clearly understood that the only way to
solve the questions now besetting mankind is to eliminate completely the exploitation of
independent countries by developed capitalist countries, with all the consequences that
this implies.”2 Insert communist countries into this equation and this system of
‘Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, (Summer, 1989)
http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htrn (accessed September 1, 2009).
2 As quoted in Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.: Howard
University Press, 1974), 3.
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exploitation is at the core of this work. Much of the influential research done on
developing states seems to overlook the effects of the Cold War. Indeed, many studies
appear to estimate the effects of outside influences as almost inconsequential, as if
African problems were birthed without the husbandry of imperialism.
In his influential 1968 work, Political Order in Changing Societies,3 Samuel
Huntington probes the conditions under which societies undergoing rapid and disruptive
social and economic change may in some measure realize the goal of political order. For
Huntington, modernity causes people to form groups which become defined by their
ability to access resources, this phenomenon, Huntington terms as “tribalism.”
Tribalism - increases group conflict and societal conflict over resources hampers
development. “Ethnic or religious groups which had lived peacefully side by side in a
traditional society become aroused to violent conflict as a result of the interaction, the
tensions, [and] the inequalities generated by social and economic modernization.
Modernization thus increases conflict among traditional groups, between traditional
groups and modern ones and among modern groups.”4 From this perspective, conflict is
seen as a socio-economic phenomenon among indigenous groups naturally growing out
of the move from traditionalism to modernization. There is no mention of the influence
of Cold War forces on the antagonisms between these groups. Given that Huntington’s
text was published in 1968, at a highpoint in the Cold War, such an omission is highly
significant. Could it be proven that interstate groups were influenced, perhaps even




directed, by Cold War rivalries and that such direction contributed to the development
hampering group conflict?
In Social Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy,5 Barrington Moore focuses on three
routes stemming from pre-industrialization to the modern world. For Moore,
revolutionary development focuses on the influence of domestic economic factors.
Moore acknowledges that “smaller countries depend economically and politically on big
and powerful ones and that means the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their
own boundaries,”6 but there is no specific mention of the rivalries of the Cold War and
their influences on economic, and hence, social transformations. Instead, Moore focuses
on the “role of the landed upper class and the peasants in the bourgeois revolutions
leading up to capitalist democracy, the abortive bourgeois revolution leading to fascism
and the peasant revolution leading to Communism.”7 One has to look elsewhere for the
imperialist effects of globalized capitalism on developing states.
In comparing the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, Theda Skocpol
acknowledges that the key problem hampering the emergence of a revolutionary situation
and the resulting political and social development is that “peripheral areas of the globe
were incorporated into world economic networks centered on the more industrially
advanced countries. . .their pre-existing economic structures and class relationships were
often reinforced or modified in ways inimical to subsequent, self-sustaining, and




diversified growth.”8 The literature on World Systems Theory is clear on this point.
There is a need to expand such analyses into the Cold War.
African states have been incorporated into the global economic system as peripheral
suppliers of labor and other raw materials to the large scale economies of core states.
From 1945 to approximately 1975, colonization reached its political and economic end;
the global economy shifted, which increased the costs associated with colonial
administration, and the decolonization process altered African politics and development.
The administrative bureaucracy of many African states was dedicated to efficiently
routing labor to each of the three zones to facilitate production.
For Immanuel Wallerstein, the first zone produced for the world market, the second
zone produced food crops for workers in the first zone and the third zone produced
manpower to export to the first zone. The land of the first zone was controlled by white
settler farmers, by companies (concessions), by African peasant farmers. The land of the
second zone was controlled largely by Africans. The third zone was controlled by the
indigenous population, largely in the form of communal ownership.9
The function of African governments during this time period was to maintain the
profitability of the African state as a supplier to the global system and the core states at
the center of that system. Workers in the third zone were prevented from becoming
owners so that the workers would remain exploitable for their wage-based labor. African
8 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions A Comparative Analysis ofFrance, Russia and China
(Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 85.
Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World Economy,” in The
Political Economy ofContemporary Africa, ed. Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallersein (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1976), 47.
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governments would coerce labor to move from the first zone to the third; therefore, the
domestic policies, and ultimately, the development of African states, were subservient to
overriding, global, economic necessities. All this occurred against the backdrop of the
rivalry between the two blocs of both superpowers.
Much of the literature is muted when detailing the nexus between globalized
capitalism and the causative effects of the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) as they engaged in an imperialist rivalry on abject African
states. In writing about the need for good governance in African politics, Goran Hyden
lists four shortcomings that reflect the trend of post-independence politics. (1) The
personalized nature of rule; (2) the frequent violations of human rights; (3) the lack of
delegation by central authorities; and (4) the tendency for individuals to withdraw from
politics.’0 Neglected here is the possibility that “bad” politics in African states also partly
results from governmental actors being influenced by international stressors placed onto
their domestic decision-making abilities.
The scholarship that details how the Cold War was fought on African battlegrounds
exhibits an observable inattention regarding the developmental ramifications of such
conflicts. For instance, Chazan and Mortimer et al. examine the political contact that
African governments have had with global actors and they observe that:
The legacy of imperialism nevertheless remains a strong influence upon Africa’s
place in contemporary world politics. . . since World War II, the two global
superpowers have gradually increased their involvement in Africa. . . Soviet-U.S.
10 Goran Hyden and Ronald Cohen, eds. Human Rights and Governance in Africa (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 1993), 87.
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competition has been the most significant change in the external environment
facing African states.11
The discussion then elaborates on how various outside participants have influenced the
political decision-making of various African states, but the concrete details about the
economic, political and social development of the states as a result of such increased
contact are not present within this research.
In his essay, “The United States and Africa,” Jeffrey Herbst investigates the increased
political marginality of African states after the end of the Cold War. The author is able to
detail the decreased strategic role and relate U.S. led involvement in economic
liberalization for African states. Herbst demonstrates this in the context of Cold War era
investments and argues that “the United States never provided enough resources to make
a significant difference to Africa’s economic prospects. Correspondingly, there was little
U.S. involvement in Africa before the Cold War ended.”12 This sentiment begs for
further investigation.
RESEARCH QUESTION
What are the effects of the Cold War on the political, social and economic
development of Angola and Ethiopia between 1975 and 1991?
‘Naomi Chazan, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild, Politics and Society in
Contemporary Africa (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 377 — 378.
12 Jeffrey Herbst, “The United States and Africa,” in Africa in World Politics. The African State System
in Flux, eds. John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991), 168. While
there was pullback in 1991, there was also a reordering of American goals in Africa that soon followed.
The current War on Terror has served to further highlight the strategic importance of African states
exemplified by the current American military bases in Dj ibouti in the Horn of Africa and the American
Naval vessels stationed off the coast of Guinea.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The aim of this study is to use World Systems Theory to understand conflict in Angola
and Ethiopia in the context of the Cold War. Africa’s decolonization and independence
movements began at the high point of this international conflict and were pointedly
affected by it. African independence leaders, to varying degrees, were able to choose the
economic vision that they thought would develop their new polities into the future. Both
the Soviet bloc and that of the West, in their hunger for economic markets, raw materials,
labor, global influence and relative military power courted leaders amenable to their
goals. Thus, Africa was among the territorial battlegrounds that the Cold War was fought
upon and African peoples spilled their blood in the service of this global conflict.
This study will link its comparative analysis of Angola and Ethiopia to a discussion of
exploitative international development, unequal monetary exchange, accumulation and
profit. During the Cold War, both blocs were primarily and fundamentally concerned
with the acquisition of territory, resources, ideological adherents and spheres of
economic, and by necessity, governmental influence. By sheer virtue of the nature of that
conflict, be it conceived as center-periphery or producer-supplier, there is an unequal
exchange where weaker and developing states constantly had to shape their policy
decisions within the context of this global rivalry.
World Systems Theory contends that core states by virtue of their ability to
accumulate capital relative to less developed parts of the world, exploit the peripheral
states. This systemic exploitation may be termed a form of imperialism which may in
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turn be defined as the practice by which powerful nations of people seek to extend and
maintain control or influence over weaker nations or peoples through the exploitation of
markets and resources both natural and human through the ultimate threat of physical or
economic violence. Hobson argued that 20th century imperialism differed from that of its
predecessors in that finance capital predominated over mercantile capital and there were
several empires competing with one another for dominance. In The Accumulation of
Capital, Rosa Luxemburg continued, writing that “the crucial role played by the unequal
exchange between imperialist (capitalist) and colonized (pre-capitalist) countries is the
accumulation of capital.”3
While the acquisition and exploitation of land, markets and labor are crucial to
imperialist development and capitalist accumulation, Harry Magdoff warns, in The Age of
Imperialism, that the identification of imperialism with colonization is an
oversimplification. He writes, “The drive for colonies is not only economic but involves
as well political and military considerations in a world of competing imperial powers.”4
The nature of the inter-imperialist rivalry is a holistically political, military, economic,
social, cultural and ideological struggle for hegemony. The history of the West is based
in the struggle for one state to gain dominance and influence over its competitors.
13 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation ofCapital.
http: www.marxists.org/archive luxemburg/1 913 accumulation-capital index.htm (accessed, September 1,
2009).
~ Harry Magdoff, The Age ofImperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 39.
As the centuries have passed even a cursory look at western history’5 reveals this
struggle. The ability to control others Madgoff characterizes this history as:
“The competitive struggle among the industrial nations for
dominant positions with respect to the world market and raw
material sources. . . The struggle for power by the industrial nations
for colonial and informal control over economically backward
regions is but one phase of this economic war and only one
attribute of the new imperialism. The nations of the world
capitalist system have varying degrees of strength and
independence and the jockeying for power and control extends
throughout the system.”16
Another understanding, implicit in the problem of this work, is the ramifications of
this global conflict on the self-determination and development of African polities. A key
characteristic of an inter-imperialist rivalry is that as these large, industrial centers have
moved to consolidate power and security throughout the centuries, their histories have
shown that conflicts and ultimately war, based on differing interests, has arisen. Thus, a
discussion of inter-imperialist rivalry is, by definition, a discussion of international
relations as mature, economically developed states compete for spheres of influence.
International relations theory is concerned with geopolitical rivalries as states seek to
secure their interests by accumulating power and it seeks to predict state behavior in an
anarchic international system. In this sense, international history is a combination of both
political history and theory.
15 Please see Joseph Nye, Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History
(New York: Longman, 2000), 57.
16 Magdoff, The Age ofImperialism, 15.
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Hans Morgenthau cautions us that the use of international theory “is specious since it
substitutes what is desirable for what is possible. The new theories are in truth utopias,
differing from the utopias of old only in that they replace the simple and obvious
deductions from ethical postulates with a highly complex and sophisticated methodical
and terminological apparatus, thus creating the illusion of empirical demonstration.”7
This work will keep Morgenthau’s concern in mind even as Morgenthau ultimately
allows that a theory of international relations is useful, for when strictly applied it can
“reduce international relations to a set of abstract propositions with a predictive
function.”8
OBJECT OF STUDY
This study engages world system theory to examine the history of the Cold War to
investigate the ideological, eco-political, military and strategic nature of the conflict. The
study will then investigate the socio-political, military and eco-developmental experience
of Angola and Ethiopia to note how the Cold War affected this experience. The
influences of both blocs will be compared by examining Angola where the official state
structures were supported by the East and its oppositional forces were supported by the
West. By way of contrast, Ethiopia will be examined where the official state structures
were supported by the West until Haile Selassie’s overthrow in September, 1974.
Significantly, during 1974 until the Carter administration drastically reduced, and finally
withdrew, U.S. aid to Ethiopia in 1977, the country saw a tenfold increase in Soviet and
~ Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 243.
18 Ibid., 251.
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Cuban military aid. There is a key difference here; Eastern and Western support for the
respective sides in the Angolan conflict remained fairly constant, differing only in degree
and visibility. However, in Ethiopia, the lines of support are not as respectively even.
The U.S. made a longtime ally of Haile Selassie, yet, when he was overthrown, rather
than denouncing the coup “the Nixon administration preferred to keep the lines of
communication open with the new leaders in Addis Ababa. . .to prevent them from
running off to Moscow.”9 U.S./Ethiopian relations deteriorated steadily and when
Mengistu Haile Mariam consolidated his rule via a bloody shoot-out in February 1977, as
a result of which, he was immediately supported by the Cubans and the Soviets. There
then arose a dile a: for the Soviets had been giving aid to Somalia in its claims over
the Ogaden region. Eventually, the Soviets alienated Siad Barre and began withholding
weaponry from Mogadishu. Sensing an opening and desiring another partner in the horn
of Africa, the Carter administration made overtures to Mogadishu but did not allow any
formal assistance due to Somalia’s presence and activities in the Ogaden. The United
States government did, however, attempt to counter the growing Soviet-Cuban presence
by using its influence in Britain, France as well as in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran (under
the Shah). China also moved to support Mogadishu sensing moves by the Soviets to
increase its hegemony in the region. Therefore, it is observable that in the Ethiopian
example the East-West lines of conflict shifted drastically.
There are other reasons to compare Angola’s and Ethiopia’s experiences and
development during the Cold War. Angola’s civil war encompassed many fronts
19 Fred Marte. Political Cycles in International Relations: The Cold War and Africa (Amsterdam,
Netherlands: VU University Press, 1994), 235.
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throughout the country from 1975 until 1991 •20 Similarly, Ethiopia fought a civil war on
multiple fronts from 1977 until 1991. Mengistu in Ethiopia and dos Santos in Angola
were supported by the East in their respective civil wars. When it became clear that the
Soviet economic collapse meant that Moscow would pull its military aid to both regimes,
Mengistu was unable to withstand the pressures of his challengers and was replaced by
Meles Zenawi in 1991. In Angola, the Soviet withdrawal of support for the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) emboldened the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (IJNITA) which continued to enjoy South African and
covert U.S. aid, to contest the September 29130th elections. In October 1992, Savimbi’s
forces seized provisional capitals and the fighting was renewed.
Further, both Angola and Ethiopia had to stave off invasions from their neighbors,
South Africa and Somalia respectively. Both states did so with overt Cuban military
assistance. In both cases, the U.S. covertly used the CIA to funnel funds and credits to
the opposition groups and in both states, Soviet financial assistance propped up the
regime. Both Angola and Ethiopia were of geo-strategic importance. The Soviet wanted
to maintain naval access to the South Atlantic Ocean via Angola and to the shipping lanes
in the Red Sea through Ethiopia.
Similarly, the United States wanted to establish a friendly regime in Angola so that it
would be able to secure continued access to its strategic mineral resources; and in the
Horn, the U.S. was interested in keeping pressure on the Dergue because of its proximity
to the Middle East. Lastly, and most damning, social conditions in both Angola and
Ethiopia show popular suffering based on extreme poverty. Ethiopia has suffered from
20 The conflict resumed in 1992 and continued until the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002.
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droughts that have been described as “biblical-in-nature” which point out the
infrastructural failures and the Angolan state has not been able to relieve the alarming
poverty besetting its citizens.
Therefore, a comparison of the development of Angola and Ethiopia will present a
broader picture of the effects that the Cold War had on the states in question, their
specific regions, and Africa as a whole.
METHODOLOGY
This work will employ the techniques of the Comparative Historical Political
Economy approach This method will allow for a descriptive analysis of historic
conditions in both countries that simultaneously evaluates practices and trends, causes
and effects. The data relative to the economic, social and political development will be
analyzed and interpreted for both states. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens say that
comparative historical work gives insights into sequences and their relations to
surrounding structural conditions. The “political economy perspective focuses on actors
whose power is grounded in control of economic and organizational resources and/or of
coercive force who vie with each other for scarce resources in the pursuit of conflicting
goals.”2’ As such, this work will employ the Political Economy Approach to indicate the
periodic fluctuations of both African polities as whole systems. In the most fundamental
sense, the Political Economy Approach allows that to understand the nexus between
economic influences and political decision-making is to accept that the operation of one
21 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development &
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago,1992), 22.
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cannot be adequately comprehended without a reference to the manner in which the
whole system operates. “The very idea of a system suggests that we can separate
political life from the rest of social activity, at least for analytical purposes, and examine
it as though for a moment it was a self contained entity surrounded by, but clearly
distinguishable from, the environment or setting in which it operates.”22 Political systems
are the appropriate focal point for this work because “a political system is a system of
action. This means that the student of political systems is concerned with empirically
observable behavior.”23
When employing the Political Economy Approach to study and compare political
systems, the dichotomy between politics as it relates to the governmental superstructure
and economies concentrated on issues of infrastructure and modes of production becomes
apparent. “The base or economic structure of society serves as the real foundation on
which people enter into essential relations over which they exercise little control, whereas
the legal and political superstructure is a reflection of that base and changes in the
economic foundation bring about transformations in the superstructure.”24
In that this work seeks to identify a causal relationship between the global rivalry of
the two Cold War superpowers and the development of African states, the political
economy approach is most appropriate. For Marx, the relationship between politics and
economics is clear: “The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the
22 Gabriel Almond, G. Bingham Powell, Kaare Strom and Russell J. Dalton, Comparative Politics
Today: A World View, 7th ed. (NewYork: Longman, 2000), 13.
23 Ibid., 14.
24 Ronald Chilcote, Comparative Inquiry in Politics and Political Economy: Theories and Issues
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 44.
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economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rise the legal and political
superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.”25
The above shows how this work will focus on the political economy of two African
states in a systematic sense; the next step is to acknowledge that all political systems
exist, and are influenced by, environments both domestic and international. For this
work, the pressures of the Cold War form the international environment that placed
certain demands, or to use Almond and Powell’s conception, inputs on the African
systems in question. “Inputs may be initiated by elements within the domestic society, by
political elites or by the international environment.”26 Hence, the inputs and demands of
the international environment in the midst of the Cold War will be investigated to note
their impact.
Lastly, this work will involve historical case studies to compare the systems in
question. “The most obvious merit of this approach is to give the reader a lively sense of
the political process in each country.”27 Case studies produce a wealth of political and
economic material which can be used to comprehend the influences and inputs on
political systems. When both case studies are compared, those system’s socio-economic
experiences and the development of both parties will provide a rich picture of the impact
of outside influences.
25 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique ofPolitical Economy 1859/1904,
hup://www. marxists. org/archive/ma,:~/works/1859/critique-pol-econoin yi~pref~tce. him (accessed, September
1, 2009).
26 Mehan Kamrava, Understanding Comparative Politics: A Frameworkfor Analysis (New York:
Rutledge, 1995), 16.
27 Bernard Brown, Cases in Comparative Politics,ed. James B. Christoph and Bernard E. Brown
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 10.
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Rather than understanding absorbing the importance of one set of facts in isolation
from others, the comparative approach adds to the general body of knowledge by
“interpreting political data in terms of hypotheses and theories. Comparison is significant
only if it is explanatory in nature.”28 Comparative politics does not attempt to provide
definitive explanations or produce laws of political behavior. Rather “the purpose of
comparative analysis is to understand the political process. . . it is a more effective and
satisfactory way of gaining an understanding of politics than is the customary description
of individual political systems one by one.”29
SIGINIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This study is being undertaken to examine the Cold War as the external source for the
political, social and economic development problems of Angola and Ethiopia. The
significant contribution that this study will make is to pointedly and empirically relate the
social, economic and political condition of the peoples of Angola and Ethiopia as a
microcosm of the development of African states, respective to their experiences as
proxies to the larger international conflict of the Cold War. Bridgett Schultz reveals that
“resting mainly on a Marxist interpretation of the role of the state in a capitalist society
and the needs generated by the underlying economic system, this scholarship insists that
there exists a marriage between the needs of capital and government policies, and that




governments are therefore seen largely as reflections of economic self-interest since, in
the final analysis they are the result of an increased globalization of production and
internationalization of capital.”3°
The scholarship that details the African theater of the Cold War does not detail its
ramifications on the development of African states down to the micro popular level. In
particular, Zaki Laidi’s The Superpowers In Africa and Fred Marte’s Political Cycles In
International Relations are descriptive in the details of the North-South relationship
during the Cold War, but both are largely silent on noting the popular effects of
externally aggravated decades of civil conflict.
On the other hand there are works that detail the humanitarian aspects of African civil
war, most notably how landmines in Angola have crippled generations but these studies
do not link the humanitarian crisis/chaos to the larger anarchy of international relations
during the Cold War. This work will merge both to investigate and compare the affects
of the Cold War on the development and conditions of both Angola and Ethiopian
societies.
The quality of life, the development prospects, the abject poverty of the average
citizens in both states requires study. The governmental actors, the state institutions and
their unwillingness and/or inability to provide for the material needs of their citizens
suffered under the strains of international pressures. The hot conflicts of the Cold War
were fought on their soil, spilling the blood of their peoples. In some respect, it could be
argued that many African governments were manipulated by the superpowers.
30 Bridgette Schultz, Development Policy in the Cold War Era (Munster: Lit, 1995), 30.
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Africa’s leaders clearly understood the conundrum in which they were trapped and the
history of the non-aligned movement is evidence of this fact. The Zimbabwean
nationalist Ndabaningi Sithole once stated:
“Between capitalism’s fundamental principle of exploitation of
man by man and Communism’s inevitable conflict between man
and man there should and must be a third alternative, and with
patience, calculated economic planning and foresight Africans can
evolve a system which, while meeting her own basic needs, would
also diminish the tension between capitalism and Communism.”3’
Problems and ills, be they medical or of an economic/political nature, must be related
to the root cause before they can be solved and alleviated. The key questions then
become: Are African peoples incapable of governing themselves? Are greed and graft the
main reasons that African governments cannot improve the quality of life for their
citizens? Or could it be possible that the global system, itself in a state of bi-polar conflict
for 45 years, infected newly emergent African polities with the chaos inherent in
international anarchy?
HYPOTHESIS
The World System approach can be used to structurally explain how the Cold War
produced factors that exacerbated ethnic conflict in both Angola and Ethiopia resulting in
civil wars that have produced lasting negative effects on the development of both states.
Sub-hypothesis
Military conflict in the Angolan and Ethiopian peripheries are a byproduct of intra core
conflict which resulted in the exacerbation of ethnic conflict to the mal- development of
good governance in both Angola and Ethiopia.
~‘ Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 183.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The World System approach will be used to define the bi-polar antagonisms of the
Cold War into a structural series of competitions.
• First, the work will investigate competition amongst core states. Within both sets
of alliances that determined the North-North aspects of the conflict, this work will
look at the variances of economic aspiration, political thought and policy
directions. Within the Eastern bloc, the development of Soviet policy towards
Africa will be examined and the differences and competition between the Soviet,
the Chinese and the Cubans will be explored. Similarly, within the Western bloc,
the policy differences and colonial legacies between the U.S., England, France
and Portugal will be examined to detail the intricacies of Western motives in
Africa during the Cold War.
• Secondly, this work will investigate competition between the core and its
periphery. After having established the details of competition within both blocs,
each set of alliances will be taken together and their policies in both states will be
investigated. More specifically, the relationship (again all within the context of
the Cold War factors) between the Eastern bloc separately towards Angola and
Ethiopia will be detailed and compared. Likewise the relationship between the
Western bloc again separately towards both Angola and Ethiopia will be detailed
and compared.
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• Thirdly, this work will investigate the competition between peripherized states.
Namely, this work will examine and compare events, conflict and ultimately the
development (or lack thereof) of both Angola and Ethiopia and note their affects
on the economics and politics of south central Africa in the Angolan case and the
Horn of Africa in the Ethiopian case.
• Lastly, this work will investigate the competitions within both peripheral states.
Internal group conflict within both Angola and Ethiopia will be examined with an
eye toward noting the internal and external causes of each set of conflicts.
The world system structure above detailed will serve as the context in which the
various Cold War factors have impacted the development of both the Angolan and
Ethiopian states. In this manner, the various Cold War factors become the
independent variables and the developmental effects become the dependent variables
that are to be measured and compared for both states.
The independent variables that are composed of the various Cold War factors are
1. Political factors
a. The groups involved in the political and military conflicts in both
Angola and Ethiopia.
b. The relationship of these actors to policy makers in both the Eastern
and Western blocs and the rationale for their cooperation or conflict.




a. Military opportunities for core states in both blocs to secure naval
bases, training grounds and airports in both Angola and Ethiopia as
well as the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans
b. The relationship and resulting dependencies of the competing groups
within both Angola and Ethiopia on Western and Eastern military
funding, training and arms.
The above independent Cold War factors result in the following measurable dependent
variables.
1. Dependent military/geo-strategic variables
a. Levels of military aid32 per bloc to both Angola and Ethiopia
b. Levels of military aid to extra-state groups
c. Intra-African relations measured along the T-axis of x = War/Peace and
y Antagonistic/Cooperative
32 Weaponry expenditures, troop levels, financial assistance, etc.
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CONCEPTS
The term Cold War has entered into the popular lexicon, yet its precise definition has
proven elusive. In The Cold War, Evan Luard says “it could perhaps be defined as a state
of intensive competition, political, economic and ideological which yet falls below the
threshold of armed conflict between states.”33 Fred Marte in Political Cycles in
International Relations, correctly criticizes Luard’s definition by noting that intense
competition does not imply a Cold War. Marte further notes that Luard has omitted the
military and atomic/nuclear shape of the Cold War.
Marte then offers his definition, “a pattern of hostile interactions expressed in a global
rivalry — which is in nature ideological, political, economic, technological and military
between two power blocs that stops short of a hot war due to the reciprocally deterring
effects produced by the devastating destructive armaments both sides possessed.” ~
Marte’s definition is itself open to criticism, for while descriptive, he omits the proxy
element of the conflict. To be sure, the Cold War did not become hot partly because of
the mutually assured destruction element of the arms race. The balance of terror and
deterrence concepts are evidence of this. This made the superpowers use proxies in
developing areas of the globe to wage the territorial face of the conflict, further polarizing
the globe and thus reinforcing the raison d’être of the conflict. The proxy element is
fundamental to this work.
The working definition used here is that the Cold War is the decades long bipolarizing
global hostility between the East and the West along ideological, political, economic,
~ Marte, Political Cycles in International Relations, 2.
~ ibid, 2.
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military and territorial lines that because of the mutually assured destruction of outright
military contact between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in proxies being
used to campaign and gauge gains and losses.
In the most fundamental sense, this work advances that social, economic and political
development in Africa must be placed within the context ofNorth-South eco-political
relations, within a world system characterized by center-periphery interactions. The
northern industrial states enjoyed the prosperity and riches they derived through unequal
and exploitative economic relationships with poor developing southern states. Within
this North —South relationship there is a distinction between Western and Soviet bloc
policies.
Both blocs fall within Lenin’s ‘north’ category yet the West argued that free market
development of African economies coupled with diffusion of capital and contact with
advanced capitalist states would foster development in the south (Africa). The
modernization school as articulated by Walt Rostow argued that development was a
“linear process leading, after an initial take-off phase, to the self-sustaining workings of a
mature industrial society. Thus Europe continued a stronghold on its former colonies by
insisting on the relevance of its model for the rest of the world; it continued to be the
center guiding the way for the underdeveloped periphery.”35
On the other hand, the Soviet bloc argued that “reform within the confines of the
present international division of labor is impossible and called for a massive restructuring
~ Bridgette Schultz, Development Policy in the Cold War Era, 46.
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of both national economies and the global economy in which they were embedded.”36
This restructuring for both the Soviets and the West would be geared towards steering
African economies towards a model that cemented Africa’s position as a supplier for the
producer nations.
Keeping the above in mind, a discussion of the Cold War is a discussion of
international relations amongst core states (the Eastern and Western blocs), between that
core and the periphery (both blocs with Angola and Ethiopia) and between the periphery
itself (southern African states and the states of the horn of Africa). International relations
theories have historically focused on states and their relations in an anarchic global
system. The discipline of international relations is a “scientific attempt to explain and
if possible predict the behavior of states in their complex relationships with one
another.”37 Yet if this work was merely to focus on the state as primary actor, the
complexities of the proxy element of the Cold War could not adequately be explained.
Along with states, armed nationalist/separatist movements/forces must be included
into the explanatory mix. These armed forces are either formed in opposition to, in
support of, or in tandem with the state regime. As such these movements/forces are
important players on the national stage and have accordingly had extensive contact with
either the Eastern or Western blocs. The authority of the state was challenged and
constrained as these armed movements gained control over large sections of land and
people and gained international exposure with varied levels of support from international
36 ibid, 32.
~ Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, International Relations. The Changing Contours ofPower
(New York: Longman, 2000), 7.
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organizations. The proximity of the armed forces to the larger power blocs competing
during the Cold War gave it credibility. It is in this way that non-state actors were able to
challenge the legitimacy and authority of the state. Their importance mandates that this
work must include these non-state groups into the working theories of international
relations.
SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE STUDY
This work will investigate the development of Angola and Ethiopia within the context
of north-south relations and will acknowledge the Cold War as east-west competition
within the North that had ramifications for the south. To carry out this study this work
looks at the beginnings of the Cold War by reviewing the literature that seeks to
understand the motivations and goals of the participants. The work uses world system
theory as the framework so chapter two views the genesis of the Cold War as the
beginnings of the contest between two core states, each in competition with the other for
strategic access and influence in the African periphery. Chapter Three looks at Africa’s
independence period noting that this occurred during a time of heightened conflict
between the core states. Independence served to highlight social cleavages as groups
vied to control the government for the attendant power to allocate scares goods, services
and resources. Groups in Angola and Ethiopia for various reasons sought outside
assistance which they received as the core states sought to compete in their lands.
In line with our world system framework, Chapter Three looks at how African states
became the peripherized proxies to the larger global conflict. Chapter Four focuses
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specifically on conflict in both Angola and Ethiopia. The chapter sees both civil wars
from 1974 through 1991 as proxy based conflict in the service of the contest between the
core states in the Cold War. In that both cases ultimately proved more expansive than a
mere fight between warring ethnic groups, the chapter notes how each conflict engaged
their particular regions of the continent. The motivations of the semi-peripheral actors
will be explored here as examples of how both the Eastern and Western blocs
experienced intra-core conflict. This work concludes with a specific itemized
comparison between both the Angolan and the Ethiopian cases and offers some
comments for the future of globalization in a uni-polar world.
There are indeed some limits to be considered. This work is testing the applicability
of an economic construct to explain power politics and globalized group conflict. As such
it does not spend much time pressing either a liberal or Marxist interpretation of the
motivations of the groups. The effort here is to apply the core, semi-periphery, periphery
framework to aid in the understanding of two theaters of the Cold War. Specific
demographic indicators of domestic development are omitted. Transnational activity in
Angola and Ethiopia as a function of facilitating the flow of profits to the core is
mentioned but the focus here is more on the flow of global authority and international
power less financial profits.
Truly, the goal here is to compare so that the common themes, differences and
similarities may be illustrated. If this work merely focused on either the Angolan or the
Ethiopian case, then the fullness of the picture would be reduced to an isolated study
robbed of a larger frame that would facilitate a richer understanding of the processes at
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work. Comparative politics makes it possible “to recognize what is most significant in
the collage of political characteristics that we find in the world’s many countries.”38
Comparing these two cases in the framework of world system theory allows us to better
understand the Cold War itself and its effect on marginalized states.
38 Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger ed. Readings in Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and
Changing Agendas. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), 7.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW:CoreStatesinconflict
The scholarship on the Cold War is as old as the conflict itself. This work has earlier
offered that the Cold War may be defined as the decades long bi-polarizing global
hostility between the East and the West along ideological, political, economic, military
and territorial lines that because of the M.A.D. of outright military contact between the
United States and the Soviet Union resulted in proxies being used to campaign and gauge
gains and losses. Each school of thought on the Cold War focuses much attention on the
causes of the conflict and assigning fault to either the West or the Soviets. A focus on
causation and blame reveals the intricacies of post WW II world order, the settlement and
rebuilding of Europe, the weakness of Britain, France and Germany and the relations
between the former rivals that came to engulf the world.
As Nazi forces began to falter, it became apparent that both the ideologies of
capitalism and Communism would be victorious over the forces of National Socialism.
The defeat of Nazism meant that its notions of collectivism, anti-rationality and
authoritarianism would be placed in repose. The stage is thus set for conflict between the
capitalist notions of individualism, democracy and republicanism and Communism with
its attendant notions of class conflict, exploitation and dictatorship of the proletariat.
Victory in World War II sowed the seeds of further ideological conflict between the
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victors. Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union each felt that the cost for that
victory had been paid for by the lives of its citizens and the infrastructure of its cities.
Soon the alliance between first Roosevelt and then Truman, Churchill and Stalin
began to crumble. The purpose of this alliance was to counter the threat posed by an
expansionist Hitler. When that threat drew to a close, the rationale for the alliance
faltered. In Cold War as History, Louis Halle points out that there was considerable
angst in American and British circles immediately after WW II concerning the weakness
of Western Europe and its inability to stand against Russian military might. “...Russia
was left in possession of half of Europe, while the other half lay prostrate before it. The
Western Allies, having put down the terrifying specter of Hitler, were now confronted
with the no-less-terrifying specter of Stalin.”39 However, there is a necessary and
immediate challenge to this thought. In its hard fight against Hitler’s forces, the Soviet
Union lost 20 million people and over 1700 cities. The Soviet military was weary,
manpower drained and economically fatigued. Was it then immediately inclined to
justify Western fears and expand into Western Europe?
Why did relations between the Soviets and the West devolve into competition and
hostilities so automatically and so quickly? Political Scientists and historians disagree.
There is considerable debate as to which side is to blame for the beginnings and the
perpetuation of the Cold War from 1945 to 1989. Indeed the various approaches may be
divided into three schools of thought: The traditionalists, the revisionists and the post
revisionists.
~ Louis Joseph Halle, Cold War as History (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 2.
30
Traditionalists
Scholars of the traditionalist school were among the first to distinguish between Soviet
and American ideologies and objectives in the post war era. For the traditionalist the
breakdown of the WW II alliance was caused by Stalin’s violation of the Yalta
Conference accords. Additional factors also include Soviet intransigence and aggressive
expansionism all of which resulted in the imposition of Soviet-dominated governments
on an unwilling Eastern Europe. Traditionalists noted the ideological differences as they
point out that Communist theory rejected liberal democracy and instead advocated a
worldwide proletarian revolution. Organizations such as the Comintern were regarded as
actively working for the overthrow of all Western governments and this Soviet
belligerence necessitated a response which made conflict inevitable.
Writing in the 1 940s through the early 1 960s, their work emerges in the context of
tensions and rivalries occurring in real-time. Much of their perspective is dependent on
the official statements of the Americans and Soviets and one could say bound to that
era’s understanding of the history of the West and the Soviet Union. It must be
understood at the outset that the work of these scholars from this time period must be
viewed with this in mind. Was it possible for a historian writing about contemporary
events to wall himself off from the massive propaganda that each side was distributing?
Within the traditionalist framework, there is evidence of competing strains of thought.
Traditionalists as a whole blame the genesis and perpetuation of the Cold War on the
Soviets. Traditionalist liberals are more accepting of the accommodating and negotiating
styles of both Roosevelt and Truman but remaining critical of the Soviet Union.
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Traditionalist conservatives strongly reprimand the Truman administration for not being
aggressive enough in challenging Stalin’s thirst for expansion and conquest. Lastly, the
traditionalist realists focus on power politics and lay blame at the feet of the Soviets
while rejecting the American argument that the Cold War is divisible into a set of
moralistic goals like freedom and democracy.
A core claim of the traditionalist school of thought is that post WW II relations
between the U.S. and the Soviets became marred by ideological competition. A
significant feature of this ideological conflict is that Communism is synonymous with
aggression and presented a threat that the U.S. is forced to defend itself against. It is
quite evident that Lenin accepted Marx’s belief that capitalist economies are beset by an
internal contradiction which would bring forth the revolutionary consciousness of the
oppressed proletariat, but Lenin, Trotsky and others like Mao and later Castro would
grow impatient waiting for the slow turning wheel of history to bring down the
bourgeoisie. Where Marx’s idea was that economic based revolutions would spring up
inevitably and automatically from the historical forces of class conflict, the Communists
believed that those historical forces needed to be assisted by human initiative. This
human initiative necessitated a revolutionary vanguard to guide the masses in their
uprising. For Lenin, imperialism is the threat to revolutionary masses worldwide, and
this in turn, meant that there needs to be revolutionary vanguards situated around the
world to spur and protect the revolution.
For the traditionalist, this meant that Communism is at once ideologically opposed to
western capitalism and simultaneously aggressive and expansionist in scope.
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Traditionalist scholars hold that capitalism is defensive in nature (not essentially and
necessarily expansionist as Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao and others have suggested), and
thus confronted by ideological and eco-political hostility must defend itself.
John Lukacs writes “It would seem, then, that if ideas are more important in history, the
causes of the Cold War struggle are on that deeper level: between the Russian
Communist and the American Anti-Communist ideas.”4° The hostility between these two
conflicting eco-political ideas caused an alliance already growing tenser as WW II began
to close, to devolve into mutual distrust and in the words of Louis Halle an “irreducible
dilemma”4’ of bipolar hostility.
For traditionalists like Herbert Feis, this conflict became most evident in Eastern
Europe. The West had a political vision for Eastern Europe which included democracy
and representative legislatures. Traditionalists hold that this vision was confronted by
aggressive Soviet expansion into that region whereby the Soviets sought to subjugate
those governments into compliance with Soviet control.42 This expansionism leads the
West to believe that Stalin was a Hitler-style aggressor bent on usurpation and conquest.
Truman once said to his daughter “We are faced with exactly the same situation with
which Britain and France were faced in 1938-39 with Hitler.”43
40 John Lukacs, New History of the Cold War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), 322.
41 Halle, Cold War as History, viii.
42 Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War they Waged and the Peace they Sought (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), 571.
“~ Quoted in Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making ofthe Cold War (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1979), 64.
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Gaddis Smith agrees with Feis in the view that the Soviet Union was a warmongering
state bent on unlimited expansion through the whole of Europe. For the traditionalist,
American decision-makers are confronted with an intransigent threat and were thus
robbed of many policy options. The United States must defend itself. Indeed for Smith
the United States shares the blame for the generation of Cold War hostilities because it
was not forceful enough, early enough in checking Soviet Expansionism. The US was
slow in standing up to Stalin and this encouraged Moscow to go further than it might
have otherwise.44
This sentiment is furthered by what may be described as the realists within the
traditionalist school. Louis Halle and John Lukacs agree that Soviet aggression
necessitated a strong response and generally favor the Truman Doctrine’s efforts to foster
security. The traditionalist realists however criticize the moralistic grounds upon which
the Western response stood. Equating containment with a universal standard of
democracy and worldwide freedom was a strategic error.
In this frame, Moscow is not a warmonger bent on destruction for the sake of it but
instead a regime scarred by Hitler that sought to preserve a zone of protection for the sake
of its security. When Washington and London concluded that the proper way to control
Moscow was to advocate freedom for the world, Hans Morgenthau saw a critical error.
“Thus the Truman Doctrine transformed a concrete interest of the U.S. in a
‘~ Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy during the Second World War 1941-1 945 (New York: John
Wiley, 1965), 146 and 177-78.
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geographically defined part of the world into a moral principle of worldwide validity to
be applied regardless of limits of American interest and American power.”45
The ideological conflict, based on diverging economic assumptions was given form
and character in the political realm. Arthur Schlesinger, in his article “Origins of the
Cold War,” writes that this ideological conflict causes different and conflicting
worldviews to arise in both camps which he describes as the universalist view and the
sphere-of-influence view. For Schlesinger, the U.S. advanced a universalist view that
says all nations should acknowledge a shared interest in the affairs of the world that
vested common peace and security in the United Nations. Conversely, Schlesinger says
that the Soviet Union preferred a sphere-of-influence style division of the world whereby
each power would be granted predominance in areas vital to its national security and
interests. Security and peace would come about through the balance of power.
Schlesinger is incorrect in saying that the U.S. was vesting peace and security in the
United Nations and thus not engaged in growing a sphere-of-influence around itself. Just
as the Soviets took control over Eastern Europe so too did the U.S. gain authority over an
even vaster sum of land. Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands were the
colonizers of Western Europe and between them they controlled a significant portion of
the earth’s people. WW II significantly weakened each state and their according ability
to hold their colonies.
Their domestic infrastructure needed rebuilding. This meant both that they needed
Marshall plan aid and that they would have to neglect some of their colonial
~ Hans Morgenthau, In Defense ofNational Interest: A Critical Examination ofAmerican Foreign
Policy (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1951), 116.
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administrations at least for a time. “As these European nations became solidly aligned
with the West, thus with the United States, in the then emerging Cold War rivalry, it
actually meant that all these territories. . .had automatically become firmly lodged in the
Western Orbit”46 of the United States. Both Washington and Moscow must be
understood to prefer a sphere-of-influence style of global division. The role of the United
Nations is less the holder of power than it is an umpire for team competition in a bipolar
world.
One may view the Truman Doctrine in this light. On March 12, 1947, Truman
addressed a joint session of congress and proclaimed that it is “the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures.”47 This becomes amongst the first containment policy
moves made by the Truman administration whereby the U.S. gives 300 million dollars to
Greece and 100 million dollars to Turkey in military and infrastructure aid. Both Greece
and Turkey were staving off Communist insurrections and each was seen as vital to the
political and strategic goals of the West. “If Greece was lost, Turkey would become an
untenable outpost in a sea of Communism. Similarly, if Turkey yielded to Soviet
demands, the position of Greece would be extremely endangered.”48 Moreover, “the
failure of the West to prevent a Communist takeover in Greece would not only put the
Russians on a particularly dangerous flank for the Turks, but strengthen the Soviet
46 Marte, Political Cycles in International Relations, 8.
~‘~‘ Harry Truman, Truman Doctrine http://www.yale.edullawweb!avalon/trudoc.htm, (accessed,
September 2, 2007).
48 Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking
ofLiberal Internationalism (The University Press of Kentucky. 2006), 64.
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Union’s ability to cut off allied supplies and assistance in the event of war.”49 The
Truman doctrine also provided the rationale for the U.S. to offer assistance to help both
the French and Italian governments keep Communists out of political power.
If the weakness in the colonial system and the Truman Doctrine are examples of the
U.S. sphere-of-influence then surely Soviet moves into Eastern Europe are examples of
its own. After WW lithe Soviet Union was damaged and war weary but at the same time
cognizant of its weakness. At Yalta, Stalin acknowledged that the Soviet Union would
need fifty years of peace to recover from its war wounds and damages.5°
Thus, for the revisionist school, Stalin moved cautiously to avoid war with the West
and accepted a deal with his allies that gave Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union while
ceding Western Europe to the West and the U.S. “Soviet self-containment was the very
premise ofjoint allied policy, written into the paragraphs and clauses of the Tehran, Yalta
and Potsdam agreements.”5’ Traditionalists acknowledge that Stalin agreed to contain his
reach during the war, but they disagree that Stalin acted with restraint. The traditionalists
see the Communist parties confronting Western governments as Stalin’s efforts to stir up
strife from within in Greece, Turkey, Italy, France and Belgium. Revisionists counter
that in the latter three states, the Communist parties were supportive of the conservative
governments.52
‘~ George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine
Contained the Soviets in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 21.
~° Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 6 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 304.
~‘ Isaac Deutscher, Russia after Stalin (London: Hamilton, 1953), 74.
52 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, the use of the atomic bomb and the
American confrontation with Soviet power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 25.
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Schlesinger’s notion of a bipolar world divided up into spheres-of-influence gives rise
to the balance of power concept which is the explicandum of Louis Halle’s work Cold
War as History. For Halle, the Cold War is yet another crisis in the European balance of
power. The Napoleonic wars of the early nineteenth century were balance of power
conflicts where European states were forced to confront Napoleon’s France. Another
example of balance of power crisis in Europe was the test presented by Kaiser William II
that generated a series of defensive agreements and counter-coalitions to restore balance.
Again Hitler’s aggression and successes caused the allies to come together to confront the
Axis powers, with Europe a major staging ground.
Halle sees a link between the Cold War and the alliance against Hitler. Halle sees
Stalin as aggressive and totalitarian as was Hitler and writes “On this third occasion, as
we have seen, Russia was left in possession of half Europe, while the other half lay
prostrate before it. The Western allies, having put down the terrifying specter of Hitler,
were now confronted with the no-less-terrifying specter of Stalin.”53 For the
traditionalist, Stalin was ideologically diametrically opposed to the West and because this
necessitated a response, the Soviets are at fault for the Cold War. Feis for example, says
that it is Communist ideology which drove Stalin to extend his control into countries
neighboring the Soviet Union.54 Halle disagrees and offers that Soviet foreign policy
decisions are an extension of centuries old Tsarist concerns. It is not ideology, but it is a
Communist version of traditional Russian policies. Traditionalists link the foreign
~ Halle, Cold War as History, 2.
~ Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, 571.
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policies of Communism to Tsarist Russia and this emphasis must be given some
attention.
For the early traditionalists, it was important to link Stalin to Hitler. The revisionist
critique is that once Soviet foreign policy is equated with Nazi warmongering it becomes
easier for American politicians to generate domestic support for their political purposes.
For the Kolkos, the Stalin equals Hitler equation is deliberately designed to generate fear
for purposes that “have little, if anything, to do with Russia.”55 Williams counters that,
“it is no doubt wrong and inaccurate to conclude that the effort to establish the false
analogy between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany was the product of conscious
distortion by America’s private and official leaders.”56
The traditional Russian objectives and policy motivations have always included the
military capacity to defend its Western and southern borders, trade access to the Caspian
and Black Seas and land routes to access the shipping lanes in the Mediterranean and the
Baltic seas. John Lukacs, like Schlesinger and Halle, views the Cold War as arising from
military and strategic concerns not ideological conflict. For Lukacs, there existed a
power vacuum in both Eastern and Western Europe after the defeat of Germany. The
Soviets were able to expand their sphere-of-influence into Eastern Europe and this placed
them into a position to challenge for power in Western Europe as well. A case in point
for Lukacs is the meeting of US and Soviet armies at Elbe River April 25, 1945 which
precipitated the “division of Germany and of most of Europe into American and Russian
~ Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, Limits ofPower: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-
1954 (New York,: Harper & Row, 1972), 715.
56 William Appleman Williams, Tragedy ofAmerican Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing ,1962),
239.
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spheres of influence.”57 Lukacs is critical of the thought that ideology drives Soviet
policy and states “By 1945 the similarities between Stalin’s regime and that of Tsar
Nicholas I, for example, were so obvious that pages and pages from books such as the
Marquis de Custine’s description of his travels in the Russia of the 1 840s would apply to
Stalin’s Russia in the 1940s. Yet Americans sought the key to Soviet conduct in dogma
rather than in history.”58
For Lukacs, Schlesinger and Halle, ideological dogma and Communist theory were not
the core determinants of Soviet actions. Instead of furthering the global revolution
against Communism, traditional objectives such as access to the European seas and
border security were the chief concerns. “The history of Soviet Russian foreign policy is
studded with innumerable examples when considerations of Russian national interest
clearly proved more important than the interests of international Communism, at the
expense of the latter. This was especially true of Russia under Stalin (and this was, of
course, the core of the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky); but it was already evident
under Lenin.”59
This distinction is necessary to solve the conundrum of Soviet behavior and the proper
American reaction. Halle writes “The behavior of Russia under the Communists has
been Russian behavior rather than Communist behavior. Under the Communists Russia
has continued to behave essentially as it behaved under the Czars.”6°
~ Lukacs, New History ofthe Cold War, 1.
Ibid, 77.
Ibid, 330-33 1.
Halle, Cold War as History, 11.
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Walter Lippmann agrees with this summation when, in his response to George Kennan’s
Long Telegram as Mr. X, he states “...Mr. X has neglected even to mention the fact that
the Soviet Union is the successor of the Russian empire and that Stalin is not only the
heir of Marx and of Lenin but of Peter the Great, and the czars of all the Russians.”6’
Gaddis Smith seeks to link the centuries old Tsarist objectives and Communist
ideology as related forces that drive Soviet policy. In arguing that Stalin was bent on
expansion Smith says “The evidence indicates that Soviet leaders believed that their state
and ideology could never be secure as long as the world contained any large
concentration of non-Communist power. Defensively they could assign no limits to the
requirements of security; offensively they were under a compulsion rooted in Russian
history as well as Communist ideology to expand the area of their domination wherever
practical. Russian security and expansion were two sides of the same coin.”62 Thus for
Smith, Stalin, like the Tsars before him and the defeated Hitler, is an expansionist
supported by history on one side and ideology on the other to justif~’ his aggression.
Herbert Feis’ work Between War and Peace does not agree with the link between
Tsarist Russia and Soviet policy. For Feis, Soviet behavior is linked to the Communist
ideal of expansion. In that those ideals were predicated on furthering the Communist
revolution, they were linked to the domination of Eastern Europe and needed to be
challenged by the West.63 As evidenced in Feis’ work there is another core element that
61 Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in US. Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947),
30.
62 Smith, American Di~plomacy during the Second World War 1941-1945, 16.
63 Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).
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must be acknowledged in traditionalist thought. The possible legitimacy of any security
concerns the Soviets may have had is replaced with a depiction of Stalin’s personality as
twisted towards warmongering and conquest.
We have seen earlier that the traditionalist thought forces a link between Stalin’s
expansionism and Hitler’s drive to conquer Europe. This link is essential for this frame
of reference, for it allows Western policymakers to justify their actions. Joseph Stalin
was General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party from 1922 until
his death in 1953. Following the death of V. I. Lenin in 1924, Stalin is able to secure his
position.
One must take care to note that while Karl Marx originated the concept of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, and Lenin and Trotsky elaborated and first realized it, it
was Stalin who had the time and opportunity to operationalize it with dramatic
consequences. Collectivization resulted in famine which in turn resulted in repression of
any recalcitrance amongst the people. Up to 10 million deaths occurred under Stalin’s
watch. Does this mean that it is correct to equate Stalin with Hitler?
By focusing on Communist ideology and Stalin’s personality, traditionalists neglect
the security concerns of Soviet decision-makers. Even as the traditionalist notes the
balance of power/sphere of influence equations at work, even as the traditionalist links
Communist policy to traditional Russian concerns, the legitimacy of Soviet security
concerns is still ignored. In the early negotiations Stalin often stressed the importance of
friendly and secure governments along his Western borders. Any postwar agreement
would have to take this into account. During the Yalta Conference, Stalin said
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“Throughout history, Poland has always been a corridor for the enemy attacking Russia
to pass through.. . The Polish corridor cannot be closed mechanically from without by
Russian forces alone.. .The question of Poland is a life-and-death question for the Soviet
State.”64 Here we see Stalin drawing a conclusion based on a strategic analysis of
history, not drawing conclusions from paranoia. Kennan, Bullock, Schlesinger and Herz
disagree when they argue expansionism is linked to illegitimate aggression and
warmongering.
Smith and Feis relay to us a Stalin that is a bully, intentionally provoking the West
towards a confrontation. The revisionist school takes exception to this frame. When
Horowitz and Fleming detail Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe for instance, they
relate that Hitler’s invasion had exposed a weakness that Stalin desired to protect. The
negotiations that ceded Romania and Bulgaria to the Soviets allowed Stalin to establish
Communist regimes there in order to promote friendly governments on Russian borders.
Post-revisionists also cope with the traditionalists’ neglect of the legitimacy of Soviet
security concerns. John Lewis Gaddis relates that Communist ideology dictated some
strategic policy concerns that were overlooked by the West.
Stalin believed like Lenin, Marx and Engels before him that conflict between capitalist
states was inevitable. For Stalin, WW II was a brief interruption and at the end of the war
the inherent contradictions of capitalism would again surface anew. Gaddis tells us that
Stalin believed this inevitability strengthened Soviet bargaining power even though it was
considerably weakened at the end of the war. Gaddis says “There was no choice for the
64 Quoted in Vilnis Sipolis, The Road to Great Victory: Soviet Diplomacy, 1941-1945. (Moscow:
Progress, 1984), 237.
43
moment, then, but to continue to seek the cooperation of the Americans and the British:
just as they had depended on Stalin to defeat Hitler, so Stalin now depended on continued
Anglo-American good will if he was to obtain his postwar objectives at a reasonable
cost.”65 Stalin would have to negotiate for the security which he could not militarily
achieve in the early postwar years.
The traditionalist, however, is inattentive toward the possible legitimacy of this
security concern. For them, Stalin was not defending his borders but he was aggressively
and without cause threatening Western Europe and American interests. Feis, Schlesinger
and Herz say that expansionism was accompanied by totalitarianism and the Soviets
caused the Cold War by provoking an American response. Horowitz counters that
expansion into Eastern Europe was necessary for the Soviets to secure themselves in that
the Soviets emerged from WW II drained and weaker than the U.S. both militarily and
economically.
Horowitz goes further and presses that it is the U.S. who was aggressively threatening
the security of the Soviets by noting that “by 1949, there was 400 U.S. bases around the
perimeter of the Soviet Union.”66 This for Horowitz caused Stalin to feel the need to
secure his Western flank by establishing friendly governments around it. However the
post-revisionist warns that the revisionist thought that Stalin was merely defending
himself must be viewed with caution. Stalin in 1947 once mused that “had Churchill
65 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 12.
66 David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique ofAmerican Foreign Policy in the Cold War
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delayed opening the second front in northern France by a year, the Red Army would have
come to France. . . We toyed with the idea of reaching Paris.”67
Traditionalists, revisionists and post revisionists all have divergent opinions as to the
causes and blame for the Cold War. The above debate over the legitimacy of Soviet
security concerns is a case in point. Traditionalists focus on Communist ideology, sphere
of influence conceptions, balance of power equations, Stalin’s personality and traditional
Russian objectives to charge that the Soviets like the Nazi’s were aggressively driven
toward expansion and conquest thereby forcing the West to adopt a defensive posture.
The revisionists differ. It is not the Soviets who were aggressive but for the revisionists, it
is the United States who is to blame for economically bullying and threatening the
Soviets.
Revisionists
In the 1 950s towards the early 1 960s voices begin to emerge that question the
orthodoxy of American innocence and defensiveness in the face of Soviet aggression.
They began to question whether the Soviet Union was the sole instigator and began to
investigate the extent to which American decision-makers may have caused tensions
between the former allies.
Revisionists contend that it is U.S. policy that was aggressive and necessitated a
Soviet response, not the other way around which is the core contention of the
traditionalists. For the revisionist the Soviets after WW II were weakened, its
infrastructure and population drained. With the loss of 20 million people and over 1700
67 quoted in Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, 14.
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cities, this weakness meant that the Soviets would have to work to generate a post-war
agreement that entailed both the British and the U.S. understanding that there would be a
Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. For revisionist scholars this represents a
legitimate Soviet concern. Friendly regimes in the neighboring states along its borders
would prevent avenues for future invasions. The revisionists further hold that the U.S.
challenged the legitimacy of the Soviet desire thus provoking a confrontation with
Moscow.
An overview of the history of this claim is necessary. Roosevelt, Churchill and Soviet
foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov each had agreed that the West would open a second
front in the war, a point that had been debated since June on 1941. Even as late as 1943
during the Tehran Conference, Britain and the U.S. promised Stalin that they would send
troops to Western Europe. It was agreed that they would arrive in spring of 1944 and this
would be in exchange for Stalin postponing his postwar territorial claims in Eastern
Europe.
Gaddis tells us that “Roosevelt formally promised the Russian foreign minister a
second front in 1942.. .The second front did not materialize and by early 1943 Roosevelt
had reluctantly concluded that he could not keep Stalin from taking what he wanted in
Eastern Europe.”68 Roosevelt and Churchill had twice broken a promise to Stalin and
this fed the distrust between them. The Soviets came to believe that “the idea behind the
military calculations of those two states is for the forces of the Soviet Union to be
exhausted and worn out to the utmost so as to reduce its role in resolving the postwar
68 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1945 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972), 16.
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problems.”69 Ambrose explains the coming crisis this way: “The Russians alone
stemmed the Nazi tide, then began to roll it back. Victory was coming.. . Russian
suspicions of the Western democracies, already great, increased. The Anglo-Americans,
because they refused to participate in the liberation of East Europe, forfeited all right to a
say in the post-war situation in the area.”70 The Soviet move into Eastern Europe then is
the result of the U.S. failing to live up to its promises to open a second front in the war,
and this failure is a main cause for Soviet expansionism. Therefore for the revisionists, it
is not Stalin’s aggression but Western failure that leaves Eastern Europe in Soviet hands.
Traditionalists as we have seen equate Stalin with Hitler’s power-hungry mad drive to
expand and conquer. William Appleman Williams tell us that Stalin was familiar with
American literature of the day “so to be told publicly, in Foreign Affairs, that he was an
evil wind-up toy was hardly calculated to promote a relaxation of tensions.”71
Revisionists counter that the agreements that guided American, British and Soviet
relations during the War were glued together by promises of Soviet restraint after the
war. Horowitz relates that Stalin restrained himself and cites Soviet non-involvement in
the Communist movements of China, Greece, Italy and France and even acted to
convince the Communists to “come to terms with their capitalist counterparts in the name
of world stability.”72
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Along these same lines, Horowitz shows that the Soviets along with the Americans
reduced the size of its military after the close of WW II. Horowitz says “Considering that
the U.S.S.R. had long and potentially hostile frontiers in Europe, the Middle and Far East,
whereas the U.S.A. had atomic bombs and no potentially hostile frontiers bordering the
USA itself, the 1948 total Soviet manpower figures of 2.9 million would hardly seem
excessive from a purely military standpoint, when compared with the American 1.5
million.”73 The U.S. reduced its military to 13 percent of its 1945 capacity. The fact that
Stalin also reduced his military size to 25 percent of its 1945 capacity is taken by
Horowitz as proof of Stalin’s restraint.
Oar Alperovitz and Denna Fleming agree with Horowitz that Stalin, unlike Hitler,
conducted himself with restraint immediately after WW II. Alperovitz proves this by
looking at the moderation that Moscow conducted itself with as it sponsored free
elections in Hungary in 1945.~~ Fleming agrees that Stalin’s move into Eastern Europe
was driven by security concerns and adds that it was based on tacit agreement with the
West. “The charge that Russia controlled Eastern Europe merely because we appeased
her, was, of course, without foundation. She was there because the pre-war allied effort
to turn Hitler to the East had backfired”75 for the second front was never opened and
Russia had to defend itself from Germany without assistance on its Eastern border.
For Fleming then, WW II resulted in the Soviets controlling the Stettin-Prague-Trieste
line and this control over Eastern Europe triggered a belief in the West that Stalin was out
~ Ibid, 29.
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for World domination. Stalin then becomes alarmed at the intensity of Western angst and
opposition towards its influence along its borders. Fleming says that Moscow believed
that the West still harbored hostile feelings towards it and Moscow began to interpret the
West’s feelings as a desire to wrest Eastern Europe from the Soviets. This interpretation
of intentions led the Soviets to “arm and to conduct a world-wide ideological struggle
against the West.”76
Again revisionists see this ‘struggle’ conducted with restraints and limits. Another
argument used by the revisionists is that Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe was
initially accepted by the West as the logical and inevitable result of the state of military
affairs at the end of the war. Horowitz tells us that Communist regimes in Bulgaria and
Romania were the results of agreements between Churchill and Stalin concluded in
October 1944 where 90 percent of Romania was ceded to the Soviets and at the same
time 90 percent of Greece fell under British control. 75 percent of Bulgaria was given to
the Soviets and the remaining percentage to the West. Yugoslavia was divided up
equally between the Brits and the Soviets.
Fleming gives this account: “Stalin scrutinized the paper, made a large blue tick on it
and passed it back. ‘It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set it down.’ After
this there was a long silence, the penciled paper lying in the center of the table. Finally
Churchill suggested that since it might seem to some that they had disposed of these great
issues, ‘so fateful to millions of people,’ in an off-hand manner they should ‘burn the
76 Ibid, 249.
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paper.’ ‘No, you keep it,” said Stalin.”77 Thus for Fleming and the revisionists, based on
the “current position of the Russian armies” there was agreement between the allies on
the extent of Soviet influence in much of Eastern Europe.
Along with the failure of the West to live up to its military commitments which may
have prevented Eastern Europe from falling into the sphere of the Soviets, revisionists
also point out the U.S. failure to use its economic advantages to counter the Soviet’s
military position. At the end of the war, 70 percent of Soviet industrial infrastructure and
60 percent of its transport facilities were damaged beyond repair. Revisionists use these
facts to acknowledge that the Soviets were just incapable of challenging the U.S. for
hegemony in Western Europe even though control of Eastern Europe was seen as vital for
its security. For them, Stalin fully understood that the U.S. would fill the eco-political
and military vacuum vacated by devastated Western governments. Traditionalists differ
when they contend that the Soviet’s move into Eastern Europe precipitated a near future
move into Western Europe.
The Cold War for the revisionist is ultimately explainable by an examination of
economic motivations. For Lionel Robbins in The Economic Causes of War78, war is the
necessary byproduct of the chaos of international relations. This anarchy “...can be
conceived as part of a perpetual struggle for power — a struggle to either conserve of
increase it.”79 For Robbins, the struggle for power is essentially an economic struggle
that results in military and hence national strength which all states aspire towards. “It
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should be clear that, in such considerations, economic factors are almost necessarily
involved. The attainment of military power in the narrowest sense involves the control
over scarce resources. . . Thus national power involves the command of raw materials.”80
This is the root cause of conflict and war as states compete with one another for control
over scarce resources in the rush to build their national strength and economies. The
result of this competition is war and military might is its natural expression.
With the above in mind the revisionists focus on the economic motivations of
American policy-makers. William Z. Foster sees a direct link between the American
economy and war. Truman’s managed economy was dependant on the productive
capacity of U.S. industries performing at war time peak levels. A decrease in hostilities
would cause factories to slow their output and a recession was feared. “Consequently,
every peace move by the U.S.S.R. and other democratic forces sends shivers of
apprehension along their spines. Often they do not hesitate to warn openly that it would
be a disaster were real peace to come and deprive American industry of its present vast
armaments production.”81
American decision-makers anticipated a depression after WW II similar to the
depression that followed WW I and revisionists note this fear caused the Truman
administration to maintain a war-like environment after 1945. This depended on
increasing hostilities with the Soviets. Foster says “The only method American
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capitalism has of retarding the rapid deepening of the cyclical crisis within the next year
is the transformation of the present Cold War economy into a full-blown economy.”82
Even some of the traditionalists like Hertz agree that the U.S. should have and did use
its economic power as a weapon to attempt to force the Soviets to submit to Western
demands. Hertz alludes to the fear of recession when he says “Today we know that no
postwar recession developed and that in fact we soon moved into a period of further
economic expansion. But most of our economic experts, and certainly the general public
in the U.S., had no such expectations in early 1945 ~,,83 Yet, other revisionists attempt to
downplay any possibly economic motivations that U.S. officials may have had. Lukacs
even goes so far as to say “...of all the great empires of the world the U.S., with its vast
territories and population, was least in need of external commerce and markets.”84 For
Lukacs, the Marshall plan is an example of American generosity and altruism towards
Europe. Revisionists flatly disagree. Kolko argues that it’s not generosity but the desire
to compete for access to new markets, raw materials and opportunities for infrastructure
development and investment that motivated the Truman Administration.
Gabriel Kolko sees a link between the need for American industries to expand and the
foreign policy that is designed to open new markets and expose raw materials. Kolko
sees the influence of the representatives of corporate America on policymakers and
argues that these representatives are able to tailor U.S. foreign policy to fit the ensured
profitability of U.S. industries. Here is a direct challenge to traditionalists like Herz who
82 Ibid, 6.
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argue that the anti-Communist sentiment of public opinion in part forced the Truman
administration to confront the Russians. Kolko counters that instead it is American
politicians, themselves acted upon by business leaders who set the foreign policy to
which the American citizenry simply acquiesced and accepted. “The question of foreign
economic policy was not the containment of Communism, but rather more directly the
extension and expansion of American capitalism according to its new economic power
and needs.”85
Gar Alperovitz relates that Truman’s policy became increasingly more economically
hostile to the Soviets. Alperovitz contends that one of the key sources of conflict between
the American and the Soviets was the “breakdown of economic interchange”86 between
the East and the West. Fleming sees economic aggression from the West when Stalin
refused Marshall aid from the Truman administration. The prerequisite to receive aid
was that the Soviets would have to give detailed information about its economic situation.
Stalin refused to do so and traditionalists like Feis interpret the refusal to be reckless
when he criticizes “Russia was proudly maintaining the outward semblance of strength,
although its people were in sore need of almost everything.”87
Fleming counters that Stalin’s refusal is linked to the need to protect Soviet security
by keeping its financial records private and protected and he adds that it is doubtful that
the U.S. would have given Moscow aid in any event. “The chance that the American
85 Kolko, Limits ofPower, 23.
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congress, newly schooled by the Truman Doctrine campaign in fear and hatred of the
Soviet Union, would approve large funds for Russia’s rehabilitation, or for that of any
one of her satellites, was small indeed. Molotov could quite safely have left it to the
congress to defeat the Marshall Plan altogether, if the Russian orbit had any part in it.”88
This theme of economic hostility is one that William Appleman Williams expounds
upon. In Empire as a Way ofLife, Williams begins with noting the relative superiority of
America’s economy to that of the Soviet’s and explains that this is a result of the impact
of WW II on each state. “The Russians and the Chinese supplied the capital and we
busted the bank. While the Russians lost 20 million lives, for example, the United States
created 17 million new jobs safe from bombs or bullets.”89 Thus empowered with
economic might Williams says that the U.S. began to expand the Open Door Policy to
include Europe both west and east. For Williams, the U.S. triggered the Cold War by its
aggressive open-door policy which necessarily clashed with legitimate Soviet economic
and strategic security interests. The Soviets saw the policy as a means for the Americans
to penetrate the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe with the ultimate goal of
economically destabilizing the Soviet Union.9° “After all Stalin and his advisors were
subtle enough to understand the imperial nature of the Open Door Policy. Stalin viewed it
as being ‘as dangerous to a nation as foreign military invasion.’ ,,91
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Williams emphasizes U.S. economic aggression using the open door as its core policy
tool and it is here where Williams begins to differ with other revisionists who emphasize
the Atomic bomb as the key determinant of U.S. Soviet relations. Williams states “It was
not the possession of the Atomic Bomb which prompted American leaders to get tough
with Russia but rather their open-door outlook which interpreted the bomb as the final
guarantee that they could go further faster down that path to world predominance.”92 Gar
Alperovitz disagrees. In Atomic Diplomacy, Alperovitz argues that the atomic bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th of 1945 served the dual purposes of
first, halting any possibility that the Soviets would enter the war in the Pacific thereby
freeing the US of having to negotiate with the Soviets to determine the shape of Asian
politics after Japan’s defeat. Secondly, it would demonstrate American military might
and send a strong message to the Soviet Union and the world.93
According to the revisionists the Atomic monopoly briefly enjoyed by the U.S.
allowed the Truman Administration to shift course from the less antagonistic path
Roosevelt had laid and become more arrogantly aggressive towards Stalin. Horowitz
says this is evident when Truman cancels the Big Three meetings in November 1945, the
halting of the lend-lease program on May 8, 1945 and the Truman-Molotov confrontation
over Eastern Europe on April 23, 1945.~~ Traditionalists hold the opposite. For them the
Truman doctrine is to be applauded and Hertz and Feis note that when Truman sent
Hopkins to Moscow at the end of May 1945 to seek accommodation with Stalin as well
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as when Secretary of State Byrnes later in 1945 also sought terms with Stalin, both are
evidence that the Truman administration was not taking a unsympathetic hard-line
approach to the Soviets.95 Horowitz however is clear on this point. “It was Truman and
not Marshall Stalin who, in November 1945, unilaterally terminated the meetings of the
Big Three and thus initiated a ten-year period when there was no meeting between the
U.S. and Soviet heads of state.”96 For the revisionist this is an arrogance born out of
atomic success.
Both Alperovitz and Horowitz say the Truman Administration used its atomic
monopoly to give the U.S. bargaining power in its negotiations with the Soviets on the
shape of Europe after the end of the War. Beyond forcing Japan to capitulate and
surrender, the Atomic bomb was a radioactive bargaining chip wielded freely by the U.S.
Alperovitz expounds, “the atomic bomb.. .played a role in the formulation of policy,
particularly in connection with Truman’s only meeting with Stalin.. .the atomic bomb not
only influenced diplomacy but that it determined much of Truman’s shift to a tough
policy aimed at forcing Soviet acquiescence to American plans for Eastern and Central
Europe. The weapon gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence.”97
Revisionists hold this thought as major supporting evidence of their central thesis
which holds that the Soviets could not have and would not have instigated the Cold War
because they were demonstrably economically and militarily weaker than the U.S.
Traditionalists, to the contrary, believe that Stalin’s aggressive behavior in Eastern
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Europe threatened U.S. interests in Western Europe thereby necessitating a defensive
U.S. response. Denna Fleming counters that the atomic bomb was a major tool used by
the U.S. to secure its diplomatic position against Russia’s troop positioning at the end of
the War against Germany. Fleming holds that it is a Truman emboldened by the atomic
bomb who instigated the anti-Soviet policies, forcing the Soviets to act to defend
themselves and thereby caused the Cold War.
Williams develops this thought. In 1949 “. . .the Russians tested a nuclear device.
That meant that sometime in the future they could make and deliver such a bomb. Very
shortly after the successful test explosion...” the Soviets “. . . began to speculate in public
about using the stand-off to prove that Socialism could create a better society than
capitalism under conditions of peaceful competition.”98 For Williams as for the
revisionists in general, American economic confidence along with its military security
born out of the atomic monopoly caused the Truman administration to adopt aggressive
policies toward the Soviets who had no recourse but to marshal their resources and move
to counter the American challenge.
Post Revisionists
Post revisionists seek to challenge the perspectives of both the traditionalists and the
revisionist approach to the Cold War. Seeing a contradiction in both approaches where
the traditionalists emphasize U.S. security concerns and the revisionists emphasize the
economic stresses on U.S. foreign policy, the post revisionist attempts to give both
98 Williams, Empire as a Way ofLIfe, 187.
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aspects of the Cold War due consideration. Post-Revisionists however contend that the
security concerns were decisive.99
John Lewis Gaddis agrees with traditionalists Lukacs and Schlesinger that the Cold
War was an attempt by both the Soviets and the U.S. to fill the vacuum left by Hitler in
central and Eastern Europe. Towards filling this vacuum, Gaddis sees the development
of nuclear weaponry as a positive for global stability between the U.S. and the Soviets.
For Gaddis there developed a ‘long peace’ between both super powers because the
nuclear arms race gave birth to the concept of mutually assured destruction and this
forestalled direct military conflict between the two and peace ensues. In his work The
Long Peace Gaddis says “I am suggesting, though, that the development of nuclear
weapons has had, on balance, a stabilizing effect on the postwar international system.
They have served to discourage the process of escalation that has in other areas too
casually led to war. They have had a sobering effect upon a whole range of statesmen of
varying degrees of responsibility and ~
Here Gaddis opens himself up to criticism. The lack of direct military confrontation
between the U.S. and the Soviets did not stabilize the international system as he suggests
it merely created a set of limits on how aggressive both the U.S. and the Soviets could be
towards each other. The international system on a whole and the developing world in
particular were hotly affected by whatever cold ‘long peace’ existed from 1945 through
1991 and beyond. Hot wars in Asia (Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), Africa
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(Angola, Ethiopia, Zaire, Uganda) and South America (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru) are
the results of Superpower conflict being carried out by proxies in the developing world
resulting in hot wars and hot blood.
This is not to say that there are not other indigenous causes to these conflicts. To be
sure domestic actors in each of these fields were self-interested and in many cases
responding to stimuli that indeed predates the Cold War itself. One must acknowledge
that such conflict was indeed exacerbated by both superpowers as each injected their own
objectives into these conflicts and supported those objectives with arms and other forms
of military and political assistance. When Gaddis argues that nuclear weapons fostered
international stability when the developing world was in a state of flux exacerbated by
Cold War rivalries he is being myopic in his view. Gaddis is correct in that mutually
assured destruction prevented a third world war from 1945 to 1991 but he overlooks the
toll the Cold War extracted.
A core contention of the post-revisionists is that WW II made U.S. decision-makers
more likely to focus on the likelihood of future threats to the United States and world
stability)0’ A certain vulnerability to threats and thus weariness towards instability in
U.S. goals and objectives caused American foreign policy decision-makers to begin to
forecast and plan for future threats.’°2 This focus on future threats predates the emergence
of the Soviet Union as the U.S.’s opposition in the post-WW II world.
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William Z. Foster challenges the conclusions of Sherry and Yergin. Foster argues that
the post WW II U.S. economy built by the Truman administration depended on war to
sustain itself and that the managed economy was made possible by managing hostilities
toward the profit of American corporations.’°3 Revisionist theorists back up Foster’s
argument. In Rise to Globalism, Stephen Ambrose contends that the Truman
administration followed a policy designed to increase tensions with the Soviets, thereby
providing the justification for the U.S. to maintain a wartime atmosphere and thus
continue to fuel the economy oriented towards wartime production and prosperity. 104
Post revisionists counter this line of argument. Gaddis for instance, writes that the
Marshall plan would be used to achieve political ends that a purely political approach
could not without resistance.105 Gaddis criticizes the argument offered by Foster and
Ambrose by saying that there is no proof that profit accumulation for U.S. corporations
was a driving factor for U.S. policy makers.’°6
For the post revisionist, national security concerns were foremost in the minds of the
late Roosevelt and the Truman administrations and this sentiment is supported by
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in March of 1944 where he says “our fundamental
national interests are the assuring of our national interest and the fostering of the
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economic and social well-being of our~ Geir Lundestead focuses on the
security concerns when he points out that U.S. foreign policy was affected by Soviet
aggression in Eastern Europe. The U.S. did not wish its political and economic interests
to be shut out by Stalin and policy makers believed that Soviet expansionism threatened
the U.S. interests in both Eastern and Western 08
Post revisionists acknowledge that there are economic concerns at work in the early
decisions of the Cold War but they reject the revisionist notion that the U.S. was driven
by the desire to dominate global markets for the profit of its corporations and thus
fermented a warlike atmosphere with the Soviets that neglected legitimate Soviet security
concerns thus making the Cold War inevitable. Vojtech Mastny argues that the U.S. did
not do enough, that the U.S. was not strong enough in relaying to the Soviets just how
much Soviet aggression it would accept.’°9 Lundestead even says that the U.S. assisted
Soviet expansionism.”0
Post revisionists support many of the contentions of the revisionists. For instance
while disagreeing with the revisionist claim that the conflict was fermented by the U.S.
for capitalist ends, post revisionists agree that there was a post war drive by the U.S. to
secure an American empire. Revisionists hold that this drive was offensive and
purposefully hostile but post-revisionists say it was defensive and necessary. Similarly
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post revisionists Horowitz’~~ and Mastny”2 agree that Stalin’s actions were not based
solely on Communist ideology but rather a strategic summation of their post-war position
in the division of Eastern Europe. Post-revisionists also agree that America’s success
with the atomic bomb changed Truman position on the Soviets entering the war against
Japan believing Stalin an unnecessary negotiating partner for an Asia that the U.S. could
not defeat alone113
Post revisionists also arrive at many of the same conclusions of the traditionalists.
Notably in the summation of the Cold War beginning as a contest between an aggressive
Stalin and a reluctant U.S. with a suffering Europe in between. Key to the difference
between these frames of thought is how each has arrived at its conclusions. Gaddis
argues that the post revisionist base their positions on archival research where the
traditionalists depended on political convictions and personal experiences. Gaddis
explains: “But post-revisionism should not be thought of as simply orthodoxy plus
archives. On several major points, revisionism has had a significant impact on post-
revisionist historiography.”4
The above discussion should serve to illustrate that when one begins to chart the
starting point for the Cold War, one is detailing the nature and causes of the conflict
between the core states which is the explicandum of this work. Each school of thought
and their various appendices focus on blame and the question of who caused the Cold
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War. This is an appropriate focus. Causation involves the subtleties and intricacies of
international relations. Thus investigated, the Cold War becomes a complex ongoing
series of connected actions, responses and counter-responses. As a part of these actions
and pursuant to World Systems Theory, Africa becomes a major theater of the Cold War
and by proxy, the conflict becomes hot enough to spill blood in the African soil.
CHAPTER THREE:
THE FORMATION OF A COLD WAR PERIPHERY
Soviet foreign policy, the American response and African nationalism
“He who makes the powder wins the war.”
- Dahomey saying early 1800s”5
“He who produces tractors can easily produce tanks, but he who delivers oil cannot
defend himselfby throwin~g- it in the face ofthe aggressors.”
-Johan Galtung’ 6
This section will briefly review both Soviet and American interactions with African
nationalists from the late 1 950s through the 1 960s. The section will posit why those
interactions were less fruitful than either of the Cold War antagonists would have liked.
Lastly the section will note the circumstances which allowed the 1 970s to feature a
heightened role for both super-powers specifically in both Angola and Ethiopia which are
the explicandi of this work.
Soviet and U.S. policy in Africa were intrinsically tied to shifts in the structure of the
international system. The devastation of World War II left deep infrastructural,
economic and political scars which affected the ability of Western states to continue their
control and manipulation of their colonies. This vacuum is filled by the United States
and the Soviet Union which emerge as the super-powers of the post-war world and they
115 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 108 — a statement recognizing that the group best able
to secure superior firepower from the Europeans will ultimately be successful in African conflicts.
116 Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research No. 2 (1971): 165.
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entered into bipolar conflict. This re-ordering of the international system both influenced
and is affected by the independence movements in Africa. Because most African
countries gained their independence during the height of Cold War tensions; the strategic
necessities of the Soviet Union and the West, led by the United States in Africa, dictated
the terms of their sovereignty. “The African people were robbed of the opportunity to
design their own governments and systems.. .Freedom for Africans was engineered.”7
As African nationalists sought their independence and became the new leaders of
fractured states, both Moscow and Washington attempted to breed African relationships
that would give one the strategic advantage over the other. In 1957, John F. Kennedy, as
the senator from Massachusetts, remarked that African leaders would “look West or East
to Moscow or to Washington — for sympathy, help and guidance in their effort to
recapitulate, in a few decades, the entire history of modern Europe and America.”8
Thus, early in Africa’s independence period, U.S. decision-makers acknowledged the
centrality of the position that African politics would play in the larger Cold War.
To capitalize on the political flux occurring in African states, both the U.S. and the
Soviets attempted to maximize their perceived ideological advantages over the old
colonial order and in regard to each other. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
had ever been colonial powers in Africa. Each had at least a stated commitment to
117 Samuel Kobia, a Kenyan senior staff member to the World Council of Churches quoted in Jerry L.
Van Marter, “After Serving as Cold War Battleground, Africa Is Set for Renaissance,”
http://stauing.pcusa.org/pcnews/oldnews/l999/99293.htm (accessed February 20, 2008).
118 John F. Kennedy, “The New Nations of Africa,” in Let the World Go Forth: The Speeches,
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African sovereignty and anti-colonial rhetoric had a place in each of their ideological
stances.
Several points of the Atlantic Charter signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt gave weight to
the anti-colonial stance of the United States. The Atlantic Charter includes as goals the
freedom from want and fear, and states that the United States will not pursue territorial
gains and also provocatively says that all peoples have a right to self-determination. In a
joint if dissimilar vein, the Soviet ideology of Communism presupposes the need for a
revolution to free oppressed people from bourgeois exploitation. To these anti-colonial
stances that drew the attention of African nationalists, one may add the individual
histories of both the Soviets and the United States to their initial attractiveness to African
nationalists. Both the United States and the Soviet Union gained their states by popular
revolutions from oppressive regimes and went on to economically develop their states
into global super-powers. The late 1940s and 1950s were times of rapid development for
both the U.S. and the Soviets and this initially suggested to African decision-makers that
following either economic model could lead to similar industrialization and development.
Soviet Foreign Policy in Africa
The U.S. and the Soviet Union focused attention on Africa decades later than
European colonization began. Immediately following World War II Washington and
Moscow had little interest in a colonized Africa, therefore Africa is fully introduced to
the international system of bi-polar conflict ten years after the Cold War had begun.
Africa’s long sea lanes along the Atlantic and Indian oceans together with its developing
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polities and conflict-ridden transitions to independence made Africa strategically
desirable to the United States and the Soviet Union.
Both sides came to understand that the power vacuum left after the departure of the
Europeans could be exploited by the Soviets to harm Western strategic goals. This
realization must be understood as a significant turning point because the Soviet goal was
eventually to penetrate Africa to challenge Western hegemony in the region; the
American goal became containment so that the West could prevent the Soviet penetration
of Africa. Neither superpower was attentive to the African political realities of
independence, but instead was concerned with managing expansion and containment to
serve their own policy needs.
Initially in the post-war period, the Soviets enjoyed a rhetorical advantage with their
anti-colonialist message. This was supported by the concrete examples of China and
Cuba which served to prove the efficacy of their ideology. To be sure, African
nationalism presented the Soviets with an opportunity to make African inroads, but the
basic motivations that guided Soviet foreign policy in Africa from the 1950s forward are
quite similar to means used by Tsar Alexander III two centuries before. Edward Thomas
Wilson in Russia and BlackAfrica Before World War jj~’19 shows that Russian
involvement in Africa has its roots in the interactions between Moscow and Ethiopia
which date back to the 17th century. A brief foray into the history of Tsarist contacts in
Africa will show the similarity of the policy objectives and the strategic concerns
119 Edward Thomas Wilson, Russia and Black Africa before World War II (New York: Holmer & Meier,
1974), 91.
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between the Soviets and Tsarist Russia. This will make the motivations of Soviet foreign
policy in Africa from 1950 forward much clearer.
Daniel S. Papp’2° links Tsar Alexis’ 17th century agreement with Ethiopia to act
against the Ottoman Empire, to Soviet Cold War policy in Africa. In 1723, Peter the
Great sent vessels to initiate contact with Madagascar with the goal of creating a naval
route to India. The effort to establish a Russian colony there was unsuccessful, but the
Russian foreign policy goal of using strategic objectives in the drive for port access, to
drive African contacts was clear and proved to be lasting.
One such early episode of Russia’s attempt to engage Africa to further its strategic
objectives occurred in 1770. Catherine the Great initiated contact and began to make
inroads into northern Africa in her effort to help the Greeks in their conflict with the
Turks. The goal was to establish an ally in Tunisia and Catherine the Great sent Count
Alexis Orlov to attend to the matter. Orlov was able to engage the Turkish fleet and
successfully made diplomatic inroads with the Tunis Bey which resulted in a peace
treaty. Russia then assumed the role of a Mediterranean power.’2’ Here, with Catherine
in Northern Africa, the development of a familiar pattern is observed, in which Russia
exploits regional and domestic political conflict to create a favorable strategic
environment for Russian goals.
Another opportunity presents itself during the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878. During
the conflict, England closed the Suez Canal to Russian shipping. Russia saw the
120 Papp, Daniel S. Soviet Policies Toward the Developing World During the 1980s. The Dilemmas of
Power and Presence (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1986), 138.
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maritime connection between itself and the Indian Ocean as vital and engaged the
Ethiopians to gain access to the Red Sea. To avenge the denial of maritime access to the
Suez Canal, Tsar Alexander III planned to have a presence on the Red Sea that would
“thwart Britain’s ambitions and secure a swath of territory. ~122 The effort was to
expand Russia’s presence on the Red Sea to undermine the British colonial arena from
the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo giving Russia access to the Nile and the Gulf of Aden.
The Russians assisted emperor Menelik II in defeating Britain’s ally Italy at Adowa in
1896. Towards this end, the Russians struck an arms deal that would secure a colony in
Ethiopia in return for assisting the Ethiopians in purchasing arms in Europe. Tsar
Alexander III never succeeded in establishing a colony at Eritrea, but what did
materialize was an alliance between Coptic and Orthodox Christendom that lasted until
World War I and the fall of Tsarist Russia.
Just as with Catherine the Great one-hundred years earlier, Russian decision-makers
employed the same means to advance their strategic goals. Russia’s relationship with the
Ethiopians was dominated by the abiding intent to exploit domestic political conflict
thereby creating a favorable strategic environment for Russian and Soviet goals. The
chief strategic goal was to create incentives and manipulate situations which would move
Ethiopian decision-makers to allow the Russians and later Soviets to build military
facilities at the Red Sea. This would further enable the Russians and Soviets to more
efficiently project their naval power in the region. However, “attempts to establish
colonies in Madagascar and on the Red Sea coast failed; projects to secure protectorates
122 Ibid, 71.
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over Ethiopia and part of contemporary Eritrea collapsed; and a bid for a port in Djibouti
came to naught.”23
Yet, these failures were not complete. They provided experiences that the Soviets
would later build upon. Both Tsarist Russia and the Soviets were similarly motivated by
the desire to check the influence of Western nations in Africa and the surrounding
geographic region. Russians identified then, as did the Soviets during the Cold War, that
Ethiopia’s domestic unrest, proximity to the shipping lanes in the Red Sea as well as its
potential gateway status to connect the Baltic Sea to the Indian Ocean was sufficient
motivation to inspire African adventurism.
Lenin initially focused most of his energy and state machinery on the European states
on his border. Africa was a peripheral ideological concern for the first 40 years of Soviet
control of the Russian state. Moscow saw the lack of political structure in colonized
African territories as a major hindrance to its overall goal of global revolution and would
devote little time, energy or resources to Africa. The Soviets only began to pay attention
as the anti-colonial movement began. As the levels of African political organization
increased with changes in the international system in the post war period, so too did
Soviet involvement. In the wake of this political development the Soviets could not
afford to ignore Africa. African material and labor resources were of economic and
strategic importance to west. If the Soviets could deny the West those resources, it could
potentially destabilize militaries of the West.
The attempt to inject itself into the African region did represent a challenge to the
status quo maintained and enjoyed by Britain, France and Italy. This challenge
123 Ibid, 68.
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necessitated an answer which each of the colonizers attempted to various degrees.
Bolsheviks had a clean African slate, in comparison to the Western Europeans and
enjoyed a rhetorical advantage in their anti-imperialist ideology.
Cohn Legum identifies four major objectives of Soviet policy in Africa: (1) to spread
the political and economic influence of Soviet Union in a manner consonant with its post
war role as a world power; (2) to diminish or eliminate altogether Western influence and
control in Africa; (3) to promote Soviet strategic security interests, especially those of the
Soviet navy for purposes of offsetting Western nuclear delivery systems (particularly
nuclear powered missile submarines) and to project Soviet political power. Toward these
ends, the Soviets sought a worldwide system of naval and air facilities similar to those
employed by the West; (4) Soviets sought to counter the ideological and political
challenge posed by China.’24
For V. I. Lenin, Africa was a place where capitalism was allowed to grow unfettered.
In Imperialism. the Highest Stage ofCapitalism Lenin identifies Western conflict over
African territory as a contributor to World War I. “Africa’s unique role in the irreversible
downward path consisted of its having provided the last available terrain for the “free
grabbing” of territories.”~25 Lenin arrived at the conclusion that political change had to
be achieved by redistribution of territory rather than by new distribution. This would
result in the increase of the pressures for violent confrontation’26 thereby necessitating the
124 V. I. Lenin quoted in Paul Schumaer, Dwight C. Kiel and Thomas W. Heilke eds. Ideological Voices:
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development of African vanguard movements to further the revolution. For the Soviets,
this collision between African proletarians and their Western oppressors was inevitable.
Soviet decision makers understood that to play a role in the collision’s aftermath, they
would have to assist African groups seeking liberation.
In 1919, the Soviets established the Communist International’27 “to fight by all
available means, including armed force, for the overthrow of the international
bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transition stage to
the complete abolition of the state.”28 However as the l920s progressed, the Soviets
came to believe that Africa lacked the necessary revolutionary vanguard for proletarian
revolution. To extend its influence, the Comintern sponsored sympathetic groups in
African states as well as amongst blacks in the United States and the Caribbean.’29 In the
1920s and the 1930s, the Soviets managed to offer contributions and financial assistance
to African trade unions and nationalist organizations in the hopes of”... accelerating the
independence 130
Soviet policy in Africa after World War II is a continuation of decades of prewar
efforts to counter the position of the West. Western colonial states respond by complying
with some nationalist demands to try and deflate the Soviet position. An early example is
Ghana and its decolonization from the British. Ivan Potekhin explains “In order to
127 Also known as the Third International or Comintern.
128 “COMINTERN” http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uklRUScomintei-n.htm (accessed January11
2010).
129 Communist involvementlinfiltration of the Garvey movement, the African Blood Brotherhood and
the Manchester Pan-African conference of 1945 are proof of this.
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weaken the growing anti-imperialist movement the British government conceded the
question of independence to the national bourgeoisie and entrusted it with the creation of
a new constitution.”3’
The Soviets became involved in African politics only after the nationalist movement
began to show some signs of success. Stalin’s ideological understanding was shaped by
an ideological assessment of global division which took little notice of the realities in
Africa. “In 1946 Andrei Zhdanov, a close associate of Stalin and a key ideologue, helped
launch an ideological campaign designed to demonstrate the superiority of Socialism
over capitalism in all fields. This campaign, colloquially known as the Zhdanovshchina
(“era of Zhdanov”), attacked writers, composers, economists, historians, and scientists
whose work allegedly manifested Western influence.”32 Zhdanovshchina was a bipolar
understanding of the world composed of the glavny protivnik or main adversary, which is
the United States, who leads the imperialist and anti-democratic camp and the Soviet
Union who leads the anti-imperialist democratic camp. For Stalin’s party officials,
loyalty to Communist ideals must be demanded both internationally as well as in
Moscow itself. As such the African groups petitioning for aid must give their fealty to
Communist ideology or risk being abandoned by Moscow.
Stalin’s 1953 death and rising anti-colonial movements changed the Soviet
perspective in many ways. Zhdanovshchina was hostile to both the imperialist camp as
well as any taking a neutral stance and this resulted in Soviet decision-makers making
‘~‘ Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1970),
24.
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“early moves (which) tended to be clumsy in an environment about which they knew
little.”33
By 1955, Khrushchev began to deviate from Stalinist policy by arguing that the
prospects for revolution in the ‘periphery of capitalism’ looked promising for the Soviet
Union. The Soviets should then focus attention and assistance on developing countries to
pull them into the Soviet Camp. Khrushchev’s team acknowledged that ignoring the
‘bourgeois’ leaders of Africa would be political suicide in the face of growing Cold War
tensions. These ‘bourgeois’ leaders would be convinced to adopt progressive anti-
imperialist policies.
At the Bandung Conference of April 1955, 29 African and Asian nations met to
oppose colonialism by promoting economic and cultural cooperation between them. By
1961 the Non-Aligned Movement had coalesced. Non-alignment meant the move away
from the West or dis-alignment from colonial order as well as being critical of Soviet
motives in the developing world. At its core was the realization of developing states,
whose populations comprised more than half of the world, that they needed to speak in a
unified voice to a bi-polar world so that each state could develop as sovereign entities.
Where Stalin had disliked neutralism, Khrushchev welcomed it as an opportunity to bond
against the West, calling the nonaligned countries with China and itself a ‘zone of
peace”34
~ Naomi Chazan, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild, Politics and Society in
Contemporary Africa (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 389.
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A series of international initiatives and bureaucratic maneuvers within Moscow served
to impact the nascent African states. In July of 1955 at the Geneva summit, both
Eisenhower and Khrushchev agreed on the mutually assured destruction of outright
nuclear war. This served to allow both superpowers to operate on the periphery of the
other without the risk of major war. In 1959 the Soviets created the Africa Institute of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences to further its technological and ideological penetration of
Africa through infrastructural projects. In 1961 the Third African Department of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry and the International Department of the C.P.S.U. added an
Africa section.
We have seen how outside of an Ethiopian adventure, Tsarist Russia lost out in the
scramble for Africa. However, the rise of Khrushchev along with the escalation of
nationalist movements in Africa; namely the Algerian war and its repercussions in
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, Nkrumah’s push in Ghana and Sekou Touré’s sudden break
with France gave Moscow fresh opportunities. Interestingly enough, similar to the
Stalinist maneuvers, these early moves were also clumsy, driven more by opportunity
than by a coherent strategy.
The Ghana-Guinea-Mali triangle became the area where the Soviets would
concentrate their push into Africa. “The triangle which was to become the stronghold of
the Soviet presence in Black Africa during the 1 960s was thus definitively set up at the
end of 1960.. .It has been within this entente that the Soviets have acquired their first
African experience...”135
~ Milene Charles, Soviet Union and Africa. the History ofthe Involvement (Washington D.C.
University Press of America, 1980), 99.
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Trade, technical assistance and significantly arms transfers became the major tools of
Soviet foreign policy in Africa. In 1955 the Soviets cemented a Czech-Egyptian deal to
funnel assistance to Gamal Nasser, the first such deal in Africa by the Soviets. Prior to
1955, Soviet arms transfers were aimed towards China and North Korea. The 1955
Czech-Egyptian deal marked a noticeable increase in arms deliveries to the ostensibly
non-aligned countries. This deal is immediately followed in November and December
that same year by a tour of India, Burma and Afghanistan by Khrushchev and prime
minister Nikolai Bulganin. This tour was highly publicized and Western states took
notice of the Soviet advances. “Between 1955 and 1969 the percentage of Soviet arms
transfers to the nonaligned countries was nearly twice the figure that went to the socialist
countries, 63.loo against 37~9%•136
Egypt was a particular source of alarm for the United States. In Israel’s conflict with
Egypt the United States had denied Nasser access to weapons in order to protect Israel
from a possible Egyptian threat. Nasser turned to the Soviets for assistance and
Khrushchev offered to build the Aswan dam and backs Egypt during and after the Suez
crisis of 1956. One of the things Egypt offered in return was further Soviet access to anti-
colonial leaders in African states. Cairo had become a meeting place for Arab and
African nationalist leaders. The Soviets saw this as fertile ground to introduce the
Communist ideology to these growing movements so access to these meetings was vital.
Nasser however, at the same time, was not totally aligned with the Soviets. Even while
receiving technical assistance and weaponry, Nasser suppressed the Egyptian Communist
136 Union: Major Weapons Exports to Third World Recipients, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Trade, 190.
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party for his own benefit. When Nasser is replaced by Anwar Sadat, Sadat makes a sharp
turn to the United States and away from the Soviets for assistance.
When Ghana achieved independence through a relatively peaceful transfer in 1957,
Kwame Nkrumah took the lead in assisting African anti-colonial movements. Accra, like
Cairo, became a meeting point for African nationalist leaders prompting Moscow to
establish relations with Ghana in 1959 and Moscow opened an embassy in 1960.
Nkruinah was initially cautious about alienating Western economic aid and this raised
Soviet fears of Ghana’s non-reliability. By late 1961 Nkrumah began to rely more
heavily on Soviet assistance and while on a tour of Eastern Europe Nkrumah opined “but
for the Soviet Union, the liberation movement in Africa would have suffered a most cruel
and brutal suppression.”37
Nkrumah had begun to side with the Soviets in large part because of outright
American hostility to many anti-colonial movements in Africa, particularly the 1961
assassination of Patrice Lumumba. Lumumba became the founding Prime Minister of the
Congo in 1960 and was shortly thereafter marginalized and murdered by forces
collaborating with Belgian mercenaries and the Central Intelligence Agency. “The
United States began plotting the murder of Patrice Lumumba on August 25, 1960 less
than two months after he had become the Congo’s first elected Prime Minister.”38
Western duplicity in the Congo caused Nkrumah and Guinea’s Sekou Touré to move
closer to the Soviets for protection. Touré’s experience differed from Nkrumah in that
‘“W. Scott Thomson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 195 7-1966 (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press
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there was clear hostility between France and Guinea, an element not as clearly exhibited
in British decolonization efforts with Ghana. In 1958, Moscow cemented an arms transfer
agreement with Guinea making it the first such Soviet deal in sub-Saharan Africa since
that of Peter the Great two-hundred years earlier. Soviet advances in both Ghana and
Guinea began to cause the U.S. concern.
Sekou Touré in Guinea was the first sub-Saharan target of opportunity for the Soviets.
Touré was a trade union leader who had contact with French Communists in study groups
organized by the party in the colony. The abrupt and acrimonious break with France in
1958 involved a personal feud between Touré and Charles DeGaulle which caused the
split to be stark and complete. This meant that Guinea was in need of external support.
Other Western states desired not to anger France by supporting Guinea, so Guinea had
to turn to anti-Western powers for its immediate economic survival. The Soviets
responded by providing arms and economic credits and invited Touré to Moscow. Its
revolutionary activity caused Guinea to become a center for African nationalists from
Cameroon, Congo, Angola, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire. This activity caused the Soviets to
see Guinea as a vanguard nation helping to usher in a period of revolutionary change.
However, most of the radicals of these movements lost out to the moderates in their
countries and Soviet-Guinea relations soured. “The revisionist nature of Sekou Touré’s
Marxist ideas put his ruling parti democratique de guinée — PDG outside the framework
of the international Communist movement.”39 Add to this ideological disharmony, the
Soviet ambassador was seen as overly zealous in meddling in internal Guinean politics
~ Cohn Legum, “African Outlooks toward the U.S.S.R.” in Communism in Africa, ed. David E.
Albright (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980), 9.
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and was eventually expelled by Touré. The Soviets began to be weary of the
“unpredictability of African personalities and events”.
Inter-Communist conflict developed between Moscow and Beijing which also served
to limit the success of Communism in Africa in the 1 960s. China initiated contact with
African movements in the wake of the Korean War and saw the 1955 Bandung
Conference as an opportunity to expand its influence in Africa similar to its efforts
throughout southeast Asia. Its goal was to “win international recognition and support as
a means of breaking out of the political encirclement that the United States had attempted
to establish.”40 When China did not receive the Soviet aid it expected during the Taiwan
Straits crisis of 1958, China began to take the Soviets to task for its betraying the national
liberation revolutions occurring in Africa as a way of countering both Moscow and
Western advances in the region.
Chinese premier Chou Enlai toured progressive African states in 1964, presented
China as a non-white revolutionary model and was able to establish close ties with
Tanzania and Mugabe’s section of the Zimbabwe resistance. Chinese diplomatic success
in Africa forced the Soviets to counter by supporting African leaders who, while
professing an allegiance to the ideals of Communism were ultimately unable to hold onto
power long enough to carry out their ideological goals and further cement their ties to
Moscow. A string of failures followed. Ben Bella was overthrown in 1965, Nkrumah in
1966, Keita in 1968. Even staunch ally Touré was forced to accept certain economic
realities and drifted back towards France.
140 Yu, George T. Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa in Communism in Africa, ed. David E. Aibright
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The Soviets in their thirst for African allies, in the attempt to stave off complete
failure wound up being quite eager to supply arms to the moderate Nigerian government
during the Biafran secession of 1967 to 1970. “By the end of the decade, in other words,
the Soviet’s most active ally in west Africa was not a revolutionary regime but a centrist
government in need of arms.”141 The Soviet desire was to establish its diplomatic
presence as widely as possible so that Moscow could be recognized as a great power in
dialogue with African states rather than to subvert conservative African governments
already in power.
“It is a remarkable political phenomenon that as of the end of the 1 960s the entire anti-
colonial struggle in Africa had failed to produce a single Marxist-minded regime, or even
an important Communist party...”42 The end of the l960s revealed that the Soviets had
been unable to penetrate nationalist movements with a lasting effect. African leaders
were proving to be autonomous actors unwilling to substitute colonialism for an outside
directed Communism which would be able to dictate policy from abroad.
The United States’ Response in Africa
From the end of World War II until the late 1 950s, the United States had been content
to defer its concerns in Africa to its European allies as long as the U.S. could maintain a
stable presence. As African nationalism matured and the Soviets began to initiate
contacts, U.S. concerns began to mirror Soviet maneuvers in Africa. Neither superpower
141 Naomi Chazan, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, 391.
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allowed African nationalism to develop independently. Instead arms transfers, economic
aid and technical assistance were used to barter for influence and ideological adherents.
Arms transfers from both the U.S. and the Soviets were exchanged for African military,
air and naval bases.
Regional intra-African conflicts then became global in importance. East-west conflict
became intertwined with ethnic and territorial conflict. African actors began to use their
American or Soviet contacts to fulfill their needs just as the American and the Soviets
used African leaders in their strategic battle against each other.
Certain regions in Africa become highly militarized. Samuel Decalo says that in such
circumstances the military becomes a dominant political force which resulted in “no
election has ever ousted a ruling party from office in the three decades of Africa’s
independence.”143
Revisionist thought on Soviet expansion is that it is a defensive reaction against U.S.
aggression in Africa. This section accepts instead that the Soviets have been offensive
and aggressive in Africa pursuing their own strategic concerns. The Soviets continuously
sought to challenge Western hegemony in Africa. As African nationalist movements
began to gain in influence, Soviets began to penetrate Africa more deeply and this
necessitated a change in stance for the Americans. In the face of Soviet advances the
U.S. had to enter African affairs to contain the Soviets there.
~ Samuel Decalo, Coups and Military Rule in Africa. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press
1990), 2.
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William Appleman Williams core contention is that the U.S.’s chief foreign policy
interest is to acquire markets.’44 One must be sure to add however that U.S. policy-
makers were also deeply concerned with denying that access to the Soviets.
Gabriel Kolko modifies Williams’ thought that the U.S. foreign policy goal is its drive to
secure markets by adding that the facilitator is the U.S. military’45. This would mean that
the U.S. would have injected its own armed forces into African conflicts to secure those
markets. Military ‘advisors’ were indeed on the ground during the Congo crisis and
Reagan did provide military support to Chad in the 1 980s, but it must be observed that
the U.S. has restrained the use of its military forces to exceptional occasions. Generally,
the U.S. has instead preferred to provide arms and economic assistance to its proxies in
African conflicts.
Kolko also contends that the U.S. drive for raw materials and the American effort to
deny those materials to the Soviets became core objectives.’46 This served to create a
wide disparity of wealth distribution between Africa and the West and internally between
favored groups and their inter-state competitors. The American attempt to stave off
Soviet advances in Africa served to exacerbate existing rivalries and militarized the
groups in conflict with arms and ideology. David Horowitz says that U.S. policy became
the need to contain social revolutions and maintain stability.’47
~ Williams, The Tragedy ofAmerican Diplomacy, 240.
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When it could not and the instability was thought to invite Soviet involvement, the
U.S. has often resorted to supporting brutal dictators in the fight against international
Communism. Mobutu in Zaire, Banda in Malawi, Botha in South Africa are examples of
this. Schlesinger’s thoughts on universalism argue that all nations share an interest in
stabilizing world affairs. The United Nations, where African states in the 1 960s have
tried to do just that, has been ridiculed by the West in the example of the Congo crisis. In
1960 the Congo was the site of the first major confrontation between the U.S. and Soviets
through their respective proxies as each supported opposite sides in the internal struggle
for power which resulted in and followed Lumumba’s assassination. The West, instead of
seeing the U.N as a forum for universalist international cooperation as Schlesinger
thought, saw the U.N. as a collection of Third world states and tried to undo the U.N.’s
authority. This is true in the case of the Congo as well as other crises. Charles de Gaulle
characterized the U.N as “dominated by the ‘tiers monde’ . . . by the black and yellow
men.”148 The Congo events and the message received by the assassination of Lumumba
led other African nationalists to seek Soviet support. Both Modibo Keita of Mali, Touré
in Guinea and Nkrumah in Ghana initially reached out the Soviets in the early 1 960s to
help secure their positions.
U.S. policy in Africa has been determined by the Cold War and the perceived need to
counter Soviet maneuvers in the region for the duration of the bi-polar conflict. The
stated foreign policy goal of the U.S., emerging from classical liberal philosophy has
148 Henry Cabot Lodge, As It Was. An Inside View ofPolitics and Power in the ‘50s and ‘60s (New
York, Norton, 1976, 169), 78.
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been to advocate freedom in Africa by fostering democracy and development. However
these goals have been bounded by containment policy.
Geopolitical strategic concerns dominated the mindsets of American decision makers
whose interests in Africa shifted with their perception of the potential impact of African
events on their rivalry with the Soviets. The result of this concern is a foreign policy that
all too often overlooked, excused, justified and at its worst assisted political repression,
human rights abuses, corruption and economic mismanagement in states like Nigeria,
Kenya, Somalia, South Africa and Zaire. If the regime in power was willing to oppose
the spread of Communism in the region their faults would be excused or manipulated into
serving US Cold War goals.
The specific Africa policy approach depends upon who was president at the time.
Immediately after WW II ended, the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower administrations
abandoned the traditional U.S. critique of colonialism. U.S. policy makers were more
concerned that Western Europe was insulated and protected against Soviet expansionism
in Eastern European states. The U.S. and Western European states needed the assistance
and favor of each other to counter Stalin’s perceived threats. This in turn meant that the
U.S. would have to restrain its rhetoric and ease its opposition to the colonialist practices
of its allies in Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium.
Henry Byroade, the deputy assistant secretary of state who in 1953 was in charge of
African affairs said “Let us be frank in recognizing our stake in the strength and stability
of certain European nations which exercise influence in the dependent areas.. .We cannot
blindly disregard their side of the colonial question without injury to our own
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security.”49 U.S. policy in Africa was placed in the context of befriending and
strengthening ties to Western European states who would be further destabilized by a
period of abrupt decolonization which might provide opportunities for Soviet penetration
in Africa.
Mason Sears, U.S. representative to the U.N. Trusteeship Council explained “because
of the Cold War, Secretary of State Dulles decided to subordinate the promotion of
African freedom to what he considered the overriding necessity to support our N.A.T.O.
allies and the colonial~ Africa was left to Western Europe and the U.S.
facilitated a supportive, if hands off, approach to African colonialism. For U.S. policy
makers throughout the late 1940’s and mid-1950’s African decolonization could not be
supported because it would serve to weaken the influence and economic position of
Western states and at the same time would strengthen the global position of Communism
by allowing the Soviets to capitalize in Africa. For this reason Byroade plainly stated
“premature independence can be retrogressive and dangerous.”15’
However, this view could not stop African colonies from achieving independence.
Beginning in the early 1950’s African states began to achieve their independence and
events in succession forced the U.S. to re-evaluate its traditional non-involvement in
African affairs. In 1949 the United Nations General Assembly resolved that Libya should
be independent which it gained under King Idris in 1951. The Algerian war of
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independence against France from 1954 to 1962 proved to be the harbinger of future
African liberation movements. In 1956, Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan gained
independence from France and Britain. In 1957 Ghana asserted its freedom in Western
Africa followed by Guinea’s terse break from France in 1958. These movements
occurred soon after Stalin’s 1953 death and the ascendancy ofNikita Khrushchev with
his goal of expanding the influence of the Soviet Union throughout the developing world
to foster revolutions against the bourgeois west.
The convergence of the end of European hegemony in Africa and the rise of Soviet
leadership which wished to fill that vacuum, along with the disclosure that the Soviets
were supplying arms to Egypt’s Gamal Nasser via Czechoslovakian channels caused a
shift in U.S. policy towards Africa. Where before the goal was to ignore and excuse
African colonialism to strengthen the ties and strategic position of the West, now the U.S.
would have to inject itself in Africa to counter Soviet gains in the region. In 1957, then
vice president Nixon upon return from a visit to Africa concluded that “the course of
Africa’s development. . . could well prove to be the decisive factor in the conflict between
the forces of freedom and international Communism.”52 In 1958 the State department
established a bureau of African affairs and commissioned a series of National Security
Council policy reviews. This new focus served to galvanize U.S. policy makers around
the necessity and merits of competing with the Soviet for political and strategic influence




The Kennedy administration matured the African policies of the Eisenhower
administration and through 1963 numerous African leaders were welcomed into the
White House for talks. The Kennedy administration saw many newly emergent African
states headed towards closer ties with the Soviets and through the early 1 960s organized
itself to counter Soviet advances in the region. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant
to the President 1961 — 1964, remarked, “the Congo was in turmoil; a number of the new
states, especially Guinea, Mali and Ghana, seemed well launched on the Marxist road;
and the rest of Africa was consumed with bitterness towards the West.”53
In the attempt to address and counter this trend in 1961 eleven African heads of state
were invited to the White House for ceremonial handshakes and formal diplomacy.
Another ten visited in 1962 followed by seven others in 1963. To back up the promises
made and to support the arrangements reached, U.S. aid to Africa increased to $519
million in 1963.’~~
This heightened importance of African affairs to U.S. strategic concerns was not to
last however. The assassination of John F. Kennedy and the re-ordering of U.S. foreign
policy goals served to produce a re-evaluation of the effectiveness of Soviet
maneuverings in Africa. U.S. decision-makers began to view that the Soviet threat in
Africa was over-estimated. It soon appeared that the newly independent states were
economically and in some cases culturally so tied to the West that the Soviets were
having difficulties penetrating many areas with lasting effects. In the early 1960’s China
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had began to compete for African attention sending premier Zhou Enlai to tour
progressive African states in 1964 “presenting China as a revolutionary model.”55
This competition between Moscow and Beijing served to limit the effectiveness of
Communist penetration in the eyes of many U.S. officials. Anthony Lake recalled in his
book The “Tar Baby” Option that it was “conventional bureaucratic wisdom that the
Chinese and Russians would be unsuccessful in efforts to dominate the new nations of
Africa, and the official perception of American interests in Africa dwindled
accordingly.”56 U. S. policy-makers began to look at options to disengage from African
affairs typified by George Ball, Under-Secretary of State for political affairs for the
Johnson administration who commented “We could simplify our problems with Africa as
well as with certain other areas of the less-developed world if we did not take such a
proprietary interest in their development.”57
As Eisenhower’s vice-president, Nixon viewed Africa as a central battleground to
confront Soviet expansionism, but as president, Nixon and his aides looked at Africa as
“one of the world’s striking examples.. .of the failure of the appeal of Communism in
new nations.”158 With the thought that the Soviet were failing in their effort to gain
influence in Africa came the devaluation of Africa in U.S. foreign policy calculations.
From the high of $519 million in 1963, U.S. aid to African dropped 60 percent to $286
million in 1973.
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It was not until the mid-1970s that Africa became the scene for intense Cold War
conflict. The conflicts in Angola and in Ethiopia, which are the focal points of this work,
presented certain opportunities for both the West and the Soviet Union along with Cuba.
These opportunities resulted in the struggles in both Angola and Ethiopia becoming “far
more violent as a result of the American and Soviet arms that flowed to the warring
factions.”59 In the 1970s both of the Cold War combatants used their ideologies to guide
their involvement in both Angola as well as Ethiopia.
Robert Rothstein relates that for the West the liberal goals of “rapid development, the
reduction of poverty, increased equality, the improvement of human rights, integration
into the international system, democratic and stable political systems. . . have all at one
time or another seemed to receive the highest priority.”60 Soviet goals included the
development of domestic revolutionary vanguards in African states that would confront
both the imperialists and the bourgeois leadership class, rapid industrialization and the
global unity of Communist governments to the consternation of the capitalists of the
West. The West had its values, the East held onto a different set. Angola and Ethiopia
became the testing ground with ideological success measured in territory and blood.
African Nationalism
At this point, a few claims can be made about the general ineffectiveness of the
superpowers to thoroughly penetrate the African nationalist movements of the 1960s. As
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it has been argued, U.S. involvement in Africa in the 1960s was to mirror and check
Soviet advances. When the American policy-makers decided that the Soviet threat was
over-estimated, then attention and aid were reduced. The ability of the Soviets to adapt
their ideology to African circumstances is a key indicator of the Cold War rivalry in
Africa.
From the late 1950s through the 1960s, Communism and the African nationalism of
the independence period developed as antipathetic forces. This reality served to limit the
ability of the Soviets to engage African groups to successfully fulfill Soviet foreign
policy goals. Both Communism and nationalism rely on two basic requirements, they
must be mass movements and they must produce significant numbers of vanguard cadres.
In the drive for independence from the colonizers and the resulting strong feelings of
nationalism surging through populations which devolved into an extensive series of
patronlclient relationships which fractured African societies, Communists had no chance
of becoming mass popular movements.
Fracturing of mass movements.
By the time the independence movements had begun to mature in successive states
from the late 1950s forward, nationalist liberation movements had ceased to be mass
popular movements. The new African states were not able to totally shun the colonial
legacy and the eco-political mechanisms began to fracture African societies. Many
nationalist forces that assumed the mantle of leadership due to the support of popular
intertribal coalitions came under the control of smaller yet powerful groups which
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became concerned with their ability to dominate the machinery of the state. This control
was secured by the ability to distribute state resources to the favored group of the
leadership which in turn indebted that group to support those leaders in the promise of
continued favor. A combination of prebendalism (where there is competition for public
office so that the individual and his group can personally benefit from that office),
clientelism (the process of providing material support to clients via pay-offs which in turn
indebts the client and the patron/facilitator to each other) and coercion (the use of the
military and police apparatus to facilitate the ease of the aforementioned by stifling the
ability of those outside the client/patron arrangement to change it) shifted the priorities of
decision-makers and diluted the possibility of a sustained mass movement that would be
amenable certainly to the Soviets but also to development.
“To obtain and keep clients, one must gain a prebendal office; and to be sure that in
the distribution of prebendal offices an individual or his kin have a reasonable chance of
procuring one, clients must be gathered together to make their collective claim as well as
to prove that the aspirant patron is a person of consequence whose co-optation would be
rewarding.”6’ This served to fracture the initial popular movements along tribal and
ethnic lines. Newly installed regimes, in part owing to the inherited legacy of the former
colonial state apparatus, lacked organic connections with social groups different from
those of the decision-makers.
The colonial state was designed to levy taxes, preserve a sense of law and order that
benefited the Westerners and maintain a basic infrastructure whose goal is to enrich the
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colonizing European state. Outside of this scheme is bridging the linguistic and cultural
diversity of the people drawn into the arbitrary borders of the colonial state. Client
groups were served and marginalized groups remained on the outside. After
independence, new leadership groups based their position on and further centralized state
power around the inherited institutions. “They aimed to neutralize opponents, usually
regionally/ethnically based, and implement ambitious development programs”62 but the
socio-economic realities served to limit the effectiveness of their development while
simultaneously expanding political conflict over the ability to allocate state resources.
Severe poverty and a correspondingly low tax base coupled with low education levels
served to limit the state’s ability to pay its civil service and provide services to the people
living within its borders. The reality of an inefficient state along with populations
experiencing extreme need served to heighten conflict over the state apparatus and the
ability to allocate whatever scarce resources were present. “Mass poverty.. .fosters an
invidious struggle for scarce resources that threatens bureaucratic élan or socialist
commitment within the state apparatuses.”63 The reality of extreme scarcity and
concentrated need affected the reality of the independence leaders and made mere
survival a core goal of the state.
The groups in power are either galvanized around the leadership of a charismatic
personality, a coalition of economic or regional interests that operate to the consternation
of other alienated groups or around the coercive apparatus of the military which compels
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compliance in ways not entirely unfamiliar to the former colonizers. Example of these
circumstances are rife across the continent and Idi Amin’s Uganda (1971-1979), Emperor
Bokassa I in the Central African Republic (1966-1979) and Francisco Macias Nguema
(1968-1979) in Equatorial Guinea are the extreme cases.
Group competition following independence forced those groups to seek external
support for their ability to confront opponents. Moscow, along with Washington, began
to provide such aid. The external assistance facilitated greater conflict and this
exacerbated the fracturing of the states which is counter the need of Communism for a
mass movement led by a revolutionary vanguard. The Marxist cells that did develop
operated in opposition to the predominant non-revolutionary nationalist leadership’64 and
were thus only capable of achieving limited influence.
Ideological disharmony.
African anti-imperialism was directed against all foreign governments not merely the
former colonizers. When the African nationalists were engaged in expelling foreign rulers
there was not the desire to replace Western rulers with anti-imperialist ones. “. . .They
joined together in rejecting the dominance of white rule and called for genuine local self-
determination.”65 Cooperation and development partnerships were sought, but control by
the Soviets and its allies were not.
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Many nationalist leaders indeed developed their perspectives by borrowing from
Marxists but there were the elements of other ideologies present as well. The thoughts,
writings and programs of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and Patrice
Lumumba all combined the works of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky with liberal, Western
ideas which also included the thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.
“Their ideas were a complex mélange of John Stuart Mills’ liberalism, the anti-
colonialism of Lenin, a dash of Marxian class analysis and a touching belief in the
existence of Rousseau’s general will.”66
Adding to this theoretical mix were the strong and pervasive feelings of African pride,
negritude, black consciousness, and Pan-Africanism. Even the more radical socialists
operating amidst the nationalist movements labeled their ideas African Socialism in order
to stress the differences between their historical trajectory and that of other Socialists
operating internationally. African socialists argued that “there is Socialism distinctive to
Africa, a Socialism surfacing, quite spontaneously, from egalitarian cultural
predispositions and practices which antedate the European penetration of Africa.”67
Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Sekou Touré each differed from Marxist thoughts
about the necessity of an alienated proletariat being the necessary element for the
inevitable revolution.
Just as Mao had found decades earlier in China, the agrarian nature of African colonial
societies meant the peasantry vastly outnumbered whatever African proletariat that could
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be found and thus the nature of class struggle would have to be redefined for the African
setting. Touré rejected the concept of class struggle of Marx and Lenin “because African
social groups’ identity of living conditions and lack of differentiation into antagonistic
classes” meant that “the Marxism which served to mobilize the African populations and
in particular the working-class, has been amputated of those of its characteristics which
did not correspond to the African realities.”68
For Julius Nyerere, Lenin’s faith in the revolutionary potential of the urban exploited
worker is supplanted by his faith in traditional African society which was in its very
nature socialist. Nyerere in the 1962 essay ‘Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism’
says that “Socialism is an attitude of mind. We in Africa have no more need of being
‘converted’ to Socialism than we have of being ‘taught’ democracy. Both are rooted in
our own past-in the traditional society what produced us.”169 The requirement then is for
a liberation movement which stemmed from the village reasserting its traditional values
that would revolutionize the African state towards independence and beyond. African
nationalism thus is composed of a theoretical mix which served to limit Soviet foreign
policy goals in Africa while at the same time, in the drive for independence, African
nationalists were separating themselves from the colonial Western states.
Pan-Africanism and experience.
Other factors combined to influence the rise of African nationalism which made it
antipathetic to both Soviet and U.S. strategic Cold War goals. First the rise and spread of
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Pan-Africanism linked people of African descent on all sides of the Atlantic ocean in the
common goal to organize themselves to resist the colonial and racist forces acting against
them. “The Pan-African movement, originated largely by West Indian and Black
Americans, provided a forum and an impetus for those articulate Africans who began to
challenge the very system of imperial rule.”7°
In 1945 the Pan-African Congress met in Manchester, England and articulated both a
“Declaration to the Colonial Peoples” which held self-determination and sovereignty the
end goals of liberation movements as well as a “Declaration to the Colonial Powers”
which said that if the West is “still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as
a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom.”71
A second set of factors influencing African nationalism which made it incompatible to
the strategic goals of the Cold War combatants was the military experiences of Africans
in World War I, the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia and World War II. During World
War I, each of the colonial states maintained standing army divisions comprised of
African soldiers who played combat roles in Europe. During World War II African
recruits were of strategic importance to many battles in both North African and across
Europe. For example, France employed seven African divisions of the Tirailleurs
Senegalais which was composed of African conscripts from all of France’s colonized
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populations. This “constituted 7 percent of all French military forces stationed in Europe,
with 20,000-25,000 soldiers dying during the course of World War jj~172
In addition to this military experience, there is also the embarrassment of nascent
African nationalists at the defeat of Ethiopia’s 250,000 man army by Italy in 1935. A
precursor event to World War II, this invasion could also be seen as a blot which would
stain African relations with the US and the Soviets thirty years later. Ethiopia was seen
as a “proud symbol of African independence and black achievement”73 and its quick and
devastating defeat at the hands of Mussolini hungry for colonial acquisition sent a strong
message to the entire African Diaspora. Nkrumah’s outrage is symptomatic of the wider
sentiment of Africans both at home and abroad. “. . .1 could do nothing but glare at each
impassive face wondering if those people could possible realize the wickedness of
colonialism, and praying that the day might come when I could play my part in bringing
about the downfall of such a system. My nationalism surged to the fore; I was ready and
willing to go through hell itself, if need be, in order to achieve my object.”174
These military experiences had two key results on the development of African
nationalism. First the experiences in the battlefields of Europe, Asia, North African and
in Ethiopia shattered the “colonially inspired images of whites as invincible and all-
powerful.”175 African soldiers in combat killed whites themselves, saw whites killing
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each other and importantly read the early quick Japanese victories as the sign that
European armies could in fact be defeated by non-Europeans.
Based on their experiences some African soldiers came to see themselves as better
soldiers made of sterner bravery and nerve. “Laqui Conde, a Tirailleurs Senegalais
recruited from Côte d’Ivoire, summed up a common belief among African soldiers: ‘We
were stronger than the whites. The bullet that hit my tooth would have killed a white.
When the shooting came, the whites ran. They knew the area and we did not so we
stayed. Our officers? They were behind us.”176 To the large groups of African soldiers
and the nascent nationalists participating in and observing these events, subservience and
nihilism about colonialism began to give way to feelings of self-determination and self
pride. “The eye-opening experiences of many Africans who served their colonial masters
at war underscored their lack of opportunities at home and exacerbated the feelings of
injustice that were already growing.”77
These feelings extended into the independence period aided by yet a third set of
influences which served to blunt the U.S. and Soviets in their effort to achieve their
strategic goals in Africa. The independence of India and China served as concrete
examples of how people of color could free themselves from their colonizers and gain
statehood and self-determination. African nationalists were inspired by the success of
Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru in 1947 as well as the Communist victory of Mao
Zedung in 1949. If two diverse movements could achieve success against the West then
surely the diversity of African liberation movements could share similar results.
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If the large and diverse populations of both India and China could through non
violence and warfare respectively achieve their goals then the diversity present in African
situations could offer up both similarly divergent paths. African nationalists had both
armed struggle and forced negotiation to choose from and across the continent these
techniques were deployed with varying degrees of effect and success. These three sets of
factors, the rise of Pan-Africanism, military experience and the Asian examples served to
limit the initial success in the late 1950s early 1960s of the U.S. and the Soviets in
Africa. Their ability to supplant African liberation desires to the larger Cold War conflict
was hampered by strong feelings of pride and self-determination fed by real world
examples of what African groups could achieve if they but dared to.
From the 1950 through the 1960s African nationalists began to rise up across the
continent using different techniques owing to their different populations and their specific
colonial experiences. Charismatic leaders, ideology, ethnicity and armed struggle were
each used towards different results. “On the one hand, a weakening of imperial resolve,
as in Egypt, Ghana and Sudan where independence was achieved early on; on the other
hand, a strengthening of the military instrument as in Kenya, Algeria and Angola where
imperialists brutalized native peoples.” 178
As the 1 960s ended, this ideological dis-harmony and the fracturing of the
independence movements which precipitated the perceived need of new leaders to
reinforce their weak regimes threatened from within by opposition groups caused the
early post-independence commitment to non-alignment to wane.
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Non-alignment and the idea of the Third World reflected the desire of African states in
their drive for self-determination to initially shun close links with both the West and the
Soviets. African nationalists indeed had proof of the necessity of non-alignment with the
West. Soviet involvement in the early post-independence years proved to be quite
problematic on a number of fronts. First, Moscow’s stated goal was to get the nationalist
movements to openly identify themselves with the Soviets against both the West and later
China, to serve Soviet Cold War goals. This resulted in some cases in the Soviets
applying pressure to newly independent states and this heavy handed approach did not
match the sensitivities of independence felt by the new leaders.
Moscow began to intervene in power struggles within post-independence regimes to
the consternation of the new leadership. Soviet support of the political opponents of
Sekou Touré in Guinea led to the expulsion of the Soviet ambassador in 1961. The
Soviets supported avowed Marxist groups as well as other groups that rose to challenge
the leaders of the new states such as “Felix Moumie’s Cameroon Peoples Union (UPC),
small Marxist intellectual groups that emerged as vestiges of the former anti-colonial
Democratic African Assembly (RDA) in some of the countries of West and Equatorial
Africa and Oginga Odinga’s People Party in Kenya.”79 These experiences caused
African leadership to be hesitant about establishing close links with the Soviets while at
the same time shunning intimacy with the former colonial powers, thus proving the
necessity of a non-aligned movement.
As the old colonial order crumbled the Soviets moved in to capitalize on the situation.
Soviet African policy initiatives were made in response to developments in African
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countries and the activities of other actors outside Soviet control. Therefore, Soviet policy
in Africa has been reactive and opportunistic while simultaneously offensive to the West.
The mix of 1 960s ideals which comprised African nationalism (Pan-Africanism, black
consciousness, Socialism, liberalism, negritude etc.) gave way in the 1970s to political
realities and the conflict over the ability to control the state to be able to make distributive
decisions about the allocation of scarce goods, resources and services to benefit one’s
group. Where one state is supported by one or a collection of Western powers, then the
opposition group felt the necessity to turn to the Soviets, its satellites or its Chinese or
Cuban allies for help counterbalancing the situation. When this circumstance of
depending on foreign powers to help sustain struggling states and/or support opposition
forces is expanded across the continent during the Cold War, then African political
conflict becomes externalized.
Domestic forces, be they state regimes or groups in opposition to the state are
weakened by their dependence on external support. The African continent becomes
unable to solve its own problems chiefly because groups in conflict become reliant on the
millions and sometimes billions of dollars in aid and military assistance. African leaders
indeed came to realize this. Julius Nyerere once said “We regret, even while we
recognize its occasional necessity, that an African government should ask for military
assistance from a non-African country when it is faced with an external threat to its
national integrity.” Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, when temporarily head of state in July
1978, remarked, “We African leaders must realize that we cannot ask outside powers to
leave us alone while in most cases it is our own actions which provide them with the
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excuse to interfere in our affairs.” Even Sekou Touré came to agree and offered the
criticism “We Africans are more responsible for our misfortunes than imperialism.”180
African leaders were well aware of the difficulties they were inviting in when they
accepted external aid to address their internal problems, but they essentially understood
the fragility of their positions. Economic resources were minimal because of the colonial
legacy of exploitation. Military capabilities were constrained by the limited economic
resources and the political options to be able to make authoritative decisions were thus
restricted. Even the opposition groups well understood that operating in a fractured
single-party state meant that resources and options were bounded by the eco-political
realities of scarcity and powerlessness.
With the need for external assistance so great there also came the joint realization that
the core consideration of both the West and the Soviets would be to further their Cold
War conflict by contributing to African actors. Nyerere said it plainly: “We know that a
response to such a request by any of the big powers is determined by what that big power
sees as its own interest.”181 Thus, the dynamic and conflict-ridden climate of post
independence Africa of the 1 960s served to open the continent as a theater for Cold War
hostilities between the Soviets and the West in the 1 970s. The United States, Britain,
France, Belgium, Portugal as well as the Soviet Union, its Eastern European satellites




objectives defined in Cold War terms exogenous to the African affairs that often
precipitated the initial invitations for aid and assistance.
Angola and Ethiopia are examples of this state of affairs. The economic realities of the
1 970s dictated that Angola had to continually rely on Western oil companies to benefit
from its own major resource. Similar to the case with Egypt, Soviet goals were initially
blunted by Angolans realizing that they had to negotiate with the U.S. to manage their
conflict with Namibia and South Africa. Similar to the Guinean experience, the Soviet
embassy in Angola raised the ire of the host country by meddling in domestic political
affairs. Fortunately for the Soviet goal of increased and continued involvement in
Angola, South Africa continued its hard line on Namibia and continued to make military
incursions into Angolan territory. This served to keep the MPLA engaged with the
Soviets thus causing the Angolan case to differentiate itself from both the Guinean and
the Egyptian case.
Throughout the 1 970s and the 1 980s, Soviet arms shipments skyrocketed chiefly due
to shipments to Ethiopia and Angola, the points of comparison for this work. Both
governments were fending off external attacks from their neighbors while attempting to
manage internal conflicts. The MPLA in Angola has consistently considered itself a
Marxist party and the Dergue in Ethiopia evolved to consider itself the same.
In the 1970s the Soviets became the largest arms dealer in Africa. From 1975-1979
the Soviets shipped $3.4 billion in arms to Africa. From 1980-1983 another $3.87 billion
was shipped to African recipients. The collapse of Portuguese colonialism provided
another avenue for the Soviets to inject themselves in African affairs. The Soviets began
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to view failure in Angola as a blow to its influence in Africa. Initial Soviet interaction
with the MPLA dating back to the early 1 960s was geared towards helping the group
secure a place in a unity government with UNITA and the FNLA. The interaction
became an obligation for the Soviets because if it could not defend an avowed Marxist
group like the MPLA its ability to wield influence in Africa would be greatly
diminished.’82
Soviet decision-makers in both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Defense initially doubted if the MPLA could survive and initially favored defending the
status quo of détente but soon began to feel pressured by both U.S. and Chinese
involvement in the area. U.S. moves in Angola empowered intra-Soviet critics of détente
and made Brezhnev vulnerable in Moscow. Going full speed with his support of the
MPLA in Angola allowed “Brezhnev and his supporters a convenient demonstration to
critics at home and abroad that détente was not a ‘one way street,’ and that the U.S.S.R.
did not betray the revolutionary forces in the third world, and that Angola would not
become another Chjle.”83 Agostinho Neto began to forge close ties with Castro having
visited Cuba numerous times during their liberation struggle and they shared a common
ideological outlook. Castro began to view Angola as a testing ground for Cuba’s
commitment to liberation struggles abroad and a vehicle for enhancing Cuba’s place in
global affairs. Even as Cuba relied on Soviet logistical support and materials, Castro
began to pressure Brezhnev into taking a more active role in supporting the MPLA.
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In the horn of Africa, Soviet strategic concerns were keeping and enhancing access to
both the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea. Soviets were thus
concerned that the Red Sea did not become completely dominated by Arab countries.
Continued Soviet diplomatic policy in the horn and the region results from this concern.
The Soviets maintained continued contact with Haile Selassie in Ethiopia as well as with
Nimeiri in Sudan. Siad Barre’s regime in Somalia became a key client state receiving
180 million in arms and naval installations built at Berbera.
In May of 1975, a group of military officers formally came into political power
deposing Emperor Haile Selassie. The U.S. made a longtime ally of Haile Selassie, yet,
when he was overthrown, rather than denouncing the coup “the Nixon administration
preferred to keep the lines of communication open with the new leaders in Addis
Ababa. . .to prevent them from running off to Moscow”84 U.S./Ethiopian relations
deteriorated steadily and when Mengistu consolidated his rule via a bloody shoot-out in
February 1977, he was immediately supported by the Cubans and the Soviets. Marxism-
Leninism was proclaimed the new state ideology and the Dergue began to appeal to the
Soviets for assistance.
There then arose a dilemma, for the Soviets had been giving aid to Somalia in its
claims over the Ogaden region. Eventually the Soviets alienated Siad Barre and began
withholding weaponry from Mogadishu. Sensing an opening and desiring another
partner in the horn of Africa, the Carter administration made overtures to Mogadishu, but
did not allow any formal assistance due to Somalia’s presence and activities in the
Ogaden. Washington did however move to counter the growing Soviet-Cuban presence
184 Fred Marte, Political Cycles in International Relations, 235.
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by using its influence with Britain, France as well as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran (under
the Shah). China also moved in and supported Mogadishu sensing moves by the Soviets
to increase its hegemony in the region. Therefore, it is observable that in the Ethiopian
example the East-West lines of conflict shifted drastically.
The Soviets then transferred its support from Barre in Somalia to Mengistu believing
that Ethiopia would be more ideologically dependable and better able to allow the Soviets
to further its goals in the region. There was at first an effort to reconcile the Dergue with
Barre’ s government as well as with the Eritrean nationalists together under the shared
banner of Socialism attempted by both Moscow and Castro. Indeed. Castro was able to
bring both Mengistu and Barre to a negotiation about a proposed socialist federation in
the region. Barre however, insisted that independence for both the Ogaden region as well
as Eritrea would have to be secured before any wider federation could be created.
Mengistu for his part had zero desire to allow both the Ogaden and Eritrean territories to
leave Ethiopian control. In this instance, the Soviets attempted to use an ideological
appeal to subvert nationalist tendencies but “the logic of Socialism failed to prevail over
that of nationalism, forcing the Soviets to choose between partners.”85
‘~ Naomi Chazan, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, 394.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONFLICT IN THE ANGOLAN AND ETHIOPIAN PERIPHERY
“Ourfingers will be in everypie” — U. S. Senator Robert A. Taft, 1943186
“Ourfrontiers today are on every continent. “— Senator John Fitzgerald Kennedy,
1960187
“The ultimate aim ofthe Communist International is to replace world capitalist economy
by a world system ofCommunism. “Third Comintern program adopted 1928188
“Only the deliberately blind couldfail to see this latest example of imperialist
interference in Africa as apart of the world-wide struggle being waged between, on the
one hand, the independent developing states, and on the other, the neo-colonialist,
imperialist countries trying to exertpressure on them. “Kwame Nkrumah, 1969 189
This chapter will investigate political conflict in Ethiopia and Angola. The World
Systems approach will be used to place the Cold War tensions and the states galvanized
around the two super powers in context.
World Systems Approach
The core assumption of the World Systems approach is that the world is composed of
a series of interconnected social and economic relationships which result in conflicts that
serve to produce patterns of unequal exchange and development. This inequality is
characterized by the destinction between the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery.
186 Quoted in Williams, Empire as a Way ofLjfe, 169.
187 Ibid, 193.
188 Quoted in Carl Cohen ed., Communism, Fascism and Democracy (New York, McGraw-Hill
Companies, 1997), 211.
189 Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge ofthe Congo (New York, International Publishers, 1967), viii.
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In this framework, the chief actors are states, ethnic groups within certain states and
trans-national corporations.
The basic dynamic at work here is the division of labor between core and peripheral
states. The core produces technologically advanced products, houses the capital
necessary for that development, and reaps the full benefits of the profits from the
enterprise. The periphery supplies cheap labor and raw materials which enhances the
profit margin of the trans-national corporation, which in turn enriches the core. The
semi-periphery is vital to the health of the system. It facilitates the transfer of materials
and profit to the core, and is exploited by the core in this role, while simultaneously
acting as another level of exploitation for the periphery as it often serves as the law
enforcer and conductor of the means of coercion.
The semi-peripheral state is both the exploited, as well as exploiter in a fashion similar
to that conceived by Marx’s division of the petit bourgeoisie. The core is industrialized,
modern, developed and wealthy by virtue of its position in the global marketplace. The
periphery is pre-industrial, traditionalist, (under)developed and poor, also by its economic
and social position in that same global marketplace.
In A D~fferent Hunger, Ambalavaner Sivanandan seeks to advance the approach of
Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein and others. Sivanandan says the “center of gravity of
the exploitation of labor by capital had been displaced from the center of the system to
the periphery.” 190 As globalized capitalism matured and the market began to embrace
more detailed modes of production, the center no longer merely supplied the
190 Ambalavaner Sivanandan, A Different Hunger. Writings on Black Resistance (London: Pluto Press,
1982), 102.
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manufactured goods and the periphery the raw materials. “Instead the center provided the
plant and the know-how while the periphery supplied primary products and
manufactures.”9’
In his 1972 essay, “Transnational capitalism and national disintegration in Latin
America, Osvaldo Sunkel, says that “...the international capitalist system contains a
internationalized nucleus of activities, regions and social groups of varying degrees of
importance in each country.” Later he adds, “Modernization implies the gradual
replacement of the traditional productive structure by another of much higher capital
intensiveness... In this process, some national entrepreneurs are incorporated as
executives into the new enterprises or those absorbed by the TRANCO (transnational
corporations), and others are marginalized; some professionals, forming part of the
technical staff and the segment of employees are incorporated, and the rest are
marginalized; part of the qualified labor supply and those that are considered fit to be
upgraded are incorporated, while the remainder are marginalized.”92
Thus world system theory assumes that there is a series of marginalizations which will
breed exploitation and result in conflict built into the global system that have to be
administered in order for the system to generate profit in as free a fashion as possible.
The frictions are a by-product of the exploitative nature of a global economic system
divided into core and periphery and wealthy and poor. “Peripheral countries exhibit an
economic system at odds with the cultural and political institutions of the people it
191 Ibid, 102.
192 Osvaldo Sunkel, “Transnational capitalism and national disintegration in Latin America” in Social
and Economic Studies, 22, 1, (March 1972): 132 - 76.
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exploits. The base and the superstructure do not compliment and reinforce each other,
they are in fundamental conflict — and exploitation is naked, crude and~
World Systems approach then assumes that there is exploitation at work in the
systemic marginalization of certain domestic groups to the benefit of other external
groups. This systemic marginalization amounts to structural violence enacted against the
aggrieved groups which in turn manifests physical violence in the extreme case. When
the core begins to inject its military presence on behalf of one group’s efforts to
marginalize another group, and another core state by virtue of its competition steps in to
assist the marginalized group with weaponry of its own, the situation is ripe for civil war.
This is the circumstance produced in both Angola and Ethiopia during the Cold War.
Marginalized or peripherized groups within the periphery, in conflict with each other in
the ultimate service of core groups which are themselves engaged in inter-core conflict
are being browbeaten by imperialism. Johan Galtung defines imperialism as a “species in
a genus of dominance and power relationships.”94
For Galtung, there are three dynamics in the connection between center and peripheral
states that compose an imperialist relationship that this work will utilize. First there is a
“harmony of interests between the center in the center and the center in the periphery
~ For this work the center or core states will be the Soviet Union and the United
States. The periphery explicandum of this work will be Angola and Ethiopia as well as
193 Sivanandan, A D~fferent Hunger, 145.




the states in southern Africa and the horn that played such a critical role as the conflicts
became regional in scope. The decision-makers in the core states will be seen as
harmonizing their interests with the various decision-makers in both Angola and Ethiopia
which are serving as their proxies in the region.
Secondly for Galtung, there is more disharmony of interest within the periphery nation
than within the center nations. This work will investigate the frictions between various
groups in the peripheral states of Angola and Ethiopia and will also note the disharmony
that existed between both blocs and their semi-peripheries. The bloc of states that
became polarized around Soviet policy in Africa and which comprise the semi-periphery
for the East external to Africa are: Cuba, China, East Germany and North Vietnam. The
semi-periphery for the West includes: Britain, France, Portugal, Israel and South Africa.
Thirdly, Galtung says there is “disharmony of interest between the periphery in the
center nation and the periphery in the periphery nation.”196 The periphery in the center
will be the proxies that engaged each other with the backing of either their Western or
Soviet patrons. The disharmony between the periphery in the periphery will be detailed
in the respective conflicts. Disharmony in the periphery in the center will be investigated
by noting the various motivations that developed during the patron-client relationships.
To be sure, African decision makers were rational as they sought external assistance and
support.
This study aims to compare the obviously disharmonious civil wars of both Angola
and Ethiopia and will indeed acknowledge intra-core conflict for example between the
Soviet Union, China and Cuba as well as the conflict between the United States and
196 Ibid, 85.
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Portugal, France and South Africa. Yet, true to Galtung’s analysis, the civil war between
factions in both African states may be observed to have indeed spilled more blood and
expended more resources both human and material than did the cold intra-core Cold War
conflict.
Pre- 1974 Revolution - Ethiopia
The geostrategic concerns of the Ethiopian state and the related interests of external
actors have a long and storied history, specifically in both the Eritrean and Ogaden
regions. “For as far back as records reach-at least 500 years-control of the local
periphery has been in its own view, the historic mission or manifest destiny of the
Ethiopian State.”97 Territorial integrity, regional dissonance and national separatism are
con~imon themes. Seen in this light the United States and the Soviet Union are the latest
in a historical trajectory that have become involved in these traditional Ethiopian
concerns.
The beginning of the 20th century saw a new set of Western economic goals in
Ethiopia. In 1900, President McKinley was advised by Robert P. Skinner, McKinney’s
Consul-General in France, that the US should establish diplomatic ties with Ethiopia “in
order to procure exact information for American exporters and manufacturers”98 In
1903, President Roosevelt dispatched Skinner to Ethiopia.. . authorized to sign a
commercial treaty. On December 27, 1903, the ‘Treaty to Regulate Commercial
‘~ Christopher Clapham, “Ethiopia,” in The Political Economy ofAfrican Foreign Policy, eds. Timothy
M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 80.
198 Paul B. Henze, Horn ofAfrica. From War to Peace (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 41.
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Relations between the U.S. and the King of Ethiopia,” was signed with a ten year term of
effect.
Haile Selassie rose to power in 1930 but his comfort on the throne would soon be
challenged setting in motion a chain of events that would launch Ethiopia forcefully into
world affairs. Italy invaded Ethiopia in October 1935 with superior mechanized ground
troops, a large air force and freely using chemical weapons. The overwhelmed Ethiopians
were routed and Selassie was forced to evacuate through Djibouti to England where he
spent the years advocating for the Ethiopian peoples’ suffering under fascist oppression.
In June of 1936, Selassie delivered a speech’99 to the League of Nations in which he
made an appeal for help and noted early on the growing threat posed by Italy and
Germany. In June 1940, a coalition of African colonial forces supported by the British
engaged in what is called the East African Campaign which was successful in routing the
Italians allowing Selassie to return to Ethiopia by January of 1941. Haile Selassie’s
return from exile marked the beginning of an Ethiopian modernization plan, centered on
the defense of both the state and his regime which was dependant on economic ties to the
West. Selassie’s modernization program was designed to augment the country’s
defensive apparatus that could provide stability for the state through securing Selassie’ s
regime.
This plan was tied to the West from the beginning. Ethiopia had enjoyed long
standing warm relations with Sweden and Norway. In 1946, Sweden helped Ethiopia
build an air force program and assisted in building a training institute for the Ethiopian
199 Haile Selassie, “Appeal to the League of Nations”,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acadJintrel/seiassie.htm (accessed June 3, 2008).
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imperial guard. While the Swedish assistance is notable, between 1940 and the early
1950’s the British were the major military supplier to Ethiopia. This British Ethiopian
link was an uneasy relationship for two reasons. First, Britain continued to favor a
Greater Somalia which meant that Ethiopia would have to give up the Ogaden region.
Secondly, the British did not see it fully within their interests to create a militarily strong
Ethiopia. These realities fostered a sense of unease between London and Addis Ababa. If
Selassie was to secure his military ambitions he would have to look elsewhere and by
1952 he had begun to turn more fully to Washington.
On May 22, 1953 the U.S. and Ethiopia signed two agreements that would have
effects lasting into the 1 970s. The First agreement provided a twenty-five year lease of
land to establish a military communications base called Kagnew located in Asmara,
Eritrea. Selassie wanted a return security commitment for the U.S. to defend his regime
if attacked. The U.S. refused that but did commit to train Ethiopians in counterinsurgency
operations. The Second agreement granted military assistance and training to Ethiopia
and provided for economic aid. Both Ethiopia and the U.S. strategically benefited from
this relationship. The U.S. gained a strategic foothold adjacent to the oil rich Persian
Gulf. This was important for it allowed the U.S. to monitor and influence the waterways
of the area, thus permiting the U.S. the option of propelling its military forces in the
region.
While the British and the Ethiopians disagreed on the Ogaden region, Ethiopia and the
U.S. agreed on the Eritrean issue. The U.S. view was that Eritrea would be secured from
the growing Arabic radicalism in the region if its fortunes were tied to those of Ethiopia.
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John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State said “Nevertheless, the strategic interest of the
United States in the Red Sea basin and considerations of security and world peace make
it necessary that the country (Eritrea) has to be linked with our ally, Ethiopia.”20°
Ethiopia was more than willing to facilitate the control of Eritrea because that meant that
Ethiopian access to the Red Sea was secured.
Soon, with U.S. prodding, the United Nations federated Eritrea to Ethiopia. Bereket
Selassie says “...Eritrea.. . was instead federated with Ethiopia in 1952, the result of a
United Nations resolution that was sponsored by the United States whose strategic
interests in the area coincided with Haile Selassie’ s interest in Eritrea’ s human and
material resources.”201 The Arab states responded angrily towards Ethiopia moving
Selassie towards closer military ties to Washington and the West.
For its part, Ethiopia was the largest beneficiary of U.S. military assistance in sub
Saharan Africa. From 1953 until the Selassie regime was toppled in 1974 facilitating the
end of the U.S.-Ethiopian relationship in 1977, Ethiopia received 185 million dollars in
military assistance, 36 million in military credits, cash agreements of 135 million and 22
million spent for the training of the Ethiopian military. By 1976, the U.S. had provided
135 million dollars in military and economic assistance to Ethiopia representing 45
percent of all U.S. arms transfers provided to sub-Saharan Africa.202
200 “General U.S. Policy toward Africa”, Memorandum from the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
Holmes to Secretary of State Dulles, February 6, 1958 in FRUS, (1958-1960), 9.
201 Bereket Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn ofAfrica. (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1980), 3.
202 Jeffrey Lefebvre, Armsfor the Horn. US. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953-1991.
(Pittsburg, Penn.: University of Pittsburg Press, 1991), 55.
115
During the same time period the Soviets were also making gains in the region. The
Suez crisis provided an opening and the Soviets through the Czech-Egyptian arms deal of
September 1955. The West began to fear that the Czech and the Bulgarian arms
agreements with Egypt and Syria would precipitate the increased Soviet penetration of
Africa through Egypt applying pressure on the Sudan which meant that the U.S. should
shore up support for Ethiopia so that Soviet moves in the North could be countered by
Western support of the South. Haile Selassie, noting the super-power conflict growing
in the regions surrounding his state, took the opportunity to make inroads with the
Soviets. In June of 1959, Selassie visited the Soviet Union and was able to secure 100
million dollars in credits from Khrushchev prompting him to say “We sincerely wish our
friendly relations to serve as a good model of successful cooperation between states with
different social and economic systems and the friendship between the USSR and Ethiopia
to be eternal and unbreakable.”203
Selassie was interested in two goals, first to spur the super-powers to compete for
advantage in Ethiopia by sending increased amounts of aid which ultimately serves to
consolidate the power of the Selassie regime. Second, if Addis Ababa was able to
cement ties of friendship to both Moscow and Washington through their military
assistance competition, Selassie hoped that would prevent both the Soviets and the
Americans from supporting the Somalia military in their claim on the Ogaden region
thereby keeping Mogadishu unsupported and too weak to challenge Ethiopia.
203 Nikita S. Khrushchev, World without Arms, World without Wars (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1959), 460.
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Selassie appears to have enjoyed some success with the first goal. Marina Ottaway
relays that “fear that Ethiopia might accept the offer prompted the U.S. to increase its
own military aid to Ethiopia; it agreed to provide training and equipment for one
additional division and to increase the size of the divisions, bringing Ethiopia’s armed
forces to a total of 4O,0O0.~~204
Selassie’s second goal however ultimately pushed Somalia towards a greater
militarization which ultimately works counter to Selassie’ s goal of reducing the threat of
Somalia. By the mid 1 960s, Somalia had received 95 million in loans and grants from
Italy, 59 million from the Soviets, 47 million from the U.S., and 23 million from
China.205 This eclectic mix of military assistance reflected Somali’s initial goal of
remaining neutral in the Cold War. It became evident however, that the West was
increasingly reluctant to offer aid to Somalia for fear of offending Ethiopia and
threatening their strategic designs in the Middle East. Somalia then turned to the Soviets,
who responded by offering a major deal in 1963 that included transporting more than 800
Somali troops to the Soviet Union for training and increased military aid that swelled the
Somali military which amounted to Africa’s fourth largest military behind Nigeria,
Ethiopia and Ghana. The Somali military became a dominant political power within the
country as Somalia became a force that Selassie had to contend with.
204 Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn ofAfrica (New York: Praeger, 1981),
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Political change - 1974 coup against Haile Selassie
Regional Cold War conflicts affecting Ethiopia were major contributing factors which
resulted in the coup which unseated Haile Selassie’s regime. The causes of the 1974 coup
were both regional and domestic. First amongst the regional causes are the Arab Israeli
wars of June 1967 and October 1973. The conflict with Israel served to polarize Arab
states into a moderate camp willing to negotiate some policy matters with Israel and the
West such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and a radical camp more disposed to militancy.
Both camps were sympathetic to the plight of the Eritreans who suffered the indignity
of federation at the hands of the United Nations in 1952, and even worse, had to endure
outright incorporation into Ethiopia in November 1962. U.S. policy makers began to
worry that American support that assisted the Ethiopians in crushing the Eritrean
nationalists would disaffect moderate Arab states and further alienate radical states such
as Lebanon and Syria. U.S. policy in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War was to decrease
Ethiopian assistance in the hopes of pushing both sides to the negotiating table.
A second and related cause of the 1974 coup is that Selassie was forced to travel to
Washington in May of 1973 and make a personal appeal to Nixon for increased aid to
fight the Eritreans in the North and the Somalis in the West. Selassie had boasted prior to
his departure that he would be successful but he was not. Washington had shifted its
priorities for two reasons: first, the Soviets were expelled from both Egypt and the Sudan
in 1972, allowing the U.S. to rework its commitments in the region and secondly, the
communications center in Kagnew was being shifted to Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean. Ethiopia had come to use the Kagnew base to argue that the U.S. would come to
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the defense of the Selassie regime. The shift in priorities made Selassie’s May 1973 trip
a known failure in Ethiopia.
A third regional cause for the 1974 coup is the conflict between Libya and Israel
occurring in Eritrea. Access and control of the Red Sea and the Straits of Bab-el-Mandab
in particular were of strategic concern and the 1969 Libyan coup added ideological
pressures as well. Muammar Gaddafi came to power advocating a militant form of pan
Arabism in which support for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) as a key feature. From
1969 through the early 1 970s Libya funneled arms and economic assistance to the ELF
through south Yemen. Israel in turn, stepped up its efforts to support Ethiopia through
weapon transfers and military training and agricultural development.
Israel was concerned that Eritrea not become radicalized so that the flow of goods and
resources could flow unimpeded to it through the Red Sea. Ethiopian control of Eritrea
could prevent the creation of a state on the Red Sea hostile to Israel. Libyan support for
the ELF allowed it to increase its attacks on Ethiopian infrastructure. With both Israeli
and American assistance, the Ethiopian army retaliated in 1970 by air bombing Eritrean
villages, allowing Ethiopian ground forces to move in and eliminate the guerrilla, as well
as a significant number of civilians. The massacres triggered outright anger amongst the
Arab world, moderates and radical states alike and served to embolden the Eritrean
nationalists to the detriment of the Ethiopian government.
The regional causes of the 1974 coup are matched by certain domestic causes
precipitating the end of Haile Selassie’ s rule. First the OPEC countries decided that as a
result of the Yom Kippur War they would no longer ship oil to countries supporting
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Israel thus precipitating a sharp decrease in the supply of oil and a resulting sharp
increase in global oil prices. To cope, the Ethiopian government raised gasoline prices by
fifty percent to allow it to continue to feed its military machine’s need for gasoline. This
produced a second set of domestic causes. When the Ethiopian government raised the
gasoline prices, taxi drives immediately went on strike paralyzing Addis Ababa, the seat
of government. This was followed by a large scale general strike between March 7th and
ii~ of 1974. A teachers’ strike soon followed representing 17,500 teachers which
amounted to over half of the professional population of Ethiopia. The teachers’ strike
was followed by a student uprising to press for regime change.
These civilian strikes were matched by a series of military mutinies, which were the
third domestic cause of the 1974 coup. In January of 1974 an army unit in Sidamo
province south of Addis Ababa rose and jailed their commanding officer. In Asmara,
army units imprisoned their officers and demanded direct talks with the government. The
noncommissioned officers and enlisted men were protesting what they saw as low wages
and unbearable living conditions enforced upon them by a distant and out of touch ruling
class. The last event that led to the 1974 coup is Selassie’s perceived inaction and efforts
to reduce the global media coverage and the official reaction to the drought and famine of
1972 and 1973.
Selassie’s removal was a key event in Ethiopian recent history and served to reverse
the country’s polarity in the Cold War because this was the time when the Soviets were
able to make key ideological and material inroads into the country. The 1974 revolution
while perhaps not a strictly proletarian revolt ... “so much resembled the Russian
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revolution against feudal autocrats that it was hailed as a maj or event in Marxist
terms.”206
Conflict within the periphery - Ethiopia
The Ethiopian conflict involves intra-African groups, actors from the Middle East, the
West and the Soviet blocs and groups located within Ethiopia. Compared to the rest of
Africa, Ethiopian conflict is caused less by the lingering effects of colonialism than by
irredentism and secessionist nationalism on behalf of the belligerents. The Eritreans were
convinced of the harm done to them by annexation and incorporation into the Ethiopian
state. The Somali regime was likewise convinced of the need to rescue the Ogaden
region from Ethiopian control. Even the Dergue, victorious in deposing Selassie would
have to iron out which camp within their party would take control of the state. The
situation was ripe for conflict.
Intra-Dergue conflict.
In September 1974 a group of 112 junior and noncommissioned officers with regular
soldiers seized the reigns of the state ending Haile Selassie’ s decades old rule. The
Dergue using for its name the Amharic word for committee generated the Provisional
Military Administrative Council (PMAC) to facilitate their rule. The Dergue came to
power with a commitment to Marxism but separate views on leading the state’s reforms
soon developed. The Dergue planned a series of socio-economic reforms with
nationalization of its economy and redistribution of rural land as a key feature. The goal
was to remove the possibility of the old Selassie regime from coming back into power.
206 I. William Zartman, Ripefor Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford
University Press 1989), 7.
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Within the Dergue two camps soon emerged. One side early on headed by
Lieutenant-General Aman Michael Andom began to advocate the return to civilian rule, a
more peaceful way to manage the conflict with the Eritreans and had ties to the imperial
regime that had just been ousted. The reaction of the Dergue group headed by Colonel
Mengistu Haile Mariam was swift and violent. In November 1974, Andom and 58
civilian, military and former government officials were executed. “The members of the
PMAC. . .formed a bond of solidarity and comradeship based on a bloodbath.”207 The
Dergue’s goal was to silence opposition and prevent the ascension of a group of
moderates who thought that Ethiopia should continue its relationship with the United
States. The radicals felt that the U.S. was imperialist in its ambitions towards Ethiopia
and could not be trusted. However, the controversy survived the executions.
The band of solidarity was broken by another power struggle when “the Marxist
Leninists who controlled the POMOA developed a close relationship with the First Vice-
Chairman of the PMAC, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam who was covetous of the
chairmanship of the PMAC.208 By 1976 another group of moderates led this time by
PMAC Chairman General Teferi Banti began to try to move Ethiopia back into the Carter
administrations’ favor by declaring the state a people’s republic. At the same time
Mengistu traveled to Moscow and secured a military agreement with the Soviets in the
amount of 200 million dollars. Banti began to restructure the PMAC to check Mengistu’s
207 Teferra Haile-Selassie, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1991: From a Monarchial Autocracy to a
Military Oligarchy (London: Kegan Paul International, 1997), 179.
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growing power and to subdue those within the Dergue attempting to move closer to the
Soviets.
In February 1977, an armed confrontation occurred between both camps and Banti and
his associates were killed. In the intra-Dergue debate as to its ties with the U.S. or with
Moscow, the radicals had won the day. Mengistu become chairman of the PMAC and
between December 1977 and February 1978 the Dergue engaged in violent conflict with
the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (Me’ison) and the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Movement (EPRP) which resulted in over 5000 deaths. The EPRP were
radicals who stood opposed to the Dergue’s reform program and Me’ison advocated for
the return to civilian rule. Both organizations pressed Mengistu for commitments and
while Mengistu initially favored Me’ison it was not spared the bloodletting. By the time
the smoke cleared Mengistu had effectively silenced all opposition within the Dergue to
his direction of the state.
Ethiopia had long been tense over the issue of land rights and ownership and the
Dergue’s land reform program was geared to address the alienation of rural farmers who
under Selassie were expelled from certain land holdings. Once Mengistu was able to
consolidate his control, the Dergue resorted to violence and suppression based on
controlling regional locations. The opposition was pushed into rural regions and this
forced segregation is reflected in the variety of movements that attempted with mixed
degrees of success to oppose the Dergue. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front offered
guerilla resistance but was unable to significantly threaten the Dergue’ s control of the
region.
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Similarly, the Ethiopian Democratic Union, composed of old regime landlords as well
as a royalist opposition, was also suppressed in the Gonder region. The EPLF was in
large part a reaction of highland Eritreans’ alienation from the central government. “In
terms of such criteria as language and religion, highland Eritreans were almost
indistinguishable from their compatriots in Tigray to the south, from whom they had been
separated by Italian colonialism.”209
The Dergue was able to stabilize its control via rural peasant associations and urban
organizations which were controlled by Dergue loyalists. Rural land was allocated, rents
collected, production quotas implemented and mandatory military duty enforced all of
which allowed the Dergue to manage the state. The urban dwellers’ associations served a
dual function. On one hand, they were used to collect rent and manage production quotas
yet on the other; these associations were agents of state repression used to arrest,
imprison and execute prisoners accused if being counter-revolutionaries. This is evident
in the violence termed “the white and red terrors.”
Historically, the term white terror has been used to explain violent counter
revolutionary uprisings against an ascendant Communist party. France in 1794 when
reactionary royalists targeted the Jacobins in response to the ‘Reign of Terror’ and the
White Movement in Russia which targeted the Bolsheviks in 1918 in response to the
Bolshevik revolution remain classic examples of these circumstances. In Ethiopia the
EPRP engaged in a campaign of resistance against the PMAC. In 1977 the PMAC was
able to use the EPRP resistance as a propaganda tool to justify its increasingly violent
209 John Markakis, “Ethiopia,” in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, ed. Joel Krieger (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 84.
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reaction. EPRP was able to carry out a number of assassinations against PMAC members
but the Dergue’ s response was to exaggerate the threat to validate an extreme response.
A PMAC Major Endale Tessema explained it this way: “The Ethiopian Revolution which
has now taken an offensive course by getting rid of reactionary infiltrators in high
positions, is determined to defeat the White Terror of its enemies with Red Terror
through sacrifices of genuine revolutionaries in the forefront of the struggle.. ,,2 10 The
Red Terror of Ethiopia would take thousands of lives. Mengistu in dramatic form
described what his regime would do when “he threw to the ground before a huge crowd
in the capital Addis Ababa bottles filled with a red substance representing the blood of
enemies of the revolution: the “imperialists,” and the “counter-revolutionaries,” as
members of rival leftist groups were labeled by the Dergue.”21’
The urban dweller associations organized neighborhood watch groups called Kebeles
were the agents of this repression and the government gave them free reign to arrest and
execute prisoners. “Every night Kebeles, one after the other, would execute some of the
detainees and display their bodies in public squares where passersby were forced to look
at bodies drenched in blood.”212 Soon, the Kebeles began a morbid execution
competition and other groups organized by the PMAC and POMOA began to take part in
the killing of suspected EPRP members. In the two years that followed thousands of
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civilians were killed as a result of Dergue activities. Human Rights Watch estimates the
toll as high as 500,000.213
“By the end of the summer of 1977 the first round of the Red Terror broke the
backbone of the major enemy of the PMAC and POMOA, the EPRP; and by the end of
1978 the second round of the Red Terror effectively uprooted it from all cities and
towns.”214
Once it became clear to the Soviet bloc that Mengistu had secured his control of the
state, Communist countries began to lavish praise and support on Ethiopia. First the
German Democratic Republic sent a high-level delegation led by Comrade Lambez who
was a senior Politburo member. This recognition cleared the way for other states to
follow. Fidel Castro made the first visit by the leader of a socialist state to Ethiopia and
communicated the relevance of Ethiopia to the Soviet bloc by “. . .discussing the counter
revolutionary activities of imperialism and its puppets in the Red Sea region and
expressed the need for the progressive forces in the area to coordinate their struggle
against machinations of their common enemy, imperialism.”215
The Soviet bloc’s support of the Dergue was matched by America’s cessation of aid to
Ethiopia and its resulting decision to lend assistance to the Somalis who were preparing
to wage war in the Ogaden region. Ethiopia was isolated from Western assistance and





Soviet support a must if the Dergue was to capitalize on the gains of its bloody repression
of its internal foes.
Eritrean conflict.
The colonial relevance of Eritrea for Italy is directly related to Ethiopian designs in
the region during the reign of the Dergue. There were three core historical motivations
for Italian adventures in the region. Eritrea was resource poor and did not attract much
Italian or foreign capital investment, but its first importance was to be used as a
intermediary to facilitate trade with Ethiopia. “Its presence in Eritrea enabled Italy to
include some parts of Ethiopia in its sphere of influence and even eventually to launch its
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.~~216 Secondly, Eritrea provided a source of military
manpower that Italy could exploit to pursue its military goals in Somalia and facilitate the
occupation of Libya. “Between 1912 and 1932 a permanent force of up to 6,000 Eritrean
soldiers was deployed in Libya on behalf of the Italian colonial administration”217
operating more efficiently and at a fraction of the cost of Italian soldiers.
Thirdly, once the invasion of Ethiopia was launched from Eritrea, the region served as
Italy’s main center of empire allowing Italy to compete with the other colonial powers of
Europe and more specifically the region allowed Mussolini to compete with the
expansionist Japan and with Hitler’s Germany. It should be noted that it was Mussolini
who coined the term “Axis Powers” to indicate the growing relationship between Rome
and Berlin described it as an “axis ‘round which all those European states which are
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animated by a desire for collaboration and peace may work together.”218 As World War
Two ended there remained an open question of what to do with Eritrea and whether to
distinguish it from Ethiopia. The British administered Eritrea until 1952, when it was
federated to Ethiopia.
From their experience with Italy, the Ethiopian regimes of Haile Selassie and
Mengistu were concerned with securing Eritrea as a source of security from northern
invasions from the Red Sea, and guaranteeing access to the Red Sea for commerce and
labor power that would fuel Ethiopian commercial production in the Northern regions of
the country. Pressure coming from Eritrea in part led to the overthrow of Haile Selassie
in 1974, and the Eritrean resistance movement remained a burden for the Dergue
eventually contributing to its downfall in 1991.
The key Eritrean group fighting for independence from Ethiopia was the Eritrean
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). The federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia by the United
Nations in 1952 and Selassie’s annexation of the territory in 1962 galvanized an
opposition movement initially around the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF was
composed of Muslims. Namely its chief organizers Idris Mohammad Adam, Idris Glaidos
and Osman Salah Sabbe along with 70-80 percent of the population were Muslim. By the
late 1970’s internal divisions over ethnicity and clan caused a split within the ELF and
the EPLF assumed the primary role.
To oppose the takeover by the Dergue, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
was mobilized in February 1975. The ELF had been operating for at least thirteen years
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prior to the TPLF taking up arms and the TPLF initially cooperated with the ELF splinter
group, EPLF. A fourth group, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party was formed
during the same period and was the source of some conflict between the groups resisting
the Dergue’s control of the state. The linguistic similarity which extends across the
Ethiopia-Eritrea border is unmistakable and lasting and was a source of initial
commonality between the peoples dating their kinship back to the Kebessa highland
region. This commonality and cooperation is noted here for two specific reasons. This
work noted in chapter three that mass movements fractured over the ability to allocate
state resources. The splintering of resistance groups in this case is an example of a
fractured movement. Secondly, in this chapter the work of Johan Galtung was cited to
use the World Systems approach to look at relationships in the center and in the
periphery. The fracturing of resistance groups is an example of Galtung’ s disharmony of
interests in the periphery.
Ideology soon pushed a wedge between these linguistic and regional ties. Both groups
were of Marxist-Leninist in orientation and believe that Ethiopian society was beset by
internal contradictions that necessitated armed resistance. The resistance in Tigray
emerged out of a student movement that in part blamed the Ethiopian crisis on the
suppression of various nationalities by the state. The difference lay in the nature of the
contradiction.
The EPRP believe that the class contradictions was the dominant feature while the
TPLF held that the core struggle should be to mitigate the regional contradictions
between nationalities rooted in the ethnic domination of the Amhara elites exploiting
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other Ethiopian nationalities. The TPLF then called for an independent republic of
Tigray to alleviate the ethnic contradictions while the EPLF felt that the struggle should
be to democratize Ethiopia which would negate the necessity to give independence to
aggrieved ethnic groups.219
In the middle of the ideological and organizational tension between EPRP and TPLF
was the EPLF that was allied to both sides. Yemane Ghebreab a senior EPLF member
was able to note that a fragmented opposition would inevitably weaken the resistance to
the Dergue and recalled in 1998 that, “TPLF was insisting that EPRP should not operate
inside Tigray. We said that we all worked for the same goal and should operate together.’
Such interference by EPLF into non-Eritrean affairs was not taken well by TPLF, who
accused EPLF of simplifying the ideological question of Ethiopian resistance.”220 Along
with the ideological differences there emerged tactical military disputes between TPLF
and EPLF.
During the Red Star campaign of 1983, 5000 TPLF fighters assisted in the defense of
regions controlled by the EPLF. The EPLF was unable to defend the region against the
Dergue alone and this allowed the TPLF to gain the upper hand in their debate which
centered on the link between ideology and military tactics. EPLF had mounted a defense
around fixed positions utilizing trench warfare. This was part of an overall three-pronged
strategy.
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220 Ibid., 14.
130
The second component was to use a mobile style of combat in areas that bordered
their base of operations which were defended by fixed positions but were contested by
the Dergue. Thirdly, in areas controlled by the Dergue the EPLF would use guerilla-style
tactics. “Consequently, the EPLF defended their Sahel base areas fiercely and kept the
main bulk of their army behind the trenches. From these fixed positions they launched
attacks and raids into Dergue-held areas and the contested areas.”221 The TPLF asserted
that if the goal is to liberate the people then the peasantry must be included in the conflict
by mounting a mobile defense of the region. This for the TPLF would allow the
resistance forces to grow a broad peasant base of participation in the resistance as the
resistance forces. As Nega put it rather than stay for extended periods of time in fixed
positions “If you are mobile, they can operate over a three-four times bigger area to
weaken the Dergue... (Fixed positions).. .would weaken themselves, because they cannot
multiply their forces, they cannot replace their forces. They cannot weaken the
Dergue.”222 The EPLF did not agree and reacted with anger to this line of argument and
this caused a deep rupture in their relations which resulted in 1985 of the EPLF closing
the Barka emergency relief route into the Tigray region from Sudan through Western
Eritrea. TPLF depended on this route for logistics and supplies and its closure at the





This break is not of mere historic importance to this analysis of the Cold War and its
affects. The current antagonism between Ethiopia and Eritrea which largely began as a
border dispute in 1998, traces its roots to the ideological differences during the resistance
to the Dergue from 1974 until 1991.
Soon, another fissure in the resistance movement took shape. The ELF began to
support a different Tigrayan group, the Tigrean Liberation Front (TLF). The TPLF found
itself beset on 5 sides by the EPRP, the EPLF as well as the ELF and its competition, the
TLF, all the while carrying out a resistance to the rule of the Dergue. Sebhat Nega
explains: “Anyway we were in a dilemma. But we could not give in on our principles.
We could not give up that the national struggle is the primary struggle, or the primary
contradiction.. .we clashed with EPRP and drove it out from Tigray. . .In 1981 we and
EPLF jointly evicted ELF out of Eritrea.”223
Eritrea’s geographic location on the Red Sea helped it to attract Syrian and Egyptian
support. In the midst of the Middle Eastern conflict, Israel resolved to support Ethiopia
in its claim on Eritrean land, to deny Arab states hostile to Israel, access to the Red Sea
on the Eastern side of the Bab-el-Mandeb. The Western side was already dominated by a
left leaning South Yemen, so Israel viewed its support of Ethiopia and its suppression of
Eritrean nationalists as a key feature of Middle Eastern antagonisms. At the time of the
1974 coup in Ethiopia, the Eritrean nationalists had registered enough success to have




The leftward swing of the Dergue towards Soviet and Cuban assistance was to have a
strong impact in the Eritrean nationalists in the late 1 970s. After the Soviets and Cubans
helped Ethiopia push back the Somali offensive in the Ogaden region in 1978, Ethiopia
turned its attention to Eritrea. In 1978, the Dergue launched a major offensive on
Eritrean positions and was able to take control of most towns and cities pushing the ELF
back to its northern border with Sudan. Castro had been supporting the Eritrean cause for
more than ten years and did not participate in this latest episode, but regional players
became embroiled on the Eritrean side viewing it as a stage in the larger Middle Eastern
conflict. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq all supported the Eritreans partly as a
statement of pan-Arabism. Sudan, on the other side, gave support to Ethiopia with the
tacit agreement that if it (Sudan) did not support the Eritrean rebels then Ethiopia would
not support the rebel movements in southern Sudan. Israel for its part threw its support
behind Ethiopia, which Libya sought to counter by supporting the ELF.
This observation directly correlates to the World Systems approach of this work. The
regional actors affecting the Eritrean conflict within Ethiopia may be conceived as semi
peripheral states operating within the contest between core states. As Wallerstein noted,
the core exploits both the semi-periphery and the periphery, but the semi periphery
provide the necessary function of stabilizing the world system. In an economic sense, it
absorbs the shock of transferring resources and manpower between the poor and the rich
sectors but they have a political role as well. Semi-peripheral states as regional powers
serve as political buffers through which core states transfer their goals and objectives.
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This is not to imply that regional states are not self-interested actors, but one cannot
overlook the fact that the Eritrean conflict was fought with motivations that extend
beyond the nationalism of the ELF and the EPLF and beyond the Pan-Arabic effort to
counter Israeli power in the middle East. The larger Cold War rivalry for spheres of
influence and access to resources spurred the West and the Soviets to support different
sides. In an economic sense, World systems theory asserts that without the semi-
periphery the economic system would face crisis and blockages in the flow of resources
and profit. In the context of this discussion the semi-peripheral actors of the regional
states in the Eritrean case kept the Cold War stable in that proxies could be used by both
sides to advance strategic interests without have to commit American or Russian troops
into outright war in Ethiopia
Ogaden conflict.
Somalia’s irredentist designs coupled with the Dergue’s violent consolidation of
political power caused a reversal of super power support with respect to the Ogaden
region. When Mengistu overthrew Banti in February 1977 to consolidate the radicals
control over the Dergue, Moscow and Havana immediately issued statements of support.
“The unusual promptness of Soviet support and the enthusiastic tone of the Cuban press
suggest that both the Soviets and the Cubans were, at the very least, informed of the
political direction promised by Mengistu’s accession to power.”224 On March 16, 1977, a
meeting took place in Yemen between Somali President Siad Barre and PMAC Chairman
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Mengistu “with the participation of Fidel Castro and the Chairman of the Presidential
Council of South Yemen, Rubayi-i-Ali.”225
The purpose of the meeting was to negotiate a settlement between Barre and Mengistu
on the Ogaden question which the Soviets hoped could be achieved while keeping both
states within the Soviet sphere of influence. Indeed, the Soviets moved to counter
Western and Arabic moves in the region by proposing to confederate the Horn by
regrouping Somalia, Ethiopia, S. Yemen and Djibouti. The Soviets hoped this plan
would counter the U.S. and Saudi Arabian support of Ogaden and Eritrean separatists and
place Ethiopia in a new empowered position without canceling its support of the Somalia
regime.
However Barre continued to insist that the transfer of the Ogaden region into Somalia
be a precondition for any proposed confederation of the region. Barring this, for Barre,
there could be no normal relations between the two states. “At the meeting Siad declared
that if the socialist countries would not support Somalia on the territorial issue, then he
would be required to appeal to Arab and Western states for assistance.”226 Somali
irredentism proved to be stronger than its ideological solidarity with the Soviets. Somali
intransigence freed Moscow to sign a joint declaration with Mengistu which guaranteed
Ethiopia Soviet military, logistical and economic support.
In response, making good on his earlier threat, Barre appealed to the Carter
administration for support of its Ogaden designs. In Washington the issue revealed a
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certain disharmony in diplomatic circles between the regionalists convinced that conflict
in the Horn was to be blamed on Somali irredentism, and the globalists who argued that
U.S. policy should be geared toward countering Soviet moves in the region. National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski at first publicly floated the idea of supplying
Somali arms but soon the U.S. refused open and forthright support. The U.S. refusal lay
in its fear that support of Somalia and the Ogaden separatists would decrease U.S.
maneuverability with other African states themselves struggling with secessionist
movements. Thus, “for fear of exposing itself directly, the U.S. fostered the idea of
delivering military materiel via France and Great Britain.”227 American hesitation,
Barre’s failed negotiations in Yemen as well as Kenya’s support of Ethiopia all helped to
facilitate Soviet and Cuban military support of Ethiopia in the fall of 1977.
In July 1977 Somalia invaded the Ogaden in support of the Western Somali Liberation
Front. As is the case with the Eritrean conflict, regional semi-peripheral actors were fully
engaged. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran, along with British and French backing, all moved
to support the U.S. goal of checking the Soviets in the region. “By the end of the month
60% of the Ogaden had been taken by the SNA-WSLF force, including Gode, on the
Shabelle River.”228 By September Ethiopia barely controlled 10% of the region which
was occupied by 70,000 Somali troops, 250 tanks and dozens of fighter jets.
The Soviets soon came to two related realizations. First they were forced to
acknowledge that they were arming both sides in a conflict and second their continued
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support of Somalia would be counter-productive to their aims in the region given that
Somalia was assisting Western goals in the Horn. When the Soviets failed at their
attempt to negotiate a ceasefire between the two sides, they began a massive influx of
arms and personnel into Ethiopia. By November 1977, the Soviets, Cubans, North
Koreans and the East Germans were fully engaged. By January 1978, a 40,000 man
militia trained in part by the North Koreans, 1,500 Soviet and East German advisors and
17,000 Cuban combat troops began a successful counter push. The accomplishment of
the Eastern bloc prodded negotiations with the West.
The U.S. offered to help establish a NATO group to coordinate Horn activities. This
represented a goal of the regionalists who wanted to tie a regional conference to the
withdrawal of Cuban troops with a likewise withdrawal of Somali troops from the
Ogaden. However, Ethiopian/Soviet/Cuban success in February and March of 1978
tempered U.S. negotiating power. By March 9, 1978 Siad Barre ordered the Somali
National Army to retreat back into Somalia. “Through diplomatic channels, both the
Soviet and the Ethiopians assured Washington that Ethiopian-Cuban troops would not
push their military advantage at all beyond the recognized international borders of
Somalia.”229 The Somali-Ethiopian war had ended. The semi-peripheral regional states
of Britain, France, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had come to assist the peripheral state of
Somalia, engaged in war with the semi-peripheral states of Cuba, and to a lesser degree
East Germany and North Korea who were assisting the peripheral state of Ethiopia all in
service of the larger geo-strategic contest between the Soviets and the U.S.
229 Laidi, The Superpowers and Africa, 131.
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Throughout the 1 980s the Soviets continued a high level of support for Ethiopia yet
this did not produce a counter response of greater tacit or overt support from the Reagan
administration. “Instead the U.S.A. waited - whether as a result of far-sighted restraint,
policy paralysis or the lack of any viable alternative — until the collapse of Soviet power
in the region enabled it once again to take a leading role.
Conflict within the core/semi-periphery Soviet Union and China
As Africa entered its independence period, the West and the Soviet bloc were entering
a heightened stage of Cold War conflict in the mid to late 1 960s. During the same time
period there occurred a split between the Soviets and the Chinese that soon began to
affect the Cold War in Africa.
In February 1950 Mao Zedong (or Tse-tung in the traditional) and Joseph Stalin
signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance which included a 30 year military
partnership and several loans totaling 300 million. Stalin had offered assistance to the
Chinese in their simultaneous resistance to Japanese occupation in the 1930s, as well as
in their fight to consolidate the countryside against Chiang Kai-Shek and the
Kuomintang. From these beginnings one is able to note the ideological differences which
would result in hostile relations following Stalin’s death in 1953, outright war in 1969
and different strategies in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s.
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Traditional Leninist thought held that the core dialectic was the conflict between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In that factory labor was a fact of the socio-economic life
of Europe during the maturation of the 20th century it seemed logical that the
revolutionary potential would come from the wage earners who were most aggrieved and
alienated by capitalist exploitation of their labor. Mao on the other hand faced a
dissimilar set of circumstances in the 1 930s and 1 940s in that there was no industrial
development and hence no sizable proletariat to wage revolution. Instead Mao depended
on the numerically superior and also aggrieved peasantry to provide the necessary
revolutionary potential. This shift represented quite an ideological difference between
Mao and the Soviets.
It is therefore evident that while China was assisted in following the Soviet model of
rapid industrial development by large numbers of Soviet advisors in the 1 950s the
ideological differences led to a divergence of views. The Soviets under Stalin had
attempted a collectivization experiment from 1928 to 1933. The goal of collective
farming is to have farmers send their crops to the state and the state would repay farmers
not with cash but would return a share of their produce. The result was widespread
famine which caused up to seven million deaths from starvation. The state inevitably
was imposing unreasonably high production quotas and would return far less to the
farmers. This caused many farmers to starve and protest by stopping work which caused
the reserve to dwindle and necessitated a repressive response from the states.
Mao followed Stalin’s example in 1959 through 1962. Mao believed that the large
peasant base in China would allow collective farming to result in greater industrial
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development and would result in a Great Leap Forward for the state. Locust swarms,
drought and floods through 1960, particularly the flooding of the Yellow River in 1959,
affected 60 percent of the agricultural areas decreasing agricultural production. The
natural factors combined with the ideological disposition of the leaders and their policy
decisions. Much as in Stalin’s experiment forty years earlier collectivization in China
resulted in widespread famine and some estimates run as high as 30 million deaths.
The failure of collectivization and the ideological differences helped to force a split
when Khrushchev replaced Stalin in 1954. Mao never quite warmed to Khrushchev.
Mao even defended Stalin when Khrushchev attacked Stalinist era policies. “Mao treated
Khrushchev as a superficial upstart, neglecting no opportunity to confound him with
petty humiliations, cryptic pronouncements and veiled provocations”23’ meant to keep
Khrushchev off balance thus increasing China’s ability to maneuver. The 1950 agreement
that Mao had signed with Stalin was predicated on military cooperation to aggressively
confront the West. Khrushchev began a series of conciliatory moves to the U.S. which
included chastising Mao for his failures during the Great Leap Forward.
During the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Khrushchev refused to support China and Mao
took that as an abrogation of the 1950 agreement. Also during the Cuban Missile Crisis
of 1962 Mao criticized Khrushchev for backing down to Kennedy and commented that
“Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism”232 By 1964 the Chinese
were in open ideological conflict with the Soviets. Mao asserted that the Soviets were
now counter revolutionary as they sought to appease the West. Khrushchev responded
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that Mao’s thoughts if translated into international Communist policy would result in
nuclear war. The split had concretized and as the failure of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution of 1966-197 ended in China, Africa became a major theater of Sino-Soviet
competition.
The Chinese sought to remind African decision makers that theirs was a shared
struggle against Western imperialism and Soviet hegemony. In Africa the Sino-Soviet
split reflected the ideological dimension and resulted in a material competition. Moscow
had attempted to portray themselves as the champion of the international revolutionary
movement and the ideological dimensions of this cause were challenged by the Chinese.
Mao argued that African states had more in common with China’s historical trajectory of
fighting for independence from colonial powers only to have to wage internal civil wars
after independence is achieved.
Chinese leaders also argued that European style Marxism-Leninism and its
dependence on an exploited and alienated industrial working class was unfit for the
similar Chinese and African trajectory which housed the revolutionary potential in the
hands of the peasantry. Religion was also deployed. Chinese also stressed the link
between Chinese and African nationalism by linking the Islamic communities in China
with those in Africa in an appeal to religious and racial solidarity. The differences in
Communist vision allowed the Chinese to challenge the Soviet’s commitment to the
global proletarian revolution. The Chinese argued that the shifts in theory that the
Soviets were unwilling to fully appreciate, coupled with Soviet moves to negotiate with
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the West, should move African leaders to come to the Chinese side. The ideological
dimensions were matched with military aid and economic assistance.
From 1967 to 1976 China increased its military and economic aid to Africa to 142
million dollars to 15 African states of which Tanzania and Zaire were the core recipients.
This amount represents a serious Chinese commitment to assisting African states even
though it was dwarfed by the Soviets who during the same 1967-1976 period funneled
four billion dollars that was dispersed to 21 African states. This disparity has allowed the
Chinese to portray the superpowers as arms merchants exploiting African conflicts for
their own benefits.
This line of argument persisted even while “despite their inability to furnish large
quantities of modern weapons (the Chinese) offered what they could manage in light of
the urgency with which African countries have often sought arms.”233 Between 1973 and
1976, the Chinese added 11 new weapon recipients (including states such as Sudan and
Mali) totaling 50 million dollars. This was matched during the same time period by a
Soviet increase of 250 million dollars to nine new recipients. The Soviets were forced to
respond to China’s Africa challenge.
George Yu relays four lines of contention with the Chinese acknowledged by the
Soviets. First, the Soviets saw the Chinese as moving from the Leninist view of
proletarian global revolution to a Third World movement against both superpowers.
Second, this served to weaken the global revolution against the international bourgeoisie
as the Chinese were engaged in African adventurism in that they were advocating
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revolutions in states that lacked the ideological and material means to succeed. Third, the
Chinese were overtly attempting to weaken Soviet ties with Africa as the Chinese moved
to block the Soviets from participating in the Second Conference of Afro-Asian states in
1965 and lastly the Soviets argued that the Chinese were themselves being imperialist as
they attempted to injected their cultural revolution into Africa’s development
trajectory.234
For its part China viewed itself as the better leader for the Third World, more than the
Soviets, based on shared historical experience, ideological similarity and racial bias. The
Maoists argued that the Soviets and their European communism were out of step with the
realities of developing states. The Chinese offered that their brand of communism would
be more ideologically suitable to the realities of African politics because it had been
developed amongst a people of color with a similar agrarian economy. The Chinese held
that the Soviets chiefly wanted access to African copper, uranium, gold and diamonds to
supply its industries and desired partnerships not to help Africans decolonize effectively
but to gain access to ports and land bases which would enhance Soviet global strategic
designs. Towards that end the Chinese held that the Soviets have actively undermined
revolutionary movements as the Soviets have divided and classified the various
movements as revolutionary, counter-revolutionary, non-revolutionary, progressive and
reactionary, a schema that the Chinese argued dissipated the necessary unity for
independence and African development.
Conflict in Angola and on the Horn of Africa have proved to be fertile ground for the
Sino-Soviet conflict just as it is for the wider Cold War conflict. The Chinese held that
234 Ibid, 177-180.
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the Soviets were engaged in Angola to secure natural resources which they looked upon
with “covetous eyes and hoped to replace the Portuguese as the masters of this African
Jewel.”235 The strategic locations of both the Horn and Angola fit Soviet designs on
shipping lanes and the ability to project Soviet naval power in the Red Sea, the Gulf of
Aden and the South Atlantic.
In fact, one must observe the basic truths in both the Soviet argument against Chinese
involvement in the Horn and in Angola as well as the factual basis of the Chinese
argument in both African locations. If both lines of argument have merit then both sides
are guilty of what the other charges thus just as it is true of the larger Cold War conflict,
the peripherized Horn and Angola must be seen as a battle ground for inter-core conflict
as well as conflict between the Soviet core and its Chinese semi-periphery.
Conflict within the core/semi-periphery - United States and France
In the Western case there is also observable intra-core conflict between the U.S. and
the semi-peripheral state of France. Where China and the Soviets differed in ideological
terms on the nature of the global proletarian revolution, France and the Americans
differed on the ideological ramifications of the projection of force, specifically during the
Suez Crisis and the Vietnamese War. In the years immediately after the Second World
War, France and the U.S. endured a marriage of necessity chiefly based on Marshall Plan
economic aid and the shared North Atlantic Treaty which bolstered American hegemony
in Europe while simultaneously helping the French regain its economic footing.
Disagreements began when France attempted to retain its dominance of its colonial
holdings in Africa and South East Asia.
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Francophone Africa rivaled British colonial holdings comprising almost half of sub
Saharan Africa including Guinea, Mali, Benin and the Congo which was colonized by the
Belgian King Leopold in 1885. A core feature of French colonialism was the expansion
of state structures which controlled the economy. During the African independence era,
certain Francophone states developed radical regimes which fell within the Soviet
periphery, namely Guinea and Mali. The French saw the Soviet challenge to their
influence matched by an American challenge as both Houphouet-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire
and Mobutu in Zaire moved away from France toward the U.S. Twenty years later, there
was a reversal of fortunes and a rise in French influence for “in the 1 980s France
regained influence in all its ex-colonies and grew to influence the ex-Belgian colonies;
Soviet influence with the socialist regimes (in Mali and Guinea) declined accordingly.”236
This work is making use of the World Systems approach to make plain the
relationships of these conflicts. Both Wallerstein and Galtung are clear that there is a
system of marginalizations and conflicts involved when the world is polarized around
core states who are themselves in conflict. This pressure is felt at all levels of the system.
This work will briefly look at conflict within the Western bloc by noting the tensions
between U.S. and French policy makers
The Suez Crisis was a source of controversy between France and the U.S. in that the
American reaction affected France differently than it did Britain and Israel. The Suez
Canal is of strategic and economic importance to Europe in that it provides a trade link to
the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and can allow Europe to project its naval powers to the
236 Patrick Manning, “Francophone Africa” in The Oxford Companion to Politics ofthe World, ed. Joel
Krieger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),
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Far East. Britain operated a military base at Suez numbering 80,000 soldiers for control
of Suez enabled Britain and greater Europe to control East Africa and the Middle East.
Hostilities increased between the British troops and Egyptian forces as Britain enabled
Iraq and Jordan to challenge Egyptian hegemony of the Arab world. Nasser saw British
moves in the region as a new brand of colonialism and entered into arms agreements with
the Soviets to check Western advances in the region. Soon the Soviet satellites of
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria gained influence in the region and in May of 1956 Nasser
recognized the Peoples Republic of China instead of the Western supported Republic of
China or Taiwan. This moved the U.S. to withdraw funding for the Aswan Dam and in
response Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July of 1956 threatening Western control
of the Middle East. Britain, France and Israel signed an agreement termed the protocol of
Sevres whereby Israel would attack Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula. The agreement called
for Britain and France to intervene and negotiate a withdrawal of forces to their
respective sides of the Canal. Britain and France would then argue that the Egyptians did
not have the ability to secure the Canal Zone alone and would call for the Canal Zone
being turned over to Britain and France.
The U.S. was left out of the planning and it was wrongly assumed that Nasser’s ties to
the Soviet bloc would be enough to guarantee American support for the operation. The
Americans instead feared a larger war with the Soviets and its satellites over the issue and
forced a ceasefire backed up by the United Nations Resolution #1001 settlement. The
U.S. brought diplomatic and economic pressures to bear and in March 1957 Britain,
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French and Israeli forces had withdrawn but the affect on Western relations would be
lasting.
The U.S. had proven that European states could not engage in certain military
operations without American approval. There was even a split between the British and
the French. In the midst of battle the British had withdrawn their troops abandoning the
French who were forced to withdraw. For De Gaulle this meant that France could not
depend on its allies and could not trust the U.S. to back it in times of crisis. The Suez
Crisis had resulted in the proven strength of the U.S. and illustrated the weakness of
Britain and France in the new bipolar order. The Americans had proven their core
position and relegated Britain and France to the semi-periphery position.
DeGaulle in his effort to strengthen France’s position sought to counter American
positions and prove French autonomy. John Lewis Gaddis points out four specific
instances which showed the strained relations between the U.S. and France during the
Cold War. In 1958 the French developed an independent Force defrappe or nuclear
strike force to be used as a deterrent to the Soviets as well as to provide consternation to
his allies. To humiliate the Americans and show his power De Gaulle vetoed British
inclusion in the European Economic Community. Thirdly, De Gaulle withdrew France
from military cooperation in NATO in 1966, which forced the headquarters to relocate
from Paris to Brussels and also forced American troops to leave the country. Lastly,
France extended full diplomatic privileges to Mao Zedung in 1964 while simultaneously
criticizing American actions in Vietnam. “De Gaulle rebuffed repeated efforts at
reconciliation, while remaining impervious to pressure: he had shrewdly calculated that
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he could detach France from NATO but that the U.S. could not detach themselves from
the need to defend France.”237
Intra-core conflict in both the West and the Soviet blocs allow for some comparison
between the strategies of de Gaulle and Mao. Both saw that standing up in defiance of
their super-power allies was a means towards standing up their own internal and external
positions. During the 1960s, both France and China had become sufficiently strong
enough in their respective blocks to challenge and jockey for position yet both remained
weak enough to not leave their alliance altogether. For both de Gaulle and Mao, standing
up to Washington and Moscow meant that they could rebuild the popular self esteem of
their own peoples after suffering the indignities of World War II and the Great Leap
Forward, while at the same time increasing both men’s legitimacy in their quest to keep
political power against their domestic competition.
Indeed even as the superpowers were heaping the indignity of proxy war on Angola
and the Horn, France and China, with varying degrees of success were blunting total
intra-core hegemony within their respective blocs. Mao’s and de Gaulle’s strategies
differed in their directions. De Gaulle’s method of defiance to U.S. will was to propose a
strategy of defending France against all encroachments either from the Soviets or the
U.S. Mao on the other hand utilized a strategy of attacking the Soviets ideologically, as
well as militarily during the 1969 border conflict while simultaneously attacking the West
as imperialist and assisting the Koreans and Vietnamese. De Gaulle’s defense and Mao’s
offense were both designed to stand up in the face of superpower hegemony and advocate
self-determination of their respective states both to the ire of Washington and Moscow.
237 Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, 140.
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Angola
This work has earlier shown that the causes of the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia were
domestic and international, both regional and strategic while at the same time economic
and cultural. Amongst the causes of the removal of Haile Selassie and thus the shift in the
country’s polarity from the Western camp to the Soviet bloc are international conflict in
the middle east and northern Africa, economic instability and an inadequate
response/denial by the central government to famine. These factors are exacerbated by
the cultural dissimilarity between the Amharic/Abyssinian people who were more
numerous and produced the royal line which gave them decision making abilities over the
allocation of resources and the Tigrean people of the North and the Oromo/Galla of the
south who were pastoralists that faced a land reallocation program under the Selassie
regime. The case of Angola presents similar antecedent factors which led up to the 1975
independence date and hence beginning of the civil war.
Pre- 1975 Revolution - Angola
By 1483, the Portuguese had established a colonial apparatus known as the Kongo
State stretching from modern-day Gabon, past the Congo River, to the Cuanza River
South of Luanda. The economy was dominated by the slave trade which was facilitated
by Portuguese financiers, Brazilian traders, and merchants who enslaved Africans from
the Kongo State throughout South America, Brazil in particular. The history of
Portuguese impositions and slavery in the region is the history of conflict and war which
involved both the local Africans groups as well as Dutch competitors. One of the more
famous personalities to emerge from this period is Queen Nzinga of Ndogo and
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Matamba, who in the mid 1 600s was able to negotiate a treaty with the Dutch which
facilitated Dutch assistance in her fight against the Portuguese. These political
maneuverings served to secure her kingdom and keep her people out of the slave trade for
a time.
By the beginning of the Guerilla movement in Angola in 1961, the Angolan people
had been dealing with Portuguese imposition for almost 500 years. The roots of the
ethnic divide came to be a major factor in their political/military violence from 1975 until
the 1994 ceasefire and later, the 2002 death of Jonas Savimbi. The seeds of ethnic strife
were planted when the Portuguese imposed themselves in the region in 1483, but the
military garrisons established in the 1 880s provide a more recent starting point.
Under the cover of these garrisons, mixed race Mestico traders began to do business
with Ovimbundu merchants. Enslaved people, ivory and beeswax were the favored
commodities of the region until the trade of rubber increased the amount of manpower
needed for continued trade, and lengthened the distance needed to move products to the
East Indies and South America. Conflict grew when Portuguese traders, who were exiled
convicts and Boer farmers from South Africa, began to encroach upon Umbundu land,
particularly the Kingdom of Bailundo.
An installment ceremony for Kalandula, the Soba (king) of Bailundo was held in
1902, and a Portuguese trader accused one of Kalandula’s advisors, Mutu-ya-Kavela, of
not paying for the rum. This incident was used by the Portuguese to make a “land grab”
for the Bailundo land. In April of 1902 Kalandula was arrested. Mutu-ya-Kavela formed
a coalition army of 10,000 Ovimbundu from the various Umbundu lands. The
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Ovimbundu were defeated in 3 months by a Portuguese led African force of 1000 men
using superior weaponry and Mutu-ya-Kavela was killed in August 1902.
On the heels of this victory, the Portuguese were able to suppress the Ovimbundu, and
European immigration soon increased. The military defeat of the Ovimbundu was
followed by the cultural attack of Protestant and Catholic mission schools. Soon,
Ovimbundu laborers were sent North to work plantations where they were forced into
contact with the Mbundu and Bakongo peoples. The Ovimbundu were looked down
upon as social outcasts; inferior people who were forced to capitulate while the North
never allowed itself to be as fully suppressed by the Portuguese. When the Mbundu and
Bakongo people launched a war to liberate the North in 1961, they expelled 60,000
Ovimbundu back to the central highland area. The seeds of ethnic strife had born fruit
and ostracized their Southern neighbors, a slight that Savimbi would later use as a
rallying call.
The 1961 guerilla resistance initially involved two coalition groups. The Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacão de Angola,
or MPLA) was established in 1956 as the umbrella group for Angolan Communist Party,
the Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola, Movement for the National
Independence of Angola and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Angola. The base
of support for the MPLA was been the Mbundu people collaborating with mixed race,
urban intellectuals who were “members of the Angolan Communist Party in 1956, when
it was founded.”238
238 Peter Vanneman, Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa: Gorbachev ‘s Pragmatic Approach, (Stanford,
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Similarly, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de
Libertacão de Angola or FNLA) was a coalition that grew out of the Uniao das
Populacoes do Norte de Angola or the Popular Union ofNorthern Angola in 1957. The
FNLA drew its support from the Bakongo people of the North. The insurrection by these
two groups included attacks upon plantations and towns initially using knives and clubs
until outside support would be secured. “It is estimated that about two thousand whites
and fifty thousand blacks were killed during six months of anti-colonial turmoil before
Lisbon succeeded in reestablishing control with fresh troops from the metropolitan home
base.”239
Between 1961 and 1974, Portugal faced revolutions in its colonial holdings of
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, São Tome and Principe as well as in Angola. A year before
the 1961 action in Angola, MPLA had formed linkages with PAIGC, in Guinea-Bissau,
FRELIMO of Mozambique, and the MLSTP in São Tome and Principe. Portugal was
able to stave off the insurrections by receiving weapons and financial assistance from the
United States as well as military troops from South Africa. Portugal and the United
States signed a mutual defense pact in 1951, which served to facilitate the flow of arms to
Portugal which in turn helped it hold onto its colonies in Africa. SIPRI reports that
between 1952 and 1973 the United States supplied 85 M-47 Patton tanks, 24 PV-2
Harpoon aircraft, 50 F-86F Sabre fighter aircraft, 8 DC-6/C-118 Transport aircraft and 8
239 Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola. Five Centuries ofConflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1979), 20.
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DC-6/C-118 Transport aircraft (transported illegally) to the Portuguese war machine.240
These weapons transfers allowed Portugal to tighten its grip on its colonies. This resulted
in bloody protracted struggles that served to prolong Portuguese suppression of Angola as
well as support the Apartheid regime in its efforts to contain the growing dissent of the
black majority in South Africa.
The U.S. justified its support of colonial Portugal and apartheid South Africa by its
fear of a Communist takeover in southern Africa. This led successive American
administrations from Eisenhower to Carter to offer varying degrees of support to overtly
repressive actions against the colonized people of southern Africa. Julius Nyerere
confirms that “in southern Africa events did not force any readjustments of American
policies during the 1960s; so none were made. Practical support for the status quo
continued unabated until after the Portuguese Revolution in April 1974.~~241
This understanding of reality was shared amongst the African forces fighting
colonialism. If Portugal was supplied by the United States and supported by South
Africa and in a larger logistical sense by NATO then they were locked in an
asymmetrical conflict against the West with practically no hope of winning unless
countervailing forces could be brought to bear. The Soviets were then presented with an
opportunity in Angola to confront the West and prop up the global standing of its
revolutionary propaganda. For African nationalists, it was a matter of survival that tested
the boundaries of non-alignment. Eduardo Mondlane president of FRELIMO remarked:
240 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database , http://armstrade.sipri.org/arrns trade/trade_register.php.
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153
“What are we supposed to do if, apart from the Africans, only the Communists will train
and arm us? . . .when we are denied Western aid we are apparently expected to do without
Communist aid as well.”242
While his sentiment illustrates a common problem for African nationalists struggling
against Portuguese colonialism, Mondlane’s experiences differs between the MPLA and
the FNLA. In 1961 MPLA troops were trained by Algerians in Morocco and FNLA
troops were trained in Tunisia and Algeria. In November 1962 MPLA founder Mario de
Andrade traveled to Algiers and gained the support of Ben Bella who had just achieved
the independence of Algeria from France four months earlier. In January 1963, Holden
Roberto received a similar Algerian pledge for the FNLA. Ben Bella attempted to get
both groups to reconcile their differences without success.
Intense intra-revolutionary competition was soon to follow which forced African
states to choose sides. “The question of whom to support in Angola plagued other
governments through the 1960s. ~ Agostinho Neto and de Andrade from the MPLA
and Holden Roberto of FNLA were well known in African political circles. Both had
traveled to the Second All African People’s Conference in Cairo in March of 1961, and in
the summer of 1963, both presented their cases for recognition to the Organization of
African Unity’s Liberation Committee. FNLA was better organized, received official
OAU recognition, and was able to form the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile
(GRAE). “In fact, by 1962, Roberto headed the only Angolan nationalist movement
242 Alan Hutchinson, China’s African Revolution (London, 1975), 229.
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recognized by the OAU and enjoyed the support of most African leaders including
Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba and Sekou Touré.”244
In the 1964 summer meeting, the OAU again supported FNLA-GRAE, but this time
formally recognized MLPA as a legitimate anti-colonial force on the ground in Angola.
Like Ben Bella before, the OAU unsuccessfully tried to get both sides to reconcile and
unify. For the next ten years the intra-revolutionary rivalry caused each side to make the
case to generate support for its group over its rival. FNLA under Roberto was able to
secure backing from Western governments and pro-Western African regimes while
MPLA under Neto formed alliances with leftist governments like Cuba based on their
ideological similarity.
In 1966, another movement joined the intra-revolutionary competition. The National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniäo Nacional para a Independência Total
de Angola or UNITA) emerged out of the FNLA-GRAE under the leadership of Jonas
Savimbi who represented the southern and east central Ovimbundu region of Huambo.
Savimbi presaged his departure from the FNLA at the OAU meeting in 1964. Savimbi
was at the time FNLA Foreign Minister and in Cairo he delivered a speech in which he
alleged that Mr. Roberto had set up a “commercial empire in the Congo” (now Zaire) and
that FNLA administrators were “wage earners and profiteers who enriched themselves on
the money ofNew York financial circles and other international organizations.”245
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Earlier, the Ovimbundu were shunned by the Mbundu and Bakongo peoples. This
slight based in the Bailundo rebellion sixty years earlier had not been forgotten by
Savimbi “whose grandfather Sakaita Savimbi had fought in the Bailundo rebellion and
lost his status as a counselor to the ruler ofNdulu as a punishment.”246 In many ways the
formation of UNITA is an outgrowth of the historic isolation imposed by their
humiliation at the hand of the Portuguese. The Portuguese army that defeated Mutu-ya
Kavela in 1902 was staffed by people from Luanda in the North as well as their southern
neighbors in Benguela. Angolans were used to kill Angolans for the benefit of the
colonial core, which was intent on exploiting the human and material resources of the
region.
Until his death in 2002, Savimbi has depended upon this history and shored up his
support “throughout the central highlands where stories of the Bailundo rebellion against
the Portuguese traders have been handed down from generation to generation”247 and
used as a source of tribal pride. In the 1960s and forward, the tension between UNITA
and MPLA became an extension of this internecine fighting that has been inspired by
outside forces for at least a century earlier. The difference this time was the Cold War.
The East Germans provided logistical support and police training; the Soviets supplied
advanced weaponry and strategic support while Cuba injected troops to support the
MPLA.
246 Karl Maier, Angola: Promises and Lies (London: Serif, 1996), 44.
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Initially, the Soviet bloc provided training to UNITA as well as Savimbi and his top
military aids were trained and armed in China. It is here that Savimbi became enamored
with and adopted some aspects of Mao’s leadership style, particularly the cult of
personality which revered Savimbi in the way that Mao was revered as the Great Leader
of the Chinese. After 1975, support and logistics for UNITA’s efforts came from the
West, sanctioned by the United States, in the form of South African and Zairian troops.
Savimbi became “attractive to the white settler population. Despite his earliest Marxist
jargon, Savimbi now became the moderate leader and a possible savior for the white
population.”248
In the run up to the 1975 accords, the MPLA received aid from the OAU as well as
other leftist governments and the FNLA supplanted the declining aid from the OAU with
support from Tunisia, Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire, governments that were friendly to
Zaire who in turn was a client of the West.. UNITA during this time period did not
receive aid or even recognition from the OAU.
By 1974, the economic and military stress from the battle in Angola, as well as the
concurrent conflicts in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, began to worsen the political
climate for the central government in Lisbon. On April 25, 1974 the Carnation
Revolution occurred in which a leftist military coup unseated the right wing
administration of Marcelo Caetano. The new military leaders decided to negotiate with
African nationalists in Angola. The fissures between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA were too
large to mend into a unity government.
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The OAU again attempted to negotiate a settlement. A third meeting between
Roberto, Neto and Savimbi resulted in the Alvor agreement signed on January 15 which
set November 11th as the date for Angola’s independence. Portugal signed off on the
agreement; this is when the Cold War overtly signed in.
Conflict within the core/semi-periphery - Portugal and the West
From the outset, Angola’s independence has been held captive by infighting between
the three major groups which each made a claim to power. World Systems theory is an
appropriate model to impose onto these circumstances because the division and loyalties
involved are stark and clear. With the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the core states in
conflict, the satellites revolving around each polarity have become semi-peripheral actors
engaged in supporting one of the three peripheral groups vying for power.
The West, through its economic and diplomatic ties to Portugal as a semi-peripheral
state in the Western polarity, has been continuously connected to Angolan affairs. In
Africa Must Unite, Kwame Nkrumah reveals that Portuguese colonies have served to
supply cheap labor not only to Portuguese industries, but also to South African
corporations which were financed by the West. From diamond and copper mines to
railway construction, Western companies are linked through finance capital which serves
to enrich, and thus strengthen, the core and its European semi-periphery.
Nkrumah, speaking of the connectedness of Western finance writes, “these mines
where this contract African labor from the Portuguese territories works may be situated in
South Africa of Rhodesia, but the main shareholders are large financial and commercial
groups in the United States, in the United Kingdom, in France and in Belgium. . . Much of
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the investment in the Portuguese colonies is not Portuguese at all, but international.”249
In such circumstances, the multinational corporation becomes a power unto itself,
rivaling the colonial state apparatus in power and maneuverability.
Two corporate examples can illustrate this point. The Belgian mining company, Union
Minière, the British mining company, Tanganyika Concessions, and, and the South
African mining company, De Beers, established a system of capital links which allowed
them to control the Luanda mines owned by the Angola Diamond Company. This
company’s holdings and control over the labor power of Angola’s people was
considerable. “It possesses a prospecting monopoly over five-sixths of Angola and a
labor conscription monopoly over most of the Luanda province, one third the size of
Ghana.”25° Its profits allow the corporation to dictate policy concerning Angola’s
ultimate profitability as a colony; and as Angola’s ethnic groups are forced into contact
with each other, the corporation can influence the political liaisons made by Angola’s
people.
A second example of the influence of the multinational corporation is the U.S.
company, Gulf Oil (Gulf). Gulf established a subsidiary called Cabinda Gulf Oil which
discovered crude deposits in 1966. “By 1970, Gulf secured a total monopoly and was
producing ten million tons of oil per year, making it the fourth largest oil producer in
African after Libya, Algeria and Nigeria.”25’ Soon, Petrofina of Belgium and Elf-Total
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of France lined up with Occidental and Exxon from the U.S. to gain a share of the oil
profits. These oil companies sponsored the FLEC (Frente para a LibertacAo de Enclave
de Cabinda) to work for independence of the Cabinda enclave, which would free the oil
companies from having to negotiate with the Marxist MPLA after independence. FLEC
was excluded from the Alvor accords because they not only desired independence from
Portugal but independence from Angola as well.
These economic necessities, again true to the form of World Systems Theory, caused
the core states to line up their satellites to support one of the three main groups after the
November independence. Soon after, Senator John F. Kennedy met with Holden Roberto
in 1959, and praised Roberto’s “speaking out in the Senate against French colonial policy
in Algeria and urged him to take a similar position against Portuguese rule in Angola.”252
When Kennedy took office, he funneled aid to Roberto covertly through the CIA, so as
not to anger his Portuguese allies.
The Portuguese discovered the aid and threatened not to renew the U.S. lease for
military facilities on the Azores Islands in December 1962. Choosing to prioritize the
Azores base over Angolan nationhood, the U.S. limited its contact with Roberto and cut
its aid. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara reasoned, “The critical military importance
of our rights and continued use of our facilities in the Azores and of securing extension of
our rights in negotiations which must be undertaken in 1962 are such that any further
252 Kelly, America’s Tyrant, 211.
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public pressure on the Portuguese regarding the use of U.S. military material in Angola
should be avoided.”253
Political Change 1975 independence - Angola
By the spring of 1974, Zaire and China had begun training and equipping both FNLA
and UNITA forces. UNITA also secured assistance from South Africa.
After the Lisbon revolution forced negotiations with the Angolan nationalists groups,
“the CIA approved 300,000 in covert funds for Roberto”254 which “emboldened FNLA to
attack MPLA offices in Luanda.”255 This aid was approved by a four member National
Security Council group calling itself the ‘40 Committee.’ The four members were Henry
Kissinger in his dual role as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, CIA
director William Colby, Deputy Defense Secretary William Clement and Joint Chiefs of
Staff Gen. George S. Brown. This decision was made January 22, 1975, nine days after
the January 15 Alvor Accords which provided for a coalition government to lead Angola
after its November 11 independence date. Roberto took his CIA funds to war with the
approval of his longtime supporters Mobutu and Washington.
For its part in the region the Soviets had been vacillating in their support of the
MPLA. “Twice in the early 1 970s, just before their historic intervention, the Soviets fell
out with the leader of their client MPLA and shifted support from the highly intellectual
poet-doctor Augustino Neto to the soldierly Daniel Chipenda, who ultimately fought with
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an invading South African force during the 1975-1976 civil war.”256 By December 1974
however, the Soviets, looking at the Western aid pouring into the country became
resolute and resumed arms shipments to the MPLA, trained 250 MPLA soldiers in
Moscow and “by January 1975 enough (arms) had arrived to equip a force of five
thousand to seven thousand.”257
In February of 1975, FNLA with Zairian help began to drive MPLA out ofNorthern
Angola and even threatened Luanda. On March 23, 1975 FNLA again with Zairian
regulars took the town of Caxito with a 4000 man force in an action that killed 60 MPLA
members. “The Soviets dispatched arms to help MPLA defend itself in its stronghold of
Luanda.”258
The international dimensions of the Angola conflict were stark and numerous. On
May 1, 1975 Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State under Kissinger warned that
“UNITA was soliciting arms everywhere and South Africa was clearly interested in
helping. Ten countries, by this time, were actively and liberally supporting the FNLA.”259
Savimbi had been presenting himself as an alternative to the Marxist MPLA and the
capitalists of FNLA which increased his attractiveness to both China and South Africa.
In May of 1975, Cuban deputy premier Carlos Rafael Rodriguez sent 230 military
advisors to help the MPLA and by June 23, the MPLA had destroyed 12 out of 15 FNLA
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political offices with the help of left wing factions of the Portuguese army and with arms
from the Soviets.260
In July, a CIA plan was put into action that would send arms to both Roberto and
Savimbi in the hopes of balancing the power between the groups which would put off a
total MPLA victory. “President Ford signed Kissinger’s Angola plan July 16 and the first
planeload of arms left for Kinshasa and onward to delivery to Angola July 29.~~261 The
CIA plan was met with stiff resistance from the Soviet side. The MPLA with Cuban and
Soviet assistance was able to drive FNLA and UNITA completely out of Luanda by the
end of July, full out civil war had broken out and the Cubans reinforced Luanda as its
stronghold and the proposed seat of Angola’s government. In August, MPLA received
two hundred more Cuban instructors in the hopes of setting up four training facilities in
September.
In the same time period “the Chinese, having already given some supplies to the
FNLA in Zaire, increased their military supplies to Savimbi’ s UNITA forces using
Tanzania and Zambia as conduits.”262 Kissinger had clearly settled on sending assistance
to FNLA and UNITA covertly through Mobutu in Zaire. Kissinger saw the Angolan
conflict solely in terms of global politics and was determined the Soviets should not be
permitted to make a move in any remote part of the world without being confronted
militarily by the United States.263
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Special assistant to Kissinger Sheldon Vance who had been the past ambassador to
Zaire believed that the aid shipments would keep relations with Zaire warm and
hospitable to US designs in the region. John Stockwell the CIA chief of the Angola Task
Force became an advocate for increasing supplies to Savimbi and UNITA. Stockwell
viewed UNITA as better organized, held Savimbi in higher regard than Roberto and
made it a point to ensure that UNITA received support for the “air, ground, maritime and
propaganda branches of the little war.”264
On the MPLA side Cuban troops and Soviet Advisors poured into the country. “On
November 5 the Cubans sent 650 elite security troops ... an artillery regiment and a
mechanized battalion. . . From November 7 to December 9 at least 70 flights-carefully
coordinated with the Soviets-supplied the Cuban expeditionary force.”265 By April of
1976, there were 15,000 Cuban combat soldiers engaged in assisting the MPLA,266
matching a threat posed by South African support for UNITA and Zairian support for the
FNLA.
Conflict within the core/semi-periphery — United States and South Africa
The CIA reinforced their stations in Kinshasa, Luanda, Lusaka and Pretoria by
“dispatching eighty-three officers”267 to the region but it was the South African
involvement that proved crucial. South African and Rhodesian intervention was
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fundamentally provoked by their drive to secure white domination over the black
majorities in their states. SWAPO had long been linked to the various southern African
nationalist movements in southern Africa and by the mid 1 970s the ANC had presented a
series of significant challenges to the apartheid regime. The ties between Frelimo, ZAPU,
and the MPLA were a thorn to Pretoria in its drive to subjugate the ANC and SWAPO.
If South Africa could cement a foothold in Angola’s territory it could cement its hold
on the soon to be Namibia and justify its suppression of SWAPO as a regional necessity.
Thus, Pretoria would engage MPLA in Angola to open a second front in its efforts to
cement apartheid government in southern Africa. Mandela explains, “Destructive
apartheid policies have, moreover, caused further distortions.. .southern Africa fell victim
to apartheid’s destabilization strategy which left two million dead and inflicted an
estimated $62.45 billion of damage on the economies of our neighbors.”268
Pretoria was very familiar with the tactics of divide and conquer as it had often played
the Xhosa against the Zulu in efforts to destabilize the anti-apartheid movement. It is no
surprise then that it became South Africa’s strategy to “play on the tribal divisions within
Angola and supporting one tribal entity, the Ovimbundu group in this case, with large
quantities of arms and even participating on its side in the civil war.. ,,269 Defense
Minister and future president P.W. Botha drew up South Africa’s plans for action in
Angola believing that Pretoria was presented with “an opportunity for a dramatic shift in
268 Quoted in Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid’s Second Front: South Africa’s War against her Neighbors
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), 131.
269 Marte, Political Cycles in International Relations, 314.
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South Africa’s geopolitical strategy.. .a golden opportunity, both to ingratiate itself with
the United States and to establish influence over a key buffer state.”270
By August of 1975, South Africa had moved its troops to the Cunene River which
borders Narnibia and Angola under the rationale that it was there to protect the
hydroelectric plants. On September 17, South African Generals H.J van den Bergh and
Constand Viljoen traveled to Kinshasa to meet with Savimbi and Roberto. Roberto failed
to show up. With center stage all to himself, Savimbi made an appeal for aid by showing
that his forces were confronted by superior Soviet weaponry and that they could not hold.
Van den Bergh and Viljoen resolved that “simply arming Savimbi-the way the CIA had
been doing- would not turn the tide” and “decided to do it themselves”27’ in the form of
Operation Savannah.
The plan was to reinforce IJNITA and FNLA so that their positions were secure. Then
South African forces would clear the southern cities of Namibe and Lubango which
would allow them to capture and hold the Lobito and Benguela ports. South African
troops would then control the Benguela railway which would establish supply lines from
Benguela along the Atlantic coast into Zaire. Stockwell’s book confirms that there were
loose negotiations and joint activities between the CIA and Pretorian decision makers.272
The constant liaison between CIA and Pretoria’s Bureau of State Security is verified by
270 Allister Sparks, The Mind ofSouth Africa (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1990), 303-305.
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B. J. Voerster, the disgraced President who was replaced by P.W. Botha, who confirmed
that Kissinger indeed approved of South African involvement in Angola.273
By the middle of November, South Africa had marched 500 miles into Angola and
had effectively squeezed the MPLA between itself and the FNLA-Zairian forces
advancing from the North. This however was not entirely good news for the West. The
psychological meaning in the minds of the OAU of South African forces, acting as allies
to the Americans and Zaire deep inside Angolan territory would serve to blunt the
military success of such a move.
At this juncture a few points must be made. This work has earlier shown that there
was a fissure in Western relations between the U.S. core and the French semi-periphery.
The involvement of South Africa can also be seen in terms as a break of sorts. The
apartheid regime pursued several goals through its military activities in Angola. In the
long term, South Africa wished to humble and remove all sources of ideological and
military support for the various resistance movements in Southern Africa which were
fighting against the forces of white supremacy. SWAPO, the ANC, FRELIMO, and
ZANTJ had long established ties with the MPLA dating to the 1 960s. These nationalist
movements saw an independent Angola and Mozambique as the necessary precursors to a
southern Africa free from colonialism. The various movements also looked upon a
revolutionary Cuban regime, a small island state a mere 90 miles away from the heartland
of capitalism, proactively supporting its nationalists as an inspiration and jointly saw the
Soviets as a source of monetary and military support. South Africa realized this and
thought that if it could humble the Cubans and remove the Soviets then it could remove
273 Ibid., 219.
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the source of inspiration and secure itself from external attack while simultaneously
squelching internal attacks to apartheid while shoring up Rhodesia and South West
Africa.
This would secure a few other goals. South Africa’s intervention forced a split
between UNITA and SWAPO “producing an intelligence windfall for the SADF on those
SWAPO positions known to Savimbi.”274 If South Africa could defeat pro-Soviet forces
in Angola it could secure its long-term goals in Southern Africa.
Second, defeating the MPLA would also defeat a source of support for the ANC,
SWAPO and Frelimo. Thirdly, defeating the Cubans would assist the colonialists in
Rhodesia and Mozambique and lastly success in Angola would install a government
friendly to Apartheid in the form of Savimbi and UNITA.
In this vein, South Africa’s invasion in support of UNITA in the south was matched
by Mobutu’s support of FNLA in the North. Just as South Africa had long term goals in
mind so too did Mobutu have a rationale for his activities in Angola. Zaire wished to
curry favor with his CIA backers toward the goal of further endearing Mobutu’s regime
to the West. This would be facilitated by allowing Zairian territory to be used as a
conduit through which military supplies from the West would flow to the Angolan
theater. Thus, Mobutu hoped that he would become a power broker in the region and that
he could generate an image for himself as a progressive African leader. Mobutu was
wrong. Mobutu was only successful in being seen by African leaders, even those friendly
to the West, as an American tool fighting African nationalists on behalf of the CIA and
274 Kelly, America’s Tyrant, 218.
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apartheid. South African and Zairian activities produced a fissure in the Western bloc on
the Angolan issue.
Kissinger was aware and approved of South African military activities on behalf of
UNITA and FNLA but the results were a mixed bag. While covertly agreeing to South
African involvement, Kissinger was giving public proclamations to the opposite. In a
series of speeches between April and August 1976 the Ford administration announced a
new policy direction which would “apply economic and diplomatic pressure to Rhodesia,
South-West Africa and the Republic of South Africa to undermine their regimes and
force them to give way to Black African rule.”275 The Ford-Kissinger policy was an
acknowledgment that independent states and oppressed people would not tolerate race
based domination.
Yet, there was a disharmony between the image that Washington wished to portray
and what the CIA was doing in the Angolan country side that had to be reconciled. Just as
the semi-peripheral states of France and China had exposed certain cracks in their
respective cores, South African involvement in Angola could not be publicly reconciled.
This exposed a weakness that the United States could not readily square.
African states and movements friendly to the Soviets could now point to apartheid
South Africa’s involvement in Angola as proof positive that the U.S. was less concerned
with liberation than it was with the Cold War. This is evident in the OAU session called
at the end of 1975. States friendly to the FNLA-GRAE called a special summit meeting
where they called for immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces and a ceasefire that
275 William Schneider, “The View from Washington” in The Southern Oceans and the Security of the
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would allow a National Unity government. In a counter move states friendly to the
MPLA resolved to call for military aid to be given to Neto to drive others out.
This work has earlier shown the OAU to be divided by a split between moderates and
radical states present at its beginnings and in this session that very split was clearly
evident. The FNLA was assisted by moderate states that had financial, military and
diplomatic ties to the West and MPLA was supported by the radical wing that was more
diverse in their support. Importantly Benin, Burundi and most of all Nigeria made clear
their strong objections to South African involvement. Indeed Nigeria in expressing its
dissatisfaction of the role that Pretoria was playing with American support “recognized
the MPLA as the sole legitimate government in Angola and sent Luanda $20 million in
cash.”276 The question of South Africa’s role again called to issue the covert versus the
stated proclamations of Kissinger and caused U.S. designs in the region to be interrupted.
South Africa proved to be a tipping point of sorts and the Pretoria issue, along with
MPLA’s strong position in Luanda backed up by Cuban troops was sufficient to secure
diplomatic recognition from the OAU and the U.N. for the MPLA as the sole legitimate
Angolan government.
Some diplomatic moves were to then follow. Zambia pulled its support from UNITA
seeking to improve relations with the MPLA. Zaire even agreed to expel FNLA offices if
the MPLA would control anti-Mobutu ex-Katanga forces in its territory. South Africa
continued to support UNITA and continued to attack and periodically occupy southern
Angolan territory until the late 1980’s, justifying its moves as its quest to challenge
SWAPO forces operating in the area. The MPLA was forced to rely on Cuban military
276 Kelly, America s Tyrant, 229.
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aid and used Namibian nationalism and the anti-apartheid movement as issues that further
justified its nationalist struggle in a territory that was surrounded by pro-Western
moderates in Zaire and Zambia as well as a hostile apartheid regime in the south. Thus,
Kissinger’s covert program of aid and support for South African intervention had the
exact opposite effect of marginalizing both the Americans and UNITA in the Angolan
conflict ensuring that the conflict would continue through the 1 980s.
Conflict in the Core/semi-periphery - Soviet Union and Cuba
Just as South Africa’s role in the Western bloc must be analyzed, Cuba’s role in the
Soviet bloc must be explored. The Soviets were dependent on Cuba’s willingness to
deploy troops in support of African nationalists for those troops were also working to
further the Soviet goal of confronting the West. In a similar vein Cuba was dependent on
Soviet activism in Africa which gave Castro the opportunity to act and thereby raise
Cuba’s profile as a revolutionary state globally confronting imperialism on behalf of a
besieged proletariat. Richard Lowenthal describes Soviet policy as a strategy of counter-
imperialism where Africa had a geographic role of strategic importance based on its
decolonization efforts and its potential for economic contribution.277 Both Ethiopia and
Angola are proof positive and in the 1975 78 period, events in Angola presented the
Soviets with an opportunity to gain momentum.
Two factors were at work and Cuba’s role would become central. First, the rapid
decolonization which followed thirteen years of armed resistance and the 1974 Coup in
Portugal presented the Soviets with a prime opportunity in southern Africa to gain a
277 Richard Lowenthal, Model or A lly? .• The Communist Powers and the Developing Countries (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 154.
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geographic foothold in the region with strategic access to shipping and fishing lanes in
the South Atlantic Sea. Second the larger ideological goals of confronting the West and
staving off the Chinese challenge could be pursued by establishing and supporting clients
in the region.
These Soviet goals matched those of Cuba. Havana’s policy goals were to promote
Socialism by actively supporting liberation movements which would give Castro’s
regime leverage with both Soviet decision-makers and the larger Third World. If the
Cubans were able to successfully realize those goals then it would secure a greater
measure of independence from the Soviet bloc in diplomatic circles thereby increasing
Havana’s ability to rival Moscow and Beijing as vanguard Communist states. “...internal
resources, lack of U.S. opposition, and an African context that welcomed what Cuba
seemed best able to provide (allowed Cuba)- to become a visible and important actor
actually shaping the course of events.”278
Much of Cuba’s value to Moscow was its ability to inject its own troops in the
fighting on the ground in the service of Soviet goals. This reflects Cuba’s longstanding
commitment to Communism. Being the first Communist revolution and state in the
Western hemisphere gave Cuba legitimacy in the eyes of aspiring African nationalists.
Castro in a March 1967 speech to the University of Havana, affirmed Cuba’s
commitment to supporting revolutionary movements: “Our stand regarding Communist
parties will be based on strictly revolutionary principles. The parties that have a line
without hesitations and capitulationism, the parties that in our opinion, have a consistent
278 Jorge I. Dominguez, “Cuban Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs (Fall 1978), 96.
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revolutionary line, will receive our support in all circumstances.. . And if in any country
those who call themselves Communists do not know how to fulfill their duty, we will
support those who without calling themselves Communists, conduct themselves like real
Communists in action and in struggle.”279 Thus Cuba has worked to gain a history of
learned experience in African affairs that Soviet military leaders did not have and grew to
depend upon. Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) had been on the ground in
Africa since 1961 when they helped Nkrumah set up a guerilla training base in Ghana.
FAR had deployed its troops on numerous occasion, 1963-65 in Algeria during the border
conflict with Morocco, in 1965 Cuba supplied manpower to Sekou Touré’s Presidential
Guard, and in 1965-66 Ché Guevara led Cuban troops assisting guerillas in Congo
Brazzaville. These operations were later followed by FAR missions in Sierra Leone in
1972, Somalia in 1974 and again in Algeria 1975. “Cuba’s political, technical and
military missions in the region enjoyed far greater legitimacy than did those of the
USSR.”28°
This legitimacy was based on more than experience. The ideological claim was that if
a people of color with historic roots to Africa can sustain a Communist revolution 90
miles off the shore of the world’s most powerful capitalist state then those people have
lessons to teach nationalists in Africa. Further, Cuba’s operations in Africa were
seemingly without the economic duplicity present in some Soviet operations. Havana
279 quoted in Carl Cohen, ed. Communism, Fascism and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations (New
York: McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1997), 171.
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was never seen as developing an imperialist-like hunger for African natural resources,
nor the thirst for the labor to exploit those resources. “Cuba behaved as a committed,
selfless internationalist without big-power designs on the continent.. . due in large
measure to the fact that Havana dispatched personnel rather than money or materials to
the continent.”281 The Soviets on the other hand did not hide their desire to access and
extract African natural resources. “Southern Africa in particular they consider an
invaluable economic prize for the U.S.S.R. as the entire region is rich with such mineral
resources as petroleum, iron ore, diamonds, gold, uranium and titanium.”282
Angola then must be seen as an opportunity of immense importance for Soviet
strategy and Cuban ideology. South Africa had invaded from the south in late October
1975 and Zaire moved in from the North simultaneously squeezing the 1000 Cuban
soldiers supporting MPLA in holding Luanda. “Castro and the FAR had a heady sense of
being on the winning side of history”283 and in the summer of 1975 Cuba began its
buildup in support of the MPLA. South Africa’s invasion was used as justification for
Moscow and Havana to increase its support for the MPLA to the tune of 15,000 Cuban
troops by February 1976.
The increasing complexity of the situation in Angola had a side effect of causing the
Chinese to disengage from Angola, Mozambique and Zambia as well as from Guinea
Bissau in West Africa. The Chinese however remained engaged in the form of loans and
281 Jorge Dominguez, “Cuban Foreign Policy”, 95.
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development projects with Tanzania as well as with Mugabe’s, ZANU efforts to liberate
Zimbabwe from Rhodesia and South Africa. South Africa’s incursion into Angola’s land
gave the Soviet bloc the ideological rationale to intercede in 1975-76 in southern Africa
and Somalia’s invasion of the Ogaden region gave similar justification in Ethiopia. By
spring of 1978, there were 16,000 Cuban military men in Ethiopia along with the 15,000
in Angola.
By 1980, the Soviets had excluded its Chinese adversaries from two major Cold War
theaters in Africa and were being successful in confronting the West in both the Horn and
in Southern Africa. Cuba was giving proof positive of its commitment to its
revolutionary ideals and was increasing its bargaining position in the third world by
injecting its troops in both regions. Moscow and Havana were successfully pursuing
their goals and gaining momentum. Momentum however does not equal absolute
agreement.
It wouki be incorrect to depict Cuba during these times as being either a puppet of
Moscow or an instigator pushing the Soviets into various arenas. It must be clear that
Castro and the Soviets shared the common goals of fermenting the global revolution
against the imperialist west as well as strengthening the strategic position of both states
for the security of both states. It must also be clear that Moscow and Havana was filled
with self interested actors who pursued these goals jointly when it suited them and
diverged when necessary. The FAR was gaining valuable military experience in Africa
while simultaneously receiving training and equipment from the Soviets who were
benefiting from the FAR ventures in Africa in support of its activism on the continent.
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At the same time the FAR was constantly aware of the lessons learned from the Cuban
Missile Crisis of 1962 and its weakness relative to the U.S. “That event remains a
symbol of the possibility of a U.S. invasion, stood for decades as a reminder of the
tenuous nature of Soviet commitments to Cuban defense and provides clear evidence of
the limits of Cuban military power.”284 This understanding served to keep Havana’s ties
to the Soviets close but not enslaved to every whim and desire. There are two concrete
examples of Cuban independence in the face of a disagreement with Moscow. “In May
1977, for example, Cuban troops were employed by Agostino Neto to quash an attempted
coup by an extremist, pro-Soviet faction within the MPLA.”285 If the suspicions were
correct and Moscow intended to unseat Neto as he fervently believed, then Cuba must be
seen as actively countering a Soviet plan and thus expressing independence.
Another example is in the Horn. The Soviets publicly stated their support of
Mengistu’s efforts to defeat the Eritrean nationalists. However, on February 26, 1978,
Cuba’s Vice President declared that Cuban troops would not be used against the Eritreans
due to the ties established when Cuba helped them resist Haile Selassie. Instead the
Cubans insisted a political solution would have to be established. Cuba’s opposition,
along with Arab support, moved Moscow “the ensuing June (to) begin pushing actively
for a negotiated settlement of the Eritrean issue.”286
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Havana and Moscow must be seen as two separate actors working jointly for goals
that though similar often diverged. Cuba was not a mere puppet of the Soviets but a
needed partner in shared goals in Africa. The Soviets could not confront the West
without provoking a larger war were it not for FAR troops on the ground and Cuba could
not compete for prominence on a global stage were it not for Soviet activism, logistics
and support. The 1980’s would make all this even more obvious.
Conflict within the periphery —South Africa and Cuba
During the 1980s, a pattern emerged between the MPLA supported by the Cubans
with Soviet bloc advisors from Moscow, East Germany and North Vietnam providing
logistics and UNITA propped up by the West in the form of South African troops, and
mercenaries from Belgium, Portugal and France with CIA logistical287 assistance. Both
sides engaged in a series of annual offensives during the dry season throughout the
decade. Here this work will use three such battles to show the international dimensions
of the Angolan conflict and how the core designs of the superpowers were at work.
By November 1983, UNITA had penetrated 10 out of 14 Angolan provinces due to
South African assistance and had camps 90 miles outside of Luanda. The MPLA was
clearly on its heels and the Soviet bloc decided to step up its support. That month U.N.
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar convened a meeting between Moscow and Pretoria in
New York where the Soviets made clear their intention that the government in Luanda
not fall. It was an implicit threat backed up by a large scale show of force in Luanda’ s
ports. “The Kremlin dispatched the most powerful naval force since 1979 to round the
287 Kelly, America’s Tyrant, 230.
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Cape of Good Hope: an aircraft carrier and three surface vessels that stopped in the
Angolan capital to underline the Kremlin’s commitment to its client.”288
The Soviet naval pioy was not without precedent. In 1976, Soviet naval ships fired in
support of the MPLA. In 1978, the Soviet navy fired on Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia. In
1981 the Soviets sent their largest floating dry docks to Mozambique and Angola and
earlier in 1983 a similar show of force indeed dissuaded South Africa in Mozambique. If
however, the intent of the 1983 show in Luanda was to dissuade South Africa from
further incursions, it was unsuccessful. Pretoria called Moscow’s bluff and in December
1983 launched Operation Askari whereby it sent brigades deep inside Angola to attack
the Soviet client SWAPO. Angola’s 11th Brigade was defeated at Cuvelai. The Soviets
issued another warning this time publicly through its news agency in January 1984 and
convened a meeting between Cuban and Angolan military leaders. Cuban, Soviet and
East German pilots were given authority to fly combat missions to provide air cover to
MPLA troops and more Angolan pilots were being trained to fly the MIG-23. This
served to stop the South African advance.
The January conference of Soviet allies produced a more offensive military strategy, a
large scale re-supply effort and significantly, deployed more Soviet and Cuban advisors
into combat units where they would more readily assist in the firing of guns and risk the
loss of life. “UNITA’ s success in the Angolan provinces in 1983 threatened Soviet
prestige, even though the possibility of overthrowing the MPLA was negligible.”289 The
288 Vanneman, Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa: Gorbachev ‘s Pragmatic Approach, 50.
Ibid., 52.
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MPLA forces then prepared to jointly attack UNITA positions in the remote Cuando
Cubango region to the south and to engage UNITA forces at the Zairian border to the
North in the effort to move their strategy from mere defense to assaulting Western forces.
The goal was to eliminate instead of contain UNITA. This made the battle for the Lomba
River a necessary test in that it was the access point to UNITA’s capital region. MPLA,
Cuba and Soviet bloc forces deployed 30 T-62 tanks and 80 armored personnel carriers
with 11 brigades supplied by Soviet airfields and defended by Soviet planes which were
informed by East German radar under the command of Russian General Konstantin
Chaknovich. The MPLA forces were met by UNITA mortar and heavy artillery. South
African fighters strafed MPLA columns and even the environment worked against the
MPLA forces. “The huge heavy armored vehicles and trucks of the column couldn’t
maneuver in the soft, sandy tracks and were destroyed en masse.”29° UNITA counter
attacked. The MPLA’s southern thrust was a wash, Jamba remained secure, many
Cubans were killed and Soviet advisors were withdrawn by helicopter. In the North
however UNITA forces were routed and driven into the Zairian bush.
The Soviets responded to the failure of their Lomba River thrust by “pouring in $3.5
billion worth of military equipment to replace and upgrade that which was lost during the
ill-fated 1985 offensive.”29’ It took two years to re-supply the Angolan government’s
forces for another large scale attack. In July 1987 the MPLA began to engage UNITA in
a series of attacks that appeared to forcefully target South African troops. The Lomba




River failure was a lesson for the MPLA and its Cuban and Soviet advisors. More
advisors were given frontline roles, in 1985 there were 14 in 1987 there were up to 90.292
The advance was a slow methodical clearing of brush by infantry that preceded the
tanks “reminiscent of the advance of an ancient Roman Legion-march a certain distance,
then build a fortified camp before spending the night.”293 The two opposing forces met at
the junction of the Lomba and the Cuzizi rivers and the MPLA’s 47th brigade was
destroyed. The l6il~ brigade was prevented from capturing Cunjamba and South Africa
launched Operation Modular to repulse the MPLA. Soviet, Cuban and Angolan pilots
engaged in dog fights with South Africa with some success but overall the attack was
another failure for the MPLA. They were unsuccessful in capturing the seat of power for
UNITA in Jamba, both Savimbi and South Africa remained in country and the status quo
lingered.
In November 1987, Dos Santos and Castro met in Moscow were they resolved to
replace the existing Cuban troops with the elite Cuban 50th Division, with the best Cuban
pilots in support. North Vietnamese military advisors schooled in resisting siege tactics
were sent in. “What followed was the biggest land battle in the history of Southern
Africa, centering on two key Angolan air bases along the Soviet manned air defense
system in southern Angola.”294 By June of 1988, 15 thousand fresh Cuban troops were
in country supported by ANC and SWAPO scouts. By the end of June the Cubans were
patrolling down to the Namibian border. Neither side was able to militarily defeat the
292 Vanneman, Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa, 53.
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other so towards the end of the decade, both sides claimed victory. The 1 980s hostilities
produced a détente in Africa similar to the larger détente between Reagan and
Gorbachev.
The pressures of war had produced negotiations beginning in January of 1988. South
Africa faced domestic unrest amongst the black population and dissatisfaction in the
decline of living standards amongst whites. Military intervention proved costly for
Castro in both Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviets were overstretched and Gorbachev and
Reagan reached the Brazzaville Protocol in December 1988, by which all foreign troops
would leave Angola and Namibia would gain independence. Apartheid ended in South
Africa in 1990, Cuban troops left Angola by June 1991, and the Soviet Union disbanded
in December 1991. Without the threat of Communist takeover and South African troops
to do their bidding, the Western governments largely disengaged from Angola. MPLA
and UNITA would clash intermittently throughout the 1990s until the death of Savimbi in
2002.
Regular army, mercenaries, weaponry, nationalists and rebels from fifteen
countries and groups had been engaged. The core through the CIA provided monetary
support, armaments and logistics. On the other side of the core scale, the Soviets
provided similar monetary support logistics and weaponry and included advisors to the
battlefields. The semi-periphery states of France, Belgium, Portugal and significantly
South Africa provided mercenaries and military battalions for the West and the semi
peripheral state of Cuba did the same for the Soviet bloc with East German and North
Vietnamese assistance. The peripheral colonial governments of Rhodesia and South
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West Africa assisted by the RENAMO rebels in Mozambique, fought against the ANC,
SWAPO and Frelimo nationalists. An estimated 500,000 lives were lost and as the U.S.
emerged the victor of the Cold War, Africa was marginalized.
Soviet goals in Africa were geared towards gaining influence with African leaders
which would enable Moscow to ideologically and strategically confront the West. U.S.
goals in Africa were to contain the Soviets by supporting pro-Western actors to maintain
Western ideological hegemony and to secure corporate access to material resources. The
objective of the cores of both the West and the Soviets were the same, mirror images
differing only in their reflection. Both states suffered repeated setbacks and failures as
their policies to confront each other did not adequately appreciate the complexities of
African group dynamics and the legacy of colonial administrations on new state
governments.
Core conflict had engaged the African periphery in conflict with itself in a manner
such that the goals of the core were destined to fail. Both the Soviets and the Americans
sought to capitalize on anti-colonial movements to engage each other thorough proxies
and exacerbated local antagonisms via the influx of money and weaponry. Both core
states intervened in weak states susceptible to external influences in the service of core
goals. Africans in turn exploited the intra core conflict towards their own goals gaining
advantages and the ability to engage their enemies to secure their grasp on their power
bases.
U.S. policy was to support a single leader in a client state and use that leader as a
proxy for U.S. goals in the region. The indigenous needs of the groups in the state, much
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less human rights, democracy and justice were not factors that significantly weighed in to
the equation. Between 1962 until the end of the Cold War, the U.S. grew a client-patron
relationship which peripherized 6 states with the bulk of U.S. financial assistance. They
were Haile Selassie in Ethiopia ($817 million), Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya (over $1
billion), Samuel Doe in Liberia ($807 million), Siad Barre in Somalia ($884 million),
Gaafar Nimeri in Sudan ($1 .8 billion) and Mobutu Sese Seko ($1 .1 billion).295
Of this number, after receiving U.S. financial assistance, five of these (Ethiopia,
Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire) suffered through bloody civil wars which killed tens
of thousands of their people. The financial ties to the U.S. appear to have done nothing
for and even hampered the legitimacy of the specific rulers. Selassie was ousted in
September of 1974, Nimeri in April of 1985, Doe was deposed in September of 1990 and
Barre followed in January 1991. In Kenya Moi’s ardent anti-Communist stance and
openness to Western capital kept his government in place for 24 years. Moi however had
to withstand a coup attempt in 1982 which led to limits being placed on political
freedoms and a de facto single party state. Moi’s presidency has been marred by
corruption296 and political repression that even used torture chambers used to curtail
dissent297. The U.S. goal may have been to contain the Soviets, but the bloody regimes
which resulted in the removal of their favored clients can hardly be termed a success for
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American administrations who publically tout human rights as a precondition for
diplomatic relations.
The Soviet bloc’s record of support is no better but has been able to register two key
successes. In the early 1 960s, the Soviets established a sphere of influence termed the
Ghana-Guinea-Mali triangle with Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Touré and Modibo Keita
respectively. As with the favored clients of the U.S., Nkrumah was deposed in 1966 and
Keita was ousted in 1968. Perhaps even worse for Soviet goals, relations with Touré
soured and Touré formally renounced Marxism ml 978 and established economic ties
with the West.
In the late 1 960s, the Soviet African periphery favored Somalia and Sudan. As noted
previously, Somalia made an abrupt turn to the West for support. Moscow cemented ties
to Addis Ababa and Sudanese policy has been dominated by Western finance. In the late
1 970s the Soviets experienced a measure of success in the Horn and in southern Africa.
Soviet and Cuban support for Mengistu enabled the Soviets to challenge the West’s goals
for Eritrea and to a lesser degree the Ogaden region. In southern Africa, the Soviet bloc
worked to support African nationalists across the region including, FRELIMO, SWAPO,
the ANC and the MPLA as these groups fought the hegemony of South Africa as the
semi-peripheral proxy for the West. Indeed the Soviet bloc again with indispensable
Cuban support allowed both the Dergue and the MPLA to hold onto state government
and stave off Western funded challenges to their rule.
Mengistu survived until 1991, when he lost Soviet support as the Cold War ended.
The MPLA under dos Santos still controls Angola’s central government. The ability of
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dos Santos to outlive the Cold War (and Mengistu’s inability to do the same) may be seen
as an Angolan success as the Angolan nationalists were eventually able to begin new
state experiments through negotiations made possible after the death of both the Soviet
Union and Savimbi. However, Soviet policy may not have been the deciding factor,
merely one of many variables that allowed decolonization to fitfully proceed. Soviet
policy in Africa has always been the reactionary and opportunistic result of factors
initially beyond their control which they sought to exploit for their favor. That can hardly
be called successful foreign policy by any regime.
CHAPTER FIVE
WORLD SYSTEM THEORY COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
“Virtus Unita Fortior”298
“Our system willfit a larger empire than ever yet existed, and I have long believed that
such an empire will arise in America, and give quiet to the world. “ Matthew Lyon,
18 16.299
Angolan and Ethiopian actors, both governmental and non-governmental, have
allowed the Cold War to provide a frame for their conflicts using the motivations of the
West and the Soviet block to further their own ends. In this environment there was no
will, no consensus for nation-building and power sharing. It was only the dissolution of
the Cold War hostilities and the subsequent drying up of support which produced any
efforts at democratization.
Militarization of politics and politicization of the military
In Ethiopia the military was the key source of power to the Selassie regime as well as
the Dergue later. Domestic politics becomes militarized with the support and arms
agreements of international actors. In that the political goals only survive through
military force, the military interest becomes the primary interest. Enormous military
transfers of credits and weaponry were made by both sides of the Cold Ward conflict to
their respective clients thus making the struggle for power more bloody and destructive.
298 Angolan motto, Latin for ‘virtue is stronger when united’.
Williams, Empire as a Way ofLife, 55.
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Financial assistance from the outside was directed to the military leaving little to no
room for community development, social relief, and economic progress. The sheer
hunger born of a scarcity in large part exacerbated by domestic hostilities which itself
was exacerbated by international tension bred bloody repression of all political dissent.
Governance that attempts the consent of the governed is forgotten. All but the militarized
political goals are neglected and this neglect cannot help but produce friction as the
groups without power attempt to gain some reprieve.
This generates a series of conflicts that take on an ethnic dimension as group rivalry
becomes one of the rallying cries used to justify non-state uprisings and state based
repression. Decades old territory disputes and the ethnic loyalties of decision-makers who
had the military backing to act produced repression on both sides of these aggravated
conflicts. Where before, dozens would be killed by small arms fire, the Cold War meant
the delivery of weapon systems that could erase entire towns.
That repression produced a violent reaction which in turn brought about a violent
counter reaction. This cycle of violence drained state resources as it produced a further
concentration of national and community wealth to be diverted to the military.
Development in these circumstances is stifled and the African state lost its power to
divest itself from this spiral of decay as decision-makers instead merely strove to survive
and maintain power.
There is also a regional effect in both the Horn and in southern Africa that must be
appreciated. As in the classic cases of international relations a strictly competitive
situation arises where arms transfers by Cold War combatants to African actors serves to
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increase that actor’s position and the non-recipient must address his loss of position by
making arms agreements on his own. This zero-sum atmosphere intensified regional
rivalries as arms races fueled by the Cold War hostilities took place.
Southern Africa and the case of Angola is proof of this point. White settler
communities in Angola, South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia came down on the side of
Savimbi in their angst that a Marxist Angola would be a hostile challenge to the viability
of their patron, the apartheid regime in South Africa. Mobutu in Zaire was dependant on
American support for the viability of his regime and was accordingly hostile to the
MPLA. To the East Kaunda in Zambia was dependent on the Benguela railway for the
transport of vital goods and export income. The Benguela railway was most consistently
under the control of Savimbi’s UNITA who was able to broker Zambian hostility towards
Luanda as a toll for continued access. Given these reasons for supporting Savimbi,
Soviet financial and logistical support for Dos Santos and the MPLA, backed up by
thousands of experienced Cuban combat troops were seen as factors that upset the
balance. Just as the MPLA saw the assistance of the Soviet bloc as necessary, so too did
Luanda’s challengers see increased support from America and the West as vital.
One is also able to draw a similar comparison to the strategic situation of Ethiopia in
the Horn and how a security dilemma arises when one side receives balance tilting
support. American strategy in the region held a long standing interest via Eritrea’s access
to the Red Sea and key shipping lanes as well as the military utility of the Kagnew
listening station. The loss of the Selassie regime and the intransigence of the Dergue
towards the goals of the Carter administration shook Western strategic objectives in the
188
region. The Dergue was then able to impress upon its Soviet patron the value that it
could provide given the Cold War hostilities. From the 1970s, through the latter part of
the next decade, Soviet military and financial assistance grew substantially. Cuban boots
were again put on the ground. The balance had shifted and the West had to address this
lest the loss of position prove lasting. The Americans after failing in their initial attempt
to co-opt the Dergue looked towards Mogadishu.
The Somalis had a long standing conflict with the Ethiopians over the Ogaden region
which Washington initially sought to use to broker influence. The early goal was to use
the Somalis to destabilize the Dergue from the East which would in turn allow the
Eritreans to be successful on their northern front thereby guaranteeing access to the Red
Sea for the West as the fulfillment of a core Cold War strategic goal. However, the
Carter Administration ultimately proved unable to justify its support of a secessionist
movement in the Horn when it was actively denying such support to other actors and
withdrew its support from Somalia. Barre was forced to look for other sources of support
both to Arab states and the Soviets using its long shoreline along key shipping lanes in
the Gulf of Aden as inducement.
These negotiations proved unsustainable and the initial Somali invasion of the Ogaden
was defeated by increased and renewed Soviet support for Ethiopia. It may thus be seen
in both cases that Cold War hostilities and their strategic dimensions were used to
aggravate tense domestic rivalries which wound up drawing in the surrounding regions of
both states. The governments and their challengers, non-state groups and the surrounding
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areas were drawn into conflict, participating in the cycle of violence and the resulting
downward spiral of development.
This work has used World Systems theory to provide the framework for detailing the
system of interactions particular to both conflicts. World Systems theory also will
facilitate comparison. The center in the West is the United States and its center
counterpart in the East is the Soviet Union. The periphery that is affected by the bipolar
conflict is Angola and Ethiopia. Between the two, there was a semi-periphery of states
which exhibit two sets of characteristics. One is polarized around the leadership of both
of the superpowers and intricately involved in the conflicts yet not geographically located
in the regions.
This work has focused on Portugal and France as the key semi-peripheral actors
galvanized around the polarity of the U.S. Similarly, China and Cuba working for the
interests of the Soviet Union formed the Eastern semi-periphery. The other set of semi-
peripheral actors are states located in the conflict regions who actively exert influence on
the peripheral actors, yet are more negotiators engaged in intense diplomacy, rather than
military participants. These states are chiefly involved in the service of their individual
goals which happen to have an impact on the larger conflict between the superpowers. In
the Angolan case there were Zambia and Mozambique. In the Ethiopian case there were
Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and South Yemen.
Then there is the periphery, engaged in the various stages of military and diplomatic
contact noted above. This work has earlier cited Johan Galtung who acknowledged that
there was a periphery within the periphery which in a state of disharmony devolves into a
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set of conflicts which facilitate their being made proxies to the goals of the super powers
in the region. At various stages of the Angolan case there was the MPLA, UNITA,
FNLA, the Cuban military, the state based forces of Zaire, South Africa and Rhodesia
along with the resistance movements in the region namely SWAPO, FRELIMO and the
ANC. In the Ethiopian case there is the Dergue or the PMAC and its conflicts with the
Somali military and the Eritrean resistance in the name of the ELF, EPLF, TPLF, TLF
and the EPRP.
Comparison Scale
This comparison will process the behavior of actors in the Angolan and the Ethiopian
cases on two operational scales the military and the diplomatic. Each scale will have 5
behavioral points of distinction.
The militarism scale will be used to look at the various phases of conflict ranging from
outright violence to periods of peace. By militarism this work means the extent to which
the military priorities have influenced political decision-making and affected the society.
Modern society assumes that there is a boundary between decision-making in peace and
decision-making in times of war. To measure militarism is to observe the extent to which
this boundary has been abrogated.
During the Cold War tensions rose between the two super-powers as they competed
for adherents and strategic ascendancy over the other’s bloc of states. Even though there
was not outright fighting between the two, military prerogatives came to subsume
internal discussions and as both superpowers extended their reach into the developing
world in general and Angola and Ethiopia specifically, the military extended its influence
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as well. Both Angola and Ethiopia had internal conflicts that were exacerbated by the
superpowers who at various points in time engaged in an arms race to secure hegemony
by supporting proxies in the region. In this environment the military and strategic needs
of the Cold War led directly to the intrusion of the military into the political affairs of the
leadership. The senior military leaders came to either occupy senior political positions or
exert extreme influence over those positions. Arms shipments, fund transfers for
weaponry and training led to outright war. The military then becomes to tool through
which the political leadership comes to claim and cement their ability to make decisions.
The cases to be compared will over time show various levels of concentration of
militarism. Here then, the term militarism will have the practical meaning of
distinguishing between war, threat, tension, pressure and calm, the five phases of conflict.
Phase one will be termed calm. By calm this work means periods of relative stability
and peace, the absence of outright violence. This calm may be based on shared
ideological goals, agreement on the best tactical methods employed by both the
superpower and the proxy element or the influence the African actor gains from securing
significant outlays of military funds or troops to their cause.
Phase two is termed pressure. The pressure is evident by a marked change in the
stability of the system as it is affected by internal rivals or external actors. For the
pressure to occur there must be observable a marked diminution of the calm where the
strings attached to the transfer of arms and personnel have been tugged or the agreements
that the calm was predicated upon are shaken due to the exigencies of the time.
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Phase three is termed tension. This indicates that ideological incompatibilities have
occurred between rivals. In this phase one group is actively working against another
group, perhaps by the state disposing a marginalized group of its land or even where a
group of people have organized themselves with or without outside assistance to resist
the state or other rival groups. Tension is distinct from pressure because there is a readily
observable stress based relationship between rivals, not merely pressure to act but
activities that have heightened the strain on relations.
Phase four will be termed threat. Distinct from the earlier stage, here the tension has
devolved into hostile relations between rivals. The West and the Soviet blocs are at this
point are actively supporting the war making capacity of internal actors. Armed
skirmishes may be observable. The agenda of rivals are observably hostile to each other
and there is the persistent threat of the outright prolonged violence which characterizes
the next stage.
Phase five is termed war. There is prolonged military engagement between rivals.
The threat of outright fighting has been realized and the outside actors are providing
logistical support or have committed personnel in the military efforts. The disharmony
that has built up between rivals has fully matured into bloodletting. The Angolan and
Ethiopian proxies are fully absorbed into the Cold War in the service of their superpower
allies even while they fight in the service of localized goals.
The second scale which will have its own five phases is the diplomatic scale. This
work realizes that military activity has a necessary adjunct in the diplomatic arena. Here
is where the various actors both internal to Angola and Ethiopia and in the external Cold
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War negotiate and bargain dollar amounts, strategic lines and plans of action. Key to an
understanding of diplomacy is communication between groups that facilitates the flow of
ideas and includes the possibilities of cooperation or subversion.
A second element to accept is that this communication that diplomacy is predicated
upon occurs under threat of the ultimate recourse of violence. Groups will accept that
they need to engage in diplomatic relations when each group acknowledges the others’
control of the means of coercion. Threat of force provides the bread upon which
diplomacy is spread.
When Karl von Clausewitz, in On War, wrote that “war is nothing but a continuation
of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means.”300 this work understands him to
say that war or conflict is the militarized quest for political influence or the power to
make authoritative decisions. The diplomatic scale then charts the development of
political influence all the while acknowledging that there is a second concurrent and
joined militarist scale as well. Diplomacy may be defined as communication between
actors exogenous to each other whereby one seeks to maximize its ability to obtain its
goals either by cooperating or contesting with another. International negotiations, intra
state actors in consultation and the flow of resources in the service of influencing
strategic relations are all included under this scale.
The words of Thomas Hobbes are appropriate here. Hobbes in 1651 said “I put for the
general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power,
300 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. trans. Colonel James John Graham (London: N. Trubner, 1873), 121.
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that ceaseth only in death.”30’ Constant conflict because man by nature hungers for
power leads to the perpetual and restless need to communicate with others all under the
backdrop of the ultimate recourse: violence.
The first phase of the diplomatic scale is termed cooperation. Here rivals have made
alliances with each other based on either mutual security arrangements or the mutual flow
of resources. Talks are frequently cordial if not warm and the harmony of goals leads to
extensive assistance. The relations between Angolan and Ethiopian actors, both state and
non-state, with their superpower patrons leads to official state visits and proclamations of
support.
The second phase will be termed support. Shared goals leads to mutual respect but
the ideological harmony may be strained. Strategic alliances are more the case here than
in the previous stage. The conditions upon which support is given are specific and
subject to change when conditions and priorities shift. In this stage when the support is
promised or given it is meant to influence the behavior of the recipient and if it is not
successful then it is withdrawn.
Phase three is termed dissonance. Relations here become stressed as goals begin to
differ and ideologies no longer match. Strategy and tactics are debated and agreement is
difficult if obtained at all. Here there is disagreement over objectives, interests have
diverged and relations between rivals are more anxious than in the previous stage yet not
as utterly hostile as in the next stage. To be in a state of dissonance is to engage in
301 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobhes/thomas/h68l/ (accessed January
18, 2009).
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negotiation without out clearly knowing if the outcome will lead to a more cooperative
relationship or a more antagonistic one.
The fourth phase is called antagonism. Lines of distinction have become clearer and
there is the distinct possibility of force being used to achieve objectives. There is the
marked dispute over what should be done and the goal of the interaction between rivals is
to come out on top of the other with more power and better positioning relative to their
competitor. Rivals believe that their competitors have certain weaknesses that are ready
to be exploited. In this stage we find Robert Dahi’s notion of politics as the use of power
to make decisions utilized as various forms of power are utilized by one group to
influence the choices and behavior of its rival to get the rival to do things which it would
otherwise not do.
Phase five is conflict. Here there is outright hostility. Force is the preferred means of
communication. Von Clausewitz is fully realized as one is able to most readily see the
militarization of the political goals. The shooting war has begun and there is bloodletting
in the service of the political goals.
There are four stages that this work has focused on, each with multiple points of
comparison. Stage one is Angola and Ethiopia pre- 1974/75. This is chosen to provide
historical context for the comparison. The understanding here is that the political
conflicts that marked each state must have their roots in antecedent factors that are
particular to each state. In this stage we find the beginning contacts and initial
motivations of the core states with Angolan and Ethiopian actors. Stage one has the
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following points of comparison which were chosen based on their significance to each
states introduction to the world system:
A. Ethiopian and U.S.: 1900 through 1953 — rated 1-M, 2-D. There was peace
between both states during this time and U.S. presidents from McKinley through
Eisenhower extended diplomatic courtesies to the state, particularly lending
much support to Selassie’ s return to the throne after the defeat of Italian forces in
1941.
B. Ethiopia and U.S.: 1953-1974 — rated 1-M, 1-D. During this period the ties
between the two states were made closer. Selassie enjoyed a cooperative
relationship with the U.S. and its Western bloc allies signing strategic and
military agreements to cement Ethiopian hegemony in the region.
C. Ethiopia and Italy: 1934-194 1 — rated 5-M, 5-D. This is an early formative
conflict occurring on Ethiopian soil where Ethiopians became embroiled in a
larger global conflict, an occurrence that would soon repeat itself as this work has
shown. Here we find outright warfare between Ethiopians and Italians before and
during World War II which was eventually quelled with British and American
assistance. This allowed the U.S. to gain an important strategic foothold in the
gulf region to the consternation of the Soviets.
D. Ethiopia and Britain: 1940-1950’s — rated 2-M, 3-D. During this time the British
began applying military pressure on the Ethiopians creating a certain dissonance
in their relations. Britain was supporting the Somali claim to the Ogaden region
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believing it was not in its best interest to have Ethiopia the unchallenged
hegemon in the horn of Africa.
E. Ethiopia and Soviet Union: 1953-1963 — rated 2-M, 3-D. Here we see Selassie
hedging his global bets and attempting to forge ties with both core states that he
could them use to play one of the other for the advantage of Ethiopia. Selassie
hoped this competition would marginalize Somali strength.
F. Soviet Union and Somalia: 1963-1977 — rated 2-M, 2-D. Both emerging from
World War II with relative strength and regional authority, Somalia and the
Soviet Union began to use each other for strategic reasons. During this time
Somalia became a dominant force in the horn and a key competitor to the
Ethiopian regime.
G. Angola and Portugal: colonialism to 1975 — rated 5-M, 5-D. During the colonial
period the interaction between the people of Angola and the Portuguese was one
of outright warfare, economic subjugation and the barbarous abuse of human
rights. This state of war and conflict continued until the Carnation Revolution in
April 1974 removed Portugal’s ability to colonize Angola.
H. Angola and Soviet Union: colonialism to 1975 — rated O-M, O-D. There was little
to no contact between the Soviets and Angolan groups during this period. This
remains noteworthy because the lack of colonial involvement will be a rhetorical
strength the Soviets can wield to gain socialist adherents amongst the MPLA.
I. Ovimbundu, Bakonga, Mbundu relations: colonialism to 1961 — rated 3-M, 3-D.
The relations between indigenous Angolans were made stressful because of
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colonial efforts to divide the groups by parsing our favors and using repression
for the benefit of the colonizers. Each group began to feel the other was partly
responsible for their groups positioning. This is a key factor for the political
disunity that followed.
J. UNITA, FNLA, MPLA relations: 1964— 1975 rated 3-M, 4-D. When
independence became a reality there was a marked increase in the antagonism
between the three major groups as each began to compete for local, regional and
international recognition.
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Figure 1. Angola and Ethiopia pre 1974/75
Stage two is Political Change 1974 and 1975. During these two years, first Ethiopia
and Angola the year later experienced traumatic change that set the stage for two decades
of strife and proxy based bloodletting. The events that occurred here concretized the
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ideological positions of the various factions, cemented rivalries and tied both states to the
larger core conflict of the Cold War.
A. Ethiopia and the U.S.: 1974-1977 — rated 3-M, 3-D. Selassie is overthrown in a
coup at two years after the Soviets were removed from the region. Now that the
Soviets were no longer applying direct pressure to the Red Sea shipping lanes
through their presence in Egypt and Sudan, Selassie’s expulsion allowed the U.S.
to rework its priorities for a time resulting in a cloudy period of tension and
ideological dissonance between the U.S. and Ethiopia.
B. Ethiopia and the Soviet Union: 1975-1977 — rated 1-M, 1-D. Selassie is replaced
by the Dergue resulting in a reversal of its Cold War polarity into the sphere of
the Soviets. The Carter administration attempted to initially disengage from
Ethiopia allowing for significant inroads to be made by the Soviets in terms of
ideological harmony and military transfers.
C. Ethiopia and the U.S.:1977-1978 — rated 4-M, 4-D. The Carter Administration
soon realized that they could not in fact disengage but instead realized the threat
that the Dergue posed to U.S. interest in the region. Thus the U.S. through its
allies in the region began to actively work against the Soviets by strengthening the
opponents of the Dergue.
D. UNITA, FNLA and MPLA interactions: 1966-1975 — rated 4-M, 4-D. In the run
up to the 1975 Alvor accords which allowed for independence, the main groups
jockeyed for position. Antagonism was accompanied with the threat of all out
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war between the groups as each struggled for recognition as the ruling
government in control of Luanda.
E. The MPLA and the U.S./west: 1973-1975 — rated 4-M, 5-D. Immediately prior to
independence the West had begun to actively work against the MPLA. The
MPLA in these years received military and financial assistance from the leftist
governments of the OAU themselves receiving assistance from the Soviets. This
was a challenge that the West felt it had to meet.
F. IJNITA/FNLA and Soviet UnionlCuba: 1973-1975 — rated 4-M, 5-D. In similar
vein the FNLA began to receive support from states that were friendly to the West
through the conduit of Mobutu’s Zaire. UNITA had moved from a client of the
Chinese who initially provided arms and training to a full assistant to the West in
the form of South African and Zairian troops and logistics.
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Figure 2. Political Change 1974 and 1975
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After the traumatic political changes that both Ethiopia and Angola experienced the
stage was set for the Cold War to be fought on their terrain and with their bodies. The
next stage is to note the Core and Semi-Periphery Interactions. It must be clearly
understood that there were intra-bloc competitions and rivalries that had an impact on
both the U.S. and the Soviets as the core states. Lines of support were not clear. Rather
the interactions between the United States as core and France, Portugal and South Africa
as the Western semi-periphery was marked by competing interests and challenges to the
hegemony of the U.S. This was the case with the Soviets as well and their semi-
peripheral actors of China and Cuba. Castro and Mao gave the Soviets a means for
injecting socialist ideology into both Angola and Ethiopia and allowed the Soviets to
challenge the dominance of the West.
A. United States and France: rated 1 -M, 3-D. Initial dissonance between these two
states occurred when the U.S. rejected French attempts to keep its colonial
holdings in African and Asia when it could no longer do so by itself. For this
work a core stressor on the diplomatic relations was the Suez crisis of 1956 where
U.S. diplomatic and economic strength deterred French goals in the region. This
experience precipitated French efforts to diplomatically combat American goals
in Ethiopia
B. Soviet Union and China: rated 3-M, 4-D. Mao fostered a complex relationship
with Stalin after World War II ended based on ideological and methodological
similarities. When Stalin died Khrushchev in an effort to redirect the state
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criticized many of Stalin’s policies by making a number of conciliatory moves
towards the U.S. Mao seized the opportunity to attempt to become the socialist
vanguard for the global movement which was a direct attack on Soviet exclusivity
as the international anti-imperialist advocate. This lead to ideological antagonism
and tense military relations
C. United States and Portugal: rated 1-M, 2-D. In the 1960 and early 1970 the U.S.
felt it necessary to support Portuguese colonialism in the effort to secure the
strategically important lease on the Azores islands in the Atlantic Ocean. Yet the
Kennedy administration saw its own hypocrisy in its challenge of French colonial
policy in Algeria and began to covertly aid the FNLA until the Portuguese
discovered it and threatened to revoke the Azores lease. When Western
corporations needed U.S. support after the beginnings of hostilities in Angola the
U.S. supplied it. Thus, relations between the U.S. and Portugal may be seen as
warm and based on shared economic and strategic needs.
D. United States and South Africa: rated 1 -M, 1 -D. The Angolan conflict is much
the story of war between South Africa and Cuba as much as it is UNITA and
MPLA. The U.S. through the CIA provided logistical, financial and military
support to the apartheid regime in the effort to drive the MPLA and thus the
Soviets out of Luanda. The West supported South Africa which in turn waged
war in Angola.
E. Soviet Union and Cuba: rated 1-M, 1-D. Just as is the case between the U.S. and
S.A., the Soviets needed to support the Cubans as the Cubans were putting boots
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on the ground to secure the MPLA’s hold on the state. Castro and subsequent
Soviet heads of state saw ideological harmony and shared interests as the basis for
their military cooperation in the Angolan theater.
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Figure 3. Core and Semi-Periphery Interactions
Stage four is the Conflict within the Periphery. Here is where the various groups
within the Angolan and the Ethiopian theater are in various stages of conflict and
cooperation with themselves and the states aligned to the core states. To compare
these interactions is to understand each in relation to the other which will ultimately
provide a richer grasp of the larger core conflict.
A. Dergue consolidation: 1974-1978 — rated 5-M, 5-D. During this period there
was strident, bloody conflict as Mengistu and the Dergue worked to eliminate
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opposition to their command of the state. The executions of Lt. General
Aman Michael Andom and General Teferi Banti led to the bloodletting of
1977-1978 which left hundreds of thousands dead.
B. Ethiopian resistance interactions: 1974-1991 — rated 2-M, 3-D. The federation
of Eritrea and the granting of the Ogaden region both in the 1950’s has been a
continual source of strife that exerted itself in the 1974-1991 period.
Immediately after Selassie’s removal the EPRP and Me’ison, who were initial
allies of the Dergue began to have ideological problems supporting the
PMAC. EPRP was victimized during the above mentioned Red Terror and
MEISON was not spared casualties either. Different groups began to rise and
splinter as an expression of Eritrean and Ethiopian resistance to the Dergue.
In 1977 EPLF split from the ELF which was born in 1961 as a reaction to the
federation of Eritrea at the hands of the United Nations in 1950. The TPLF
mobilizes in 1975 on behalf of the Wollo and Gondar regions and come
commentators accuse it of attacking TLF members in their sleep302.
C. Resistance and the Dergue: 1978-199 1 — rated 5-M, 5-D. The history of
conflict in Ethiopia is the history of the Dergue attempting to maximize its
Soviet contact in the hopes of cementing their claim to power. To do this
they waged outright war against the various resistance movements.
D. United States and Somalia: 1977-1978 — rated 2-M, 2-D. During the Ogaden
war the battle lines were starkly drawn. The semi-peripheral actors of
302 Kahsay Berhe and Tesfay Atsbeha “33 years of TPLF and 32 years of Meles Zenawi: Suppression in
the Name of Liberation” http://www.ethioinedia.com/abai/tp1f022308.htrn1 (accessed March 9, 2009).
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Britain, France, Egypt and Saudi Arabia came to the assistance of the Somali
regime and their military claim on the Ogaden region. They were ultimately
unsuccessful but the period of cooperation was marked by diplomatic support
for the Barre regime as well as a shared military pressure as each supported
became involved to pursue their individual regional goals.
E. Soviet Union and the Dergue: 1977 — 1991 — rated 2-M, 1-D. The Ogaden
experience proved that the Soviets and Cubans could use the PMAC to deal a
humiliating defeat to the West. North Koreans and East Germans were fully
engaged in support of Mengistu and this support continued through our test
period.
F. South Africa and Cuba: 1975-199 1 — rated 5-M, 5-D. In the Angolan theater
South Africa fought on behalf of the West and Cuba fought South Africa in
the service of the Soviet bloc. This conflict involved the entire region of
southern Africa and lasted until the dissolution of both the Soviet Union and
apartheid South Africa turned the West’s attention elsewhere.
G. UNITA and MPLA: 1975-199 1 — rated 5-M, 5-D. South African and Cuba
were militarily engaged in the support of the conflict between UNITA and
MPLA as they struggled to take/keep control of the state. UNITA and MPLA
conflict has its roots in the colonial hostility born against the Ovimbundu















H. U.S., South Africa and UNITA: 1975-1991 rated 2-M, 2-D. The U.S.
covertly supported Jonas Savimbi’s efforts through the CIA and military
transfers to South Africa. This support was kept hidden because it was
against the U.S.’s officially stated commitment to end apartheid and
colonialist adventurism.
I. Soviet Union, Cuba and the MPLA: 1975-1991 rated 2-M, 2-D. Soviet
support of Cuba in contrast to U.S. efforts was quite public. From the Alvor
Accords forward the MPLA had expressed ideological harmony with the
Soviet bloc and the Soviets saw their theater as a prime opportunity to
challenge the West. Massive arms transfers as well as diplomatic support in
the service of ideological and strategic goals are the hallmarks of the relations
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Figure 4. Conflict within the Periphery
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Conclusions
Wallerstein’s theory has been a major contributor to understanding global dynamics
and political economies. World system theory has proven interdisciplinary applicability
as cultural anthropology, sociological history and economic history have all used his
frame to make claims about the world. Indeed the very language of development theories
has been affected by the conception of the world as being in a long cycle of dynamic
forces operating between the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds. In similar vein, this work has
looked at Wallerstein and noted that he makes a number of claims which may be applied
to better understand and compare conflict in Angola and Ethiopia within the larger
context of the Cold War.
First Wallerstein notes that a world economy as a system has an operational space that
exceeds national boundaries to include multiple political systems. “What I am arguing
rather is that capitalism as an economic mode is based on the fact that the economic
factors operate within an arena larger than that which any political entity can totally
control.”303 This can be most clearly applied to the comparison of this work. The Cold
War divided the world into spheres of influence. In the quest for ideological adherents
and strategic positioning, Angola and Ethiopia became battlegrounds on the periphery of
the world system.
303 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins ofthe
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 229-233.
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As Wallerstein noted in 2003, “That was the important thing about the Cold War. It
divided up the world into a Soviet zone that was about a third of the world, and the U.S.
zone that was two-thirds. It kept the zones economically separate and allowed them to
shout at each other loudly in order to keep their own side in order, but never to make any
truly substantial changes in the arrangement.”304 The Cold War became the world system
and the case studies of this work became the means by which the U.S. and the Soviets
could avoid outright military confrontation and thus secure a status quo of competition
and proxy based conflict.
Second the world system is able to function and is made more efficient through the
extensive division of labor. In that the system includes multiple political areas, this
division is international in scope. This division of labor portends exploitation in that
benefits are not evenly distributed. “But for the most part, it is a function of the social
organization of work, one which magnifies and legitimizes the ability of some groups
within the system to exploit the labor of others, that is, to receive a larger share of the
surplus.”305
In this comparison labor is analogous to fighting, factory working to soldiering and
farming to shooting. The labor that is occurring is the conflicts both Angola and Ethiopia
engaged in for close to twenty years. The exploitative groups are the decision-makers in
Washington and Moscow who dispatched their emissaries who emboldened and
304 Immanuel Wallerstein, “U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for Hegemony,” Monthly Review Volume
55 Number 3 http://www.mlweview.org/0703wallerstein.htm, (accessed March 11.2009).
305 Wallerstein, Modern World System, 229.
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facilitated the flow of arms. The Cold War became the superstructure that was placed
atop the local conflicts of independence and political change in Angola and Ethiopia.
In this light, the MPLA and the Dergue benefited from control of the state but the
larger beneficiary was the core state which gained strategic value. This benefit was
transmitted through the semi-peripheral actors of Cuba and China for the Soviet side and
South Africa and certain Arab states involved in the politics of the Horn of Africa. From
this notion Wallerstein is able to divide the world system into three areas of stratification.
This work is able to do the same.
Third, the world system is ever expanding for it produces development that the core
can use to extend its influence and affect more peripheral areas. In this comparison the
development Wallerstein refers to entails the widening of the polar sphere of influence of
the core competitors. As financial assistance was provided to the various proxies in both
case studies a certain militarization occurred that created a cycle of dependency. The
more weapons that were transferred to one side, the more weapons that had to be
transferred to the other side. As noted earlier this militarized politics in the service of the
larger world system itself in a state of conflict. As the Cold War ends a new era of U.S.
dominance has begun and with it a new theme of economic organization “. . . what they
called globalization which simply meant opening up all the frontiers, breaking down all
the barriers for: (a) the movement of goods; and more importantly (b) capital; but not (c)
labor.”306
306 Wallerstein, “U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for Hegemony.”
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Fourth, the position of states in the world system is dynamic allowing states to shift
their position in the hierarchy. “Indeed, it may well be that in this kind of system it is not
structurally possible to avoid, over a long period of historical time, a circulation of the
elites in the sense that the particular country that is dominant at a given time tend to be
replaced in this role sooner or later by another country.”307 Cuba and South Africa
present this case most clearly. Both states were at distinct disadvantages with respect to
the core states in terms of military ability and financial strength; both may be accurately
seen as the periphery of the economic world system.
Yet, both Cuba and South Africa were in positions of strength relative to Angolan and
Ethiopian actors and were able to play crucial roles in both case studies. Cuba and South
Africa may then be seen as semi-peripheral actors that served to facilitate the flow of
benefits towards the larger core states in conflict, thus proving the dynamism of the
system. We have seen this as we observed the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union
was indeed a core state in a bipolar world, yet it proved unable to secure this position past
the early 1990s. This has allowed the U.S. to shift from a core state in competition with
another core state to the sole core sitting atop the world system hierarchy.
Fifth, a certain class consciousness is a byproduct of the world system as people begin
to become self-aware and struggle for both self-definition and the articulation of goals
and desires. This world system represents the stratification of states based on the
exploitative flow of benefits and profits towards the center and “such self-consciousness
307 Wallerstein, Modern World System, 230.
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is a function of conflict situation.”308 There are competing interests throughout the
system and the exploitation becomes more rank the further one delves into the periphery.
Marginalized groups will struggle to organize themselves to ease the pressures of their
position. Conflict is a result. This work has seen that the political changes in the mid-
1 970s that both Angola and Ethiopia experienced produced articulate self-aware groups
who for varied reasons sought political power. It is a factor of the Cold War that these
groups matched their self-interest inside the larger interests of the core states in conflict
and became proxies to a world system in flux.
Sixth, the world system which extends beyond multiple state boundaries and through
its inherent exploitation generates conflict as groups who become self aware and
articulate their demands will ultimately reduce the viability of the peripheral state. In
order for the benefits and profits to flow towards the center it is necessary to subjugate
the peripheral state to the goals of the core. This of course creates ill will amongst
peripheral populations. The resulting conflict represents a threat to the viability of the
peripheral state even as the core is strengthened by the very conflict that weakens the
periphery. “It follows then that the world-economy develops a pattern where state
structures are relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak in the
periphery.. . What is necessary is that in some areas the state machinery be far stronger
than in others.”309
The core state is strong because it benefits from the flow of resources and profit and




domestic interests. Groups emerge across the world system hierarchy that operate the
machinery of the state, functioning as managers, decision-makers, diplomats, etc. The
periphery is robbed of the resources that would empower indigenous managers of the
state. To secure those resources is a matter of life and death to peripheral decision-
makers. The domestic groups on the outside of the peripheral managers also have an
existential desire to gain access to the resources and will fight to gain that access. The
decision-makers will fight to exclude them. Then, it is the environment of scarcity,
created by the localized effects of the larger world system that creates conflict, instability
and violence.
We have seen this most plainly in Angola and Ethiopia. “In those states in which the
state machinery is weak, the state managers do not play the role of coordinating a
complex industrial-commercial-agricultural mechanism. Rather they simply become one
set of landlords amidst others, with little claim to legitimate authority over the whole.”31°
When the exploited gain class consciousness, they will fight the managers of the state and
will ask for help to do so. To obtain assistance Angolan and Ethiopian groups appealed
to the various superpowers that were more than willing to pump arms into the region in
the service of their larger goals. This militarization of politics served only to increase the
conflict and thus the peripherization and marginalization of Angola and Ethiopia in the
world system. It could not have been otherwise. As Samuel Decalo noted a politicized
military is “hardly the repository of expertise likely to correct flaws in policy design and
implementation, increase budgetary resources, administrative and supervisory skills and
310 Ibid., 233.
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develop a deeper knowledge of global and domestic forces, all of which are viewed as at
the root of stagnation of African economies.”311
Lastly, Wallerstein uses the terms unequal exchange and capital accumulation to
indicate that the flow of surplus through the semi-periphery leads the core to profit from
the appropriation and transfer of peripheral surplus into the means by which beneficiary
classes manipulate the state to serve their ends. Peripheral countries are structurally
constrained to experience a kind of development that reproduces their subordinate status
and this strength differential is crucial to system maintenance. During the Cold War this
work has shown that the unequal exchange of arms and violence made both Angola and
Ethiopia the theater for conflict which served to accumulate systemic power in the hands
of the bipolar superpowers.
It has been the effort of this work to apply world system theory to a comparison of two
conflicts themselves examples of a broader conflict. The zones of center, semi-periphery
and periphery are conceptualized by Immanuel Wallerstein, Johan Galtung, Samir Amin,
André Gunder Frank and others, as differences in economic production which facilitates
the flow of resources and profit through systems of exploitation. The world system
generates a structural relationship between the core and the periphery where geography
and culture are facilitators of labor intensive work in the periphery and capital intensive
production in the core. There is a “multicultural, territorial division of labor”312 that
grows a power hierarchy around it allowing the wealthy and stronger core states to
311 Samuel Decalo. Coups andArmy Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints (New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1990), 289.
312 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 77.
214
dominate the poorer and weaker periphery. This work has applied a primarily economic
construct to a comparison of political and military conflicts. The three zones are separate,
different, yet unified within themselves and connected one to the other. The periphery
represents open space, opportunity and a source of possible influence, profit and power.
The semi-periphery is a facilitator, the conduit through which the profit flows. The
center is the beneficiary. Political organs in the center serve the ultimate goal of creating
an environment for the corporation to maximize profit.
The Way Forward
Both superpowers in their positions as the center of the bipolarized world interacted
with Angola and Ethiopia on the periphery as proxies to be fed, trained and then turned
loose to eat when hungry as long as their activities served the larger goals of the center.
The West saw itself as protecting the horn and the southern regions of Africa from
Communism. The Soviet bloc saw as its goals to blunt the imposition of the U.S. into
areas vacated by European colonizers after the end of the 1940’s. The injection of arms,
personnel, money transfers and diplomatic privileges while useful to the recipients in
both the conflicts, served the ultimate ends of subjugating the regions to the broader
global conflict. “. . . in other words, protecting countries across the entire world.. .became
indistinguishable from dominating and exploiting them with imperialist techniques.”313
The superpower becomes both patron and liberator while simultaneously acting as the
dominator, subjecting the flesh of the local actors to the larger scheme. The periphery, in
its role as client and recipient of outside support, saw harmony with their localized goals
313 Michael Hardt, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 178.
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of gaining state power and the attendant ability to allocate resources and services to the
favored groups. The proxy in this scheme, like its superpower patron becomes both the
subjugated and the subjugator, the liberated empowered to oppress.
World Systems theory as used in this comparison acknowledges the uneven spread of
wealth across the core, semi-periphery and peripheral elements of the global economic
system. This work readily acknowledges that Wallerstein’s primary concern was to
reflect on the beginnings and maturation of economic ties between developed and
developing states. As such world system theory is primarily an economic statement
revealing the uneven development of capitalism in the international system and is
concerned with imperialism and underdevelopment. World System theory from its
particular vantage point, allows the analyst to focus on the instruments of multilateral
imperialism such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United
Nations and transnational organizations/corporations. These instruments must be seen as
the facilitators of power and profit towards the core.
In Monopoly Capital,314 Baran and Sweezy show that these instruments that have
arisen as capitalism matured after the end of World War II represent a complex series of
exploitative relationships that divide the international system into a stratified structure.
“To put it precisely, those at the apex of such hierarchy exploit, in varying degrees, all
the lower layers and similarly those at any given level exploit those below them until the
314 Paul Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social
Order (New york: Monthly Review Press, 1966), 45.
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lowest layer is reached where none is left to exploit.”315 Conflict, competition,
antagonism and exploitation are the common themes of a global system thus realized. It
has been the goal of this work to locate the Cold War inside this theoretical frame and use
that frame to compare conflict in Angola and Ethiopia.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union robbed the MPLA and
the Dergue of the bargaining leverage they wielded in the bi-polar world. The resulting
ascension of the U.S., as the world’s power broker means that both states now must
operate with dramatically fewer options within the context of globalized capitalism. The
effects of capital, production, distribution, consumption and labor have, and continue to,
intensif~’ as the peripheral state declines in relevance. Globalization and its concomitant
structures have intensified.
Future analysis of the globalization of capitalism must note that peripheral and semi-
peripheral states have reorganized themselves into regional, co-equal trading areas in the
hopes of managing the sheer size and dominance of the U.S. economy. Semi-peripheral
states have attempted to integrate many of their structures toward shared growth. The
European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement are prime examples.
Peripheral states have realigned themselves with the shared goals of development and to
manage the problems of disintegration in the uni-polar world.
The African Union and the Association of South-East Asian Nations for example,
have attempted to avoid the problems that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and
amongst the Soviet satellites. As the periphery reorganizes itself, dominant states, which
315 Rajen Harshe, Twentieth Century Imperialism: Sh~fuing Contours and Changing Conceptions (New
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), 58.
217
have observable economic and military power, have arisen. For example, India and China
have experienced consecutive years of double-digit economic growth and have the largest
populations on Earth. Their population sizes mean that they have vast markets and pools
of labor to explore/exploit. As a consequence, India and Pakistan have even obtained a
“true ticket” to global relevance, the nuclear bomb. In the African context, Nigeria,
Egypt, South Africa and Ethiopia are all states with real power vis-à-vis their neighbors.
Globalization has also given rise to adverse reactions as the U.S. uses its post- Cold
War authority. Globalized capitalism has extended the system of exploitation. Debt,
unemployment, poverty, political instability, declining respect for human rights,
genocide, hunger and violence have become quite unmanageable in fully peripherized
areas, two of which being Angola and Ethiopia. To address these factors which threaten
the very viability of the state as a dominant organizational construct, developing states
were forced to submit to the structural adjustment programs sponsored by developing
states. The economic and political reforms mandated as a pre-condition to receive
development dollars and assistance have in many cases exacerbated both the suffering of
the developing states as well as their exploited positions within the global structure.
The U.S., through its economic size, is a major donor to both the World Bank and the
IMF and has thus earned a fresh opportunity to dominate and exploit the economies and
people of the developing world. However, the Marxist revelation that an ascendant
bourgeoisie must give birth to its antithesis through exploitation and which will
eventually revolt, did not die with the Soviet Union. Etbno-nationalism, religious
fundamentalism, secessionist movements, and armed organizations that attempt to block
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the multinational corporation’s ability to extract raw materials have all been reactions to
the uni-polar world economy.
Just as proxy-based conflict was a dominant feature of the Cold War, group-based
resistance will be a key post-Cold War reality. In the sentiment of Antonio Negri,
resistance has been forgotten and placed at the margins of the imperial totality. “In other
words it has not imagined the uprising of the multitude, the possibility of carrying to the
heart of empire something which is no longer a counter-power, but a resistant variety of
the singularity.”316
The Collapse of the Soviet Union
The Soviet system convulsed in the late 1980s. It proved too rigid to accommodate
the economic fluctuation and collapsed onto itself. The nearly 75 year experiment in
rapid industrialization resulted in a cumbersome and deeply entrenched bureaucracy.
Soviet decision-makers, with their heavy tendency to view the world through a primarily
military lens, grew government structures around themselves dedicated to the
maintenance of domestic power which they could then extend to international hegemony.
This proved sufficient for quite a time yet; the Soviet system was confronted with new
questions in the late 1 980s and early 1 990s that it could not structurally answer.
Modernization, globalization, and the attendant shifts in the international division of
labor revealed a Soviet system that was rigid, inflexible and prone to cracking where it
would not bend. Soviet industrialization produced a civil society that was productive,
advanced, and by the late 1 980s had grown mature enough to demand political and
economic recognition for its efforts. Indeed in its own labor, and itself oriented towards
316 Antonio Negri, Empire and Beyond (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press 2008), 185.
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MarxismlLeninism, began to desire power parity and demand new subjective equities
both financial and political that the system could not accommodate. The Soviet center
was confronted with a series of internal tests and its rigidity doomed itself. “It could not
compete, in other words, precisely where the real power conflicts were being played out,
and it could not face the challenges of the comparative productivity of economic
systems.. .For the Soviet regime, managing the power of the new subj ectivities was a
matter of life and death.”317
Many contemporary scholars credit the end of the Soviet Union to the outside forces
of the arms race initiated by the Reagan administration, the failed invasion of
Afghanistan, or even the costs of space exploration. These factors are all important but
the chief cause must be found within the Soviet apparatus itself. Its civil society, upon
which the state depended, developed a dialectic, independent of the state, based on the
desires for free expression, cultural development and economic growth.
Lenin’s dictatorship of the proletariat had given rise to another economic antithesis
which demanded the reform of the system. The proletariat across the Soviet bloc
demanded economic equity and social rights, higher wages, and increased freedoms from
a system ideologically and structurally unable to cope with this crisis of demand from
“below.” The American bloc was faced with a similar series of questions from its labor;
Yet, while Western economies were able to manipulate their pluralism to advance the
merging of the corporation to the state with an attendant psychological marriage of the
worker to the goals of both the corporation and the government; the Soviet system
317 Hardt, Empire, 277.
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responded by rigidly adhering to the management of its socialist economy, based on
wartime production and had lost the hearts and minds of its workers.
While the Soviet bear was exporting arms and funds to support the revolutions in
Angola and Ethiopia (as well as in other areas) it attempted to ignore the grumblings of
the proletariat within its own stomach. Marx had predicted that the internal contradictions
of capitalism would turn itself onto itself. Might he have also predicted that the Soviet
system would face its own series of internal contradictions housed in a Communist war
economy predicated on a rigid bureaucracy that stifles its own responses to the growing
cacophony of dissent within its own ranks? Repression and inflexibility caused the bear
to collapse. The U.S. was left as the sole superpower. The Dergue in Ethiopia and the
MPLA in Angola was left without a patron. The uni-polar world began to develop.
United States uni-polarity.
Left alone as the victor of the Cold War, the U.S. began to shift the nature of its
domination. Imperial activity began to be seen as the power to police the world. Where
imperial states are to naturally be shunned and resisted, the new American role as police
state is requested as a moral duty. International rule of law, most readily recognized in
the U.N., the World Bank, the International Court of Justice, the International Monetary
Fund along with humanitarian NGOs, now must merely justify and ask the U.S. to act as
the only state with the ability can. The “frogs in the international pond” had finally called
upon “King Stork”: “the U.S. is the peace police, but only in the final instance, when the
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supranational organizations of peace call for an organized activity and an articulated
complex ofjuridical and organizational activities.”3 18
Through chiefly Western organizations, the international community began to
articulate that the new role of the U.S. was to shoulder the burden that a sole hegemon
must; to provide order and stability to the international system through its military girth
and its economic might. U.S. decision-makers accepted all the while grumbling to its
domestic constituencies its desire to not police the world. The ten years immediately after
the collapse of the Soviet system provide widely known examples that need not be
elaborated here. The “frogs” asked “King Stork” to check an expansionist Saddam
Hussein in 1990, to intervene in Somalia in 1993, to manipulate the forces clashing in the
poverty stricken Haiti in 1994, and to regulate the warring ethnicities in Bosnia and
Serbia in 1999. The U.S. became the central authority; a transnational actor upon who
requests bring international law to chaotic portions of the world.
It is a difficult task to predict what the future of globalization has for the former Cold
War proxies. Many factors must be considered. First domestic decision makers in both
Angola and Ethiopia are indeed as structurally dependant on their positions as their states
are structurally dependant on the global economy. The ability to allocate is a precious
commodity itself, one that will not be conceded yet also a power that marginalized
groups will attempt to obtain. Conflict must inevitably continue. A way out of this
quagmire could be made if the African leadership class realizes that their position could
be secured if they increased the flow of resources, technology and capital to the people
318 Ibid., 181.
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upon whose labor they depend. This would grow capitalist development in a sustainable
way, decreasing the suffering of the poor and thus decreasing the conflict.
Second, labor must attempt find a means by which existing patterns of exploitation
and production can be redirected towards the many away from the few. There is a history
that both states can draw from. In Angola, the rhetoric of socialist revolution was based
on a revolutionary struggle waged with outside support against domestic groups who also
had outside assistance. The MPLA developed through the fire of its conflict to a top
down form of Marxism-Leninism. It is up to the dispossessed to address the serious
contradictions of a globalized system that directs production and distribution outwardly,
leaving the suppliers of labor and raw materials destitute. In Ethiopia, the Dergue
attempted to embrace socialist ideology without having gone through a revolutionary
struggle against colonialism in the fashion that Angola and other states did. This means
that the leadership that once consolidated and maintained its rule though bloodshed was
thereby quite reactionary, rather than being revolutionary, in its effort to quell dissent and
direct state based resources. For the Ethiopian masses, social transformation must also
include the ability to affect the distribution of resources and increased political power.
Third, the defeat of the Soviets has meant a global system directed towards the
increased capitalization and profit for the West. It is difficult to imagine anything beyond
increased conflict in peripheral areas based on the flow of systemic benefits away from
the dispossessed groups. The obvious contradiction is that conflict is based on
marginalized groups suffering and motivated to change their position. Their position is
predicated on the decision-making African elites spurring ethnic pride and animosity in
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the service of the position of the elite who itself is subjugated to the global system. In the
words of Claude Ake:
“The bourgeoisie is constantly reminded of the potential danger of the
contradiction by occasional outbursts of violence, crimes against property,
workers’ militancy and the subversion by workers and peasants of some
‘development’ policies. The assertiveness and starkness of the contradictions in
production relations is such that the ruling class is increasingly preoccupied with
coming to terms with it.”319
Fourth is the very meaning and viability of the state itself as the dominant
organizational unit. With such conflict inevitably on the horizon, the character of the
state, prospects for democratization and pluralism and the ability to allocate goods and
services to a majority of the population will certainly be key issues. Angola is amongst
the world’s poorest states and the Horn of Africa is amongst Africa’s most unstable.
These problems are systemic, a function of state frailty and as this work has shown, are a
byproduct of their peripherization to the world system. The agents of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund have replaced the African military advisors. Instead
of the Cold War bi-polarization of the world system, now Angolan and Ethiopian
decision-makers have to adjust to the market forces of globalized capital that has
rendered their economies vulnerable to outside forces.
Instead of vanishing into oblivion at the dissolution of the Cold War, African states
are more subject to transnational actors which have weakened their bargaining power
with negotiations centered on structural adjustment programs and debt management. The
state cannot provide for the majority of its citizens and is thus faced with an existential
crisis of legitimacy. Domestic instability based on scarcity issues, combined with the
319 Claude Ake, A Political Economy ofAfrica (United Kingdom: Longman Press, 1982), 186.
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current global economic crisis, may force a realization. It appears that the economic
history of the twentieth century has marginalized the centrality of the state to domestic
and international economic stability has been misread. A free market in freefall could
move a new world system in the new millennium to come back to the centrality of the
state in economic management, regulation of corporations and banks and the coordinators
of trade and development.
African states in general and Angola and Ethiopia in particular have daunting
challenges ahead and this work does not portend to offer a prescription for such
challenges. The goal here has been to analyze and compare a period of development and
conflict in both states. The world has seen that the larger world system, itself in a state of
conflict had inevitable consequences for both states even as Angolan and Ethiopian actors
were self-interested in seeking outside assistance. The experiences of this recent past can
offer a world of caution to both states going forward.
Just as the Aesop’s frogs in the pond looked for outside assistance to make their lives
better and were ultimately mistaken for they were eaten by King Stork, perhaps the
African frogs in the continental pond would do well to look inward as they negotiate with
international actors. Regional and continental integration have been re-launched as an
ideal.32° Domestic social transformation must be the goal in order for regional integration
to succeed; it must be evolutionary and seen as a continuation of a cultural development
cycle that is centuries in the making.
320 Jason McLure “United States of Africa” http://www.newsweek.com/jdJ17 1588 (accessed on March
12, 2009). Jean Ping, Chairman of the African Union Commission in a December interview with
Newsweek Magazine has acknowledged that alone African economies, even the larger states like Nigeria
and South Africa are too small to be effective.
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Furthermore, evolutionary transformation of former Cold War proxies must begin
with the national interest being culturally linked with ethnic and deep personal identity.
So conceived, the national interest will allow the state to define values which arise from
its version of history and the importance of its cultural understanding. The cement that
holds this national interest together must be food, electricity and clean streets. This is to
say only through the successful transmission of goods and services to the majority of
people can the national identity be redefined.
Personal identity develops from the process of political socialization and therefore
engenders a sense of community based on shared ideals, inspirations and aspirations.
Blind jingoism leads to a rabid nationalism that is ultimately self-destructive. Instead, the
effort must be made to psychologically attach the group to the state. A rational
nationalism where individual welfare is linked to the welfare of the ethnic or religious
group ultimately benefits the state. The governmental effort must be to identify human
rights within the state and to generate a positive, shared sense of circumstance and fate.
When Marcus Garvey said, “one God, one aim, one destiny,” he spoke of the
development of such an ethic.
The last two centuries of world history have shown the connection between the
international struggle of marginalized groups to articulate self-determinism based on
making the state live up to its responsibility of respecting and protecting core human
rights. One line of development may be seen in the related struggles from South Africa to
India, to Ghana, to the U.S. to the U.N. Mahatma Gandhi’s legal experiences in South
Africa in the late 1880’s through 1914, gave him first-hand contact with a popular
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struggle for even the most basic human rights. Indigenous South Africans were
militating to redress their grievances with the state. Gandhi began advocating for the
rights of Indians in South Africa32’ drawing inspiration from the larger conflict at work.
“Even the half-castes and the Kaffirs, who are less advanced than we, have resisted the
government. The pass law applies to them as well but they do not take out passes.”322
This sentiment helped give rise to Gandhi’s work on behalf of Indian independence
and nationalism. The Indian example was a watershed moment, an inspirational example
for people of color struggling against Western colonialism. In a particular example, the
United Gold Coast Convention was formed in 1947, the same year that India celebrated
its independence. The UGCC morphed into the Convention People’s Party with Kwame
Nkrumah at the head in 1949. Ghana’s independence in 1957, like the Indian
achievement ten years earlier, signaled that human rights in-the-face of often violent
opposition was indeed possible.
Gandhi’s non-violence and Nkrumah’s success informed the activism of Martin
Luther King Jr. during the U.S. civil rights movement. King travelled both to India and
Ghana to witness the global movement and to refine his own philosophy and movement
tactics. The impact and importance of King is well known and widely accepted. King’s
legacy of human rights’ advocacy and his ultimate sacrifice has inspired generations of
activists across the world. A particular example is the South African struggle against
321 E.S. Reddy “India and the Anglo-Boer War” http://www.rnkgandhi.org/articles/boerwar.htin
(accessed March 12, 2009). Often Gandhi based his advocacy of Indian rights in opposition to and to the
exclusion of indigenous South Africans. One example is the letters he wrote in the attempt to convince
Indians in South Africa that they should fight alongside the British against the Zulu in the 1906 Bambatha
Rebellion.
322 Mahatma Gandhi, The Collected Works ofGandhi, Volume 5
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apartheid in the 1970’s through the early 1990’s. Anti-apartheid leaders such as Albert
Lutuli and Archbishop Desmond Tutu both draw from King’s work in their own activist
work.
We are thus able to link the Zulu struggle in South Africa to Gandhi’s work in India
and further link Nkrumah’s gain of Ghanaian independence to King’s practices in the
U.S. These are all subsequently linked to the anti-apartheid movement in the persons of
Mandela, Lutuli and Tutu. This linking shows that human rights are a necessary,
evolutionary element of human society that can transform social relationships. Both
Angola and Ethiopia can benefit from this linking. Like a virus, the desire for human
rights in the boom of the exploited can be transmitted across national boundaries just as
World System theory sees the transmission of systemic benefits across national
boundaries.
As we move through this uni-polar, post Cold War world and as Africa struggles to
develop in such an atmosphere, it makes sense for marginalized people, specifically in
the former Cold War proxy regions, to develop their relationships with the state with the
transmission of human rights foremost in mind. New concepts of state management must
arise as a logical and cultural by-product of the individual people as the group identifies
its stability with the stability of the state and its position within the world system.
This work has earlier stated that it is difficult to see beyond a continuation of conflict
as groups continue to vie for the distributive power of the state. However a way forward
must replace the Hobbesian savage and brutal self-interest of group conflict with a new
social contract between African people and their leadership. Developing people in the
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post- Cold War world must seek a new paradigm. The city, the town, and the farm are
laboratories and the people of each must conceptualize a new relationship with decision-
makers in the often far-off capitals. The globalization of capitalism is itself in a state of
flux which is working to transform the developing world yet again and there is an
opportunity here. The “ghettos of social subjects and proletarians are formed into
situations of international flexibility and [by the] mobility of exploitation”323 convulsed
with post-Cold War tensions, resource conflicts, and uni-polar imperialist designs. Yet,
as history has repeatedly proven, exploitation produces resistance and resistance births
hope, opportunity, and transformation. The self-determination of the Zulu in the early
1900s, Gandhi in the 1940s, Nkrurnah and King in the 1950s and 1960s with Mandela,
Lutuli and Tutu in the 1 970s and 1 980s all prove the transformative effects of resistance
in their respective societies.
This evolutionary transformation must combine the desires of the exploited in all their
varied walks of life and generate a distinctly unique paradigmatic way forward through
the new millennium. Voice must be given to the intellectual and the unemployed alike.
The values of the worker and the homeless need be combined into a distinct articulation
of human rights which matures the productive capacity of the exploited, while reducing
the rational of the exploiter, both domestic and abroad. Even as the Cold War has passed
into this reinvigorated globalization of capital, the wretched of the earth still perform key
and vital systemic functions.
In order for a resource to be globalized it must be locally extracted. In order for profit
to be transnationalized it must first be generated from the ground. Therefore even as one
323 Negri, Empire and Beyond, 150.
229
acknowledges the preponderance of power of the developed economies one must also
acknowledge the importance of the tillers of the cocoa bean and the miners of ore. “The
fact is that global movement can only be constructed if it passes continually through the
local, through those small and continuous revolutions which constitute the gap that each
of us experiences between domination and the experience of creation.”324 There is a
natural power in the hands of labor that properly expressed can transform societies from
the cesspools of hunger, despair and nihilism through the deconstruction of exploitation
into a newly articulated link between human rights, the national interest and mutually
beneficial development.
The Cold War was once thought to be a permanent feature of international
organization and African polities were thought to be timeless chaff for the core. Yet, this
proved to be merely an episodic transition in an ever-shifting continuum. Even the
current state of affairs, which causes suffering in the two states compared in this work,
may yet also pass. Human nature is creative, complex and restless like the stream that
flows over, and makes smooth, the rock. African states have long histories with the
militarization of politics and this work has shown Angola and Ethiopia as examples of
this. Moving forward, African leadership will inevitably arise in both states, and across
Africa, which will give birth to a new form of militant identification of human rights and
sustainable development through good governance and identification with the state. The
324 Ibid., 156
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Soviet King Log has been removed and the American King Stork has to renegotiate325 for
the African frogs are beginning to look within.
325 Scott Knuteson “U.S. Air Forces Africa commander talks AFRICOM, upcoming symposium”
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123 139231 (accessed March 12, 2009) and Lance D. Davis
“AFRICOM cdr: Army’s diversity example for partner nations” http://www.ai-my.mil/
news/2009/03/04/ 1 7763-africorn-cdr--armys-diversity-example-for-partner-nations/ (accessed March 12,
2009). Knuteson and Davis both site the African Command as examples of United States decision-makers
renegotiating relations with African states.
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